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ABSTRACT 
 
The actions of governments are instrumental in economic development, and an 
important lever of policy is fiscal policy. Taxation and spending cannot only promote 
economic development but inhibit progress and retard the process, and nowhere is this 
most evident than in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which is the focus of this study. 
Promoting economic development therefore requires that policies that inhibit the 
process are identified and addressed. In this light, this thesis investigates two common 
features of fiscal policy in developing countries that may slow down economic 
development: the first is that government consumption is pro-cyclical even though 
increasing (reducing) spending in response to increases (decreases) in income worsens 
income fluctuations. The second feature is that the budget deficit (budget balance) 
increases (decreases) in response to aid inflows. 
 
We address the issue of pro-cyclical government consumption in two stages: in the 
first stage a coefficient of cyclicality of government consumption is obtained for each 
of the sample countries using an improved (equilibrium-correction) specification. 
Variation in these coefficients across countries is then explained within a cross-section 
specification in the second stage. We conclude that credit constraint and political 
distortion are significant determinants of pro-cyclical government consumption. 
However, they are not the underlying reason why pro-cyclicality of government 
consumption increases with income uncertainty as existing explanation has it. Rather, 
the latter is the result of actions taken by the government to remain solvent in 
economic downturns.  
 
iii 
 
We investigate the aid-budget deficit relationship in three parts: the first part re-visits 
the past evidence, using more recent data, improved methods and a sample consisting 
of only SSA countries. We find that, consistent with past evidence, countries with 
larger budget deficits receive more aid and aid induces larger deficits. However, the 
effect of aid on the budget deficit has improved in recent times. This suggests that, 
contrary to existing explanation, giving more aid to countries with larger budget 
deficits is not the reason why aid induces larger deficits. Rather, we show in the 
second part that there is a divergence in the cross-section and within-country (year-to-
year) dimensions of aid determination and the effect of aid depends on the latter:  aid 
induces smaller deficits in countries where decreases in the budget deficit are 
associated with increased inflows of aid over time.     
 
Finally, we use a new approach to vector equilibrium-correction models (VECMs) to 
investigate the relationship between aid inflows and the fiscal aggregates that underlie 
the contrasting aid-budget deficit relationship across countries; we use Ghana  (where 
the relationship is negative)  and Zambia (where it is positive) as case studies. We 
conclude that aid induces lower deficits when year-to-year disbursements are 
conditioned on decreases in total expenditure and domestic borrowing. Even though 
aid inflows attracted by increased expenditure may still induce lower deficits, the 
magnitude of the decrease in expenditure is over-whelmed by the initial increase that 
attracted aid in the first place.  We therefore conclude that to induce substantial deficit 
reductions, aid should be conditioned on decreased expenditure and domestic 
borrowing, or better still on reduced deficits. Thus, budget conditions are effective 
when enforced.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty is a major problem in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the eradication of which 
requires both rapid and sustainable growth. However, growth among countries in the 
region has been persistently dismal. Given their rich natural resource endowment, a 
likely explanation for the poor growth is macroeconomic mismanagement (including 
corruption and weak policies). Therefore, the answer to the growth problem would 
depend to a large extent on the causes of macroeconomic mismanagement in the 
region; commonly identified causes include income volatility (or fluctuations), high 
opportunity cost of development effort and unsustainable debt levels. We explain these 
factors in what follows.  
 
Several economies in SSA depend on undiversified traditional export commodities for 
their foreign exchange earnings. The traditional export commodities consist mainly of 
agricultural products and natural resources (including minerals). Meanwhile, 
agriculture is highly dependent on weather conditions that are not certain and returns 
from the export of natural resources depend on the global market conditions that are 
usually exogenous to the exporters. This exposes SSA economies to risks as 
unexpected shocks to the limited export bundle results in high income volatility (or 
fluctuations) and uncertainty for that matter. Uncertainty about the future complicates 
economic planning, contributing to poor economic growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1994). 
One reason for this is that policies that are useful in one economic state may become 
defective in another. For instance, it may be prudent for governments to abstain from 
 2 
 
long-term investment when revenue is uncertain resulting in poor economic growth. 
Also, income volatility is indicative of vulnerability of a country to shocks and would 
therefore lead to limited inflows of private capital. Therefore, using government policy 
as an instrument for achieving economic stability (or smoothing income) is a necessary 
platform for effective macroeconomic management. 
 
Another factor that complicates macroeconomic management in developing countries 
in general is the opportunity cost of development effoUWWKLVµFRVW¶UHIHUVWRWKHZHDOWK
DQGµSXEOLFIDYRXU¶IRUIHLWHGE\HFRQRPLFSODQQHUVZKHQLPSOHPHQWLQJHIIHFWLYH and 
efficient development policies, and is associated with corruption and political 
distortion (i.e. public pressure to spend). Thus, rather than pursuing effective and 
efficient policies, corrupt governments focus on policies that create the opportunity for 
amassing wealth. They also find it beneficial to please voters in order to remain in 
office. For instance, governments may linger over removal of producer subsidies even 
when it is not efficient simply because it can result in the loss of election votes in 
democracies. These µFRVWV¶DUH high where monitoring and enforcement institutions are 
weak since governments are often not held accountable for their actions. Enforcement 
institutions are therefore essential for ensuring that macroeconomic management is 
effective. 
 
Also, unsustainable debt levels complicate macroeconomic management. This is 
because they raise the fear of defaulting on debt repayments and limit access to 
international financial markets. The result is an over-reliance on domestic borrowing. 
,QFUHDVHGGRPHVWLFERUURZLQJE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWPD\UHVXOWLQWKHµFURZGLQJ-RXW¶RI
private investment, slowing down economic growth. Also, high levels of domestic 
 3 
 
borrowing may result in so-FDOOHGµILVFDOGRPLQDQFH¶ZKHUHE\ WKHIRFXVRIPRQHWDU\
policy on price stability is distracted by increased borrowing by the government. High 
debt levels are also associated with large unproductive spending on interest payments. 
Therefore, policies that ensure that domestic borrowing is reduced and debt levels in 
general are sustainable would facilitate macroeconomic management by restoring the 
credibility of governments, enhancing access to international financial markets and 
encouraging private investment. 
  
In the current context, therefore, what we PD\ WHUPµRSWLPDOSROLFLHV¶are those that 
place emphasis on economic stability, enforcement institutions or mechanisms, and 
debt sustainability. Empirical evidence however reveals two sub-optimal fiscal policy 
actions that are common in developing countries in general. The first is that, 
inconsistent with the income stabilization required for effective macroeconomic 
PDQDJHPHQW ILVFDO SROLF\ LV µSUR-cyclicaO¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW JRYHUQPHQW VSHQGLQJ
increases in good times (when income is high) and decreases in bad times (when 
income is low). By creating higher income in good times and contracting income 
further in bad times, pro-cyclical fiscal policy exacerbates income volatility. Even 
more challenging is that empirical evidence shows that income volatility also induces 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). There is therefore a vicious 
cycle that needs to be broken, especially in highly volatile countries. This requires a 
good understanding of the relationship between income volatility and pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy, an issue that is addressed in the present study.                
 
Foreign assistance for the macroeconomic management problem, and poverty 
reduction for that matter, in developing countries has been in the form of foreign aid 
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donations from international organisations and donor countries. The second sub-
optimal fiscal policy action is regarding the response to aid inflows. The main 
objective for aid disbursement is to promote rapid growth by relaxing the financing 
constraints faced by governments in the recipient countries. It follows then that, 
primarily, aid disbursement is motivated by need.  To promote the efficacy of aid, 
donors and recipient governments often agree on a development itinerary, which 
recognizes the aforementioned causes of macroeconomic mismanagement, before aid 
is disbursed. However, empirical evidence shows that aid inflows induce larger budget 
deficits in recipient countries, typically because more aid is given to recipients with 
larger deficits, reducing the incentive to avoid deficits (Svensson, 1995). Persistent 
increases in the budget deficit may complicate economic planning through increased 
debt levels and reduced private investment (where domestic borrowing is a 
predominant source of deficit financing). If the increases in the budget deficit are the 
UHVXOW RI WKH KLJK µRSSRUWXQLW\ FRVW¶ RI FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK DJUHHG WDUJHWV DV LV RIWHQ
believed, then monitoring and enforcement mechanisms would be of great importance. 
The most common enforcement mechanism suggested in the aid literature is the use of 
aid conditionality, whereby aid disbursement is conditioned on µJRRG¶ SHUIRUPDQFH. 
The logic is that, in order to receive more aid, recipient governments would exert more 
effort to improve economic performance. However, given that poor economic 
performance may be associated with inadequate resources rather than macroeconomic 
mismanagement, the controversy with this type of aid conditionality is that it may 
direct less aid towards countries that need it most, undermining the fundamental reason 
for disbursement. Therefore, it is important to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
relationship between aid disbursement and the relevant policy for effective 
recommendations. In the current context, where the focus is on fiscal stability, aid 
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conditionality refers to the attachment of budget conditions (including reduced 
deficits) to aid disbursement and therefore knowledge of the relationship between aid 
LQIORZVDQGWKHUHFLSLHQW¶VEXGJHWZRXOGEHXVHIXO 
 
The conceptual framework underlying the aid-fiscal response analysis is as follows: 
donors disburse aid with the primary aim of financing government expenditure, either 
directly if delivered through the budget or indirectly through projects. Conditions may 
be attached to guide the sector allocation of aid or to influence policy. Since aid to the 
government is included in expenditure, it is obvious that expenditure increases with 
aid. It is noteworthy, however, that conditions may influence other fiscal aggregates, 
including tax revenue, and cause them to respond to aid. The literature on taxation and 
several fiscal response studies however find the relationship between tax revenues and 
aid to be inconclusive. 
 
Two different measures of the budget deficit used in aid-fiscal response studies are that 
which excludes aid and that which includes aid. As with government expenditure, the 
µH[FOXGLQJDLG¶EXGJHWGHILFLWLVH[SHFWHGWRincrease with aid (since aid is included in 
expenditure but not revenue). Thus, the various relationships between aid and the 
EXGJHWGHILFLWWRFRQVLGHUZKHQXVLQJWKHµH[FOXGLQJDLG¶PHDVXUHRIWKHODWWHUDUHL
budget deficit as a function of aid; (ii) change in budget deficit as a function of change 
in aid, and (iii) aid at a function of past deficit. The coefficients on the first two are 
hypothesized to be negative; the second may however vary under some circumstances; 
for instance, the IMF expected total expenditure in Zambia to decrease with aid ± 
through a decrease in current expenditure even though capital expenditure was 
H[SHFWHG WR LQFUHDVH &RUGHOOD DQG 'HOO¶$UULFLD  $OVR WKH JRYHUQPHQW PD\
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increase expenditure (from their own resources) by less when there are aid projects. 
The coefficient on budget balance in the third relationship (which captures aid 
conditions with respect to the budget deficit) is inconclusive; not all donors condition 
disbursement on the budget deficit and not many recipients conform.  
 
7KH µH[FOXGLQJ DLG¶ PHDVXUH RI WKH EXGJHW GHILFLW LV ILQDQFHG E\ DLG GRPHVWLF
borrowing (government bonds and central bank), and foreign borrowing. Therefore, 
since we are interested in the implication of the budget balance on domestic borrowing 
DQG GHEW VXVWDLQDELOLW\ ZH XVH WKH µLQFOXGLQJ DLG¶ PHDVXUH 7KXV DOO WKUHH
DIRUHPHQWLRQHGUHODWLRQVKLSVDUHUHFDVWZLWKWKHµLQFOXGLQJDLG¶PHDVXUHRIWKHEXGJHW
deficit. In this instance, however, the sign of the coefficient on all three relationships 
are inconclusive because aid is included in both revenue and expenditure, removing 
the direct link from aid to the budget deficit.  In our empirical analysis, we specify the 
third relationship as aid as a function of contemporaneous budget deficit (including 
aid) and is only indicative of aid conditionality. The justification is that, while 
punishment of default is a means of enforcement, aid conditionality guides the use of 
aid. Therefore, since the donor-recipient relationship is a repetitive game, we expect 
the correlation between aid and the budget balance to reflect the extent of enforcement. 
7KLVDSSURDFKLVXVHGEHFDXVHLQSUDFWLFH WKHUHVSRQVHRIDLGWR WKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶V
budget deficit, as a measure of aid conditionality, has got its own limitations: for 
instance, the period between default and punishment for default may be longer or 
shorter than a year (i.e. varies with donors, recipients, and time). Even though many 
donors, with the exception of the IMF, do not typically identify the budget deficit 
GXULQJGLVEXUVHPHQWVRPHGHOLYHUDLGWRUHFLSLHQWVWKDWDUHLQWKHµJRRGERRNV¶RIWKH
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IMF, and our focus is on the extent to which total aid reflects this behaviour and the 
implication for fiscal behaviour.   
The ultimate objective of the present study is to examine and explain why fiscal policy 
(with respect to the income cycle) is pro-cyclical, with the extent of pro-cyclicality 
increasing with income volatility, and why the budget deficit increases with aid 
inflows.  This is addressed using a sample of 37 sub-Saharan African countries 
between 1960 and 2004. The outline of the thesis is as follows: in chapter 2, we 
estimate coefficients of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality for all the sample countries and 
explain their variation across countries. We focus on the effect of income fluctuations 
on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. To the best of our knowledge, this has never been 
addressed for SSA countries. Novel in our approach is that the cyclicality coefficients 
are estimated within a stationary specification. In Chapter 3, we re-examine past 
evidence on the aid-budget balance relationship. In chapter 4, we give a new 
explanation for the observed effect of aid on the budget balance. In chapter 5, we 
investigate the donor and recipient government actions (in terms of the relationship 
between aid inflows and the fiscal aggregates of the recipients) that are responsible for 
the different aid-budget balance relationship across countries. We coin our research 
questions into testable hypothesis within the VAR framework. We then use a new 
approach to VAR estimations suggested by Juselius (2009). Finally, the main results 
and policy implications are summarized in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRO-CYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 Background and literature review 
The emergence of the new endogenous growth theory has generated interest among 
economists in the importance of business cycle volatility to economic growth. Even 
though the welfare cost of business cycle volatility might have been underestimated in 
the past (Lucas, 1987), the table has turned due to a growing literature on the negative 
effect of volatility on economic growth (Badinger, 2008; Barlevy, 2004; Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995). Considering that macroeconomic policies affect fluctuations in the 
business cycle (Badinger, 2008), an obvious question is why some governments, 
especially in developing countries, pursue policies that exacerbate the cycle, such as 
procyclical fiscal policy whereby public expenditure responds positively to a 
percentage change in GDP.  
 
In both Keynesian and neoclassical worlds, pro-cyclical fiscal policy is shown to 
worsen volatility of the business cycle (Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008). Nonetheless, Gavin 
and Perotti (1997) found fiscal policy in Latin America to be pro-cyclical. An influx of 
literature in this area consistently made similar conclusions about fiscal policy in most 
developing countries in different parts of the world, rendering it a conventional 
wisdom (Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005; Ilzetzki, 2007; Ilzetzki 
and Vegh, 2008; Badinger, 2008; Catao and Sutton, 2002; Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
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Vegh, 2004, Mendoza and Oviedo, 2006). This poses a puzzle to economists in this 
area. 
 
Based on several theories, many explanations for the conduction of procyclical fiscal 
policy in developing countries have been proposed which  Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) 
categorise broadly into credit constraint rationale (whereby imperfect access to 
international credit markets prevents developing countries from borrowing in bad 
times) and imperfections in the political economy (which provoke high spending and 
rent-seeking in good times). Thus, pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is driven by reactions 
to both economic downturn and upturn. During periods of economic downturn, 
governments of developing countries find it difficult to access credit due to a high risk 
of default. Therefore public expenditure falls during economic downturns. On the 
other hand, during economic upturn, public representatives of different social groups 
pursue different policies which escalate aggregate spending (Woo, 2005). Moreover, 
due to information asymmetry, households prevent corrupt governments from rent 
accumulation by demanding high fiscal spending during economic booms (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 2005 and 2007; Talvi and Vegh, 2000).   
    
 In spite of the aforementioned explanations, the phenomenon of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy still remains enigmatic because such explanations do not fully account for the 
observed magnitude of procyclicality and a few are actually conflicting. For instance, 
whiles Alesina and Tabellini (2005) find pro-cyclicality to be worse in developing 
countries with relatively high levels of corruption and democracy, Thornton (2008) 
finds the opposite to be true. Even more, Thornton (2008) finds fiscal policy to be 
more pro-cyclical in countries where income inequality is less profound - in sharp 
 10 
 
contrast with Woo (2005) results. The former is ascribed to the countercyclical nature 
of welfare expenditure during economic downturns, and is also in accordance with the 
literature which explains that high level of income inequality enhances automatic fiscal 
stabilizers by suppressing government spending on social programs (Fatas and Mihov, 
2001; Pestieau, 2006), whereas the latter argues that increased resources associated 
with economic upturns provide incentive for representative policymakers of diverse 
income groups to pursue different preferences which may not be optimal on 
aggregrate. The contrasting results between Thornton (2008) and the related studies 
may be ascribed to different factors: Firstly, Thornton uses a sample of only sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries while the others use samples of cross-continent 
countries. Secondly, in order to obtain longer series, Thornton (2008) combines data 
from different sources. However, African data obtained from different sources are 
often inconsistent and may therefore yield misleading results when combined. Thirdly, 
the empirical specifications used for estimating the coefficients of fiscal policy pro-
cyclicality are different across studies. Given that the fundamental reason for the 
estimation and explanation of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality is its exacerbating effect on 
the volatility of the business cycle,1 and that stabilizing business cycle fluctuations is a 
pressing issue in SSA, the first objective of the study is to re-examine Thornton (2008) 
using single-source data series and improved empirical specification to estimate the 
coefficients of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality. We then investigate how this affects 
existing results on determinants of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality.  
 
                                                 
1
 Studies that have established the exacerbating effect of procyclical fiscal policy on the volatility of the 
business cycle include Badinger (2008), Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh 
(2004), Talvi and Vegh (2000). 
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There is also evidence that volatile business cycles also cause pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
(Lane, 2003; Talvi and Vegh, 2000) ± a related evidence is that the exogeneity of fiscal 
policy cyclicality in the determination of output volatility is strongly rejected 
(Badinger, 2008). Although this suggests the existence of a vicious cycle between 
income volatility and pro-cyclical fiscal policy which needs to be broken, it is not 
addressed in Thornton (2008) study on SSA. Existing empirical evidence on the effect 
of income volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy are based on samples of 
cross-continent countries. This may not reflect the situation in SSA. Therefore, as a 
contribution to the literature, the second objective of the study is to re-examine the 
effect of income volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy only in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using a sample of only sub-Saharan African countries is relevant for our 
purpose because fiscal policy is shown to be predominantly pro-cyclical in the region 
(Thornton, 2008). Moreover, economies are relatively volatile in the sub-region of 
Africa because of undiversified sources of income. 
 
Also of interest is the explanation for the effect of output volatility on the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy. Again, the standard (existing) explanation is the 
aforementioned credit constraint and political distortion arguments; the implication is 
that when credit is made available in bad times and institutions are put in place to 
safeguard against political pressure to spend in good times, income volatility would 
not affect pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy.2 In contrast, however, the present study 
argues that the effect of output volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is the 
result of optimal solvency behaviour of governments facing imperfect risk sharing 
(associated with heavy reliance on non-state-contingent bonds). To be specific, 
                                                 
2
 See Talvi and Vegh (2000). 
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economic fluctuations have adverse effect on the volatility of public revenues 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2004), yet low income governments rely heavily on non-
state contingent domestic bonds which require (high) interest payments on outstanding 
bonds to be maintained even in bad times (implying imperfect risk sharing between the 
government and the households). Therefore, fiscal authorities find it prudent to set 
lower absolute debt limits (which applies even during good times) in order to remain 
solvent at all times, including bad times (Mendoza and Oviedo, 2006). Among 
countries with similar average revenue, the expected minimum revenue (in bad times) 
is lower in those faced with higher income volatility. The debt ceiling is therefore 
lower (and is maintained at all times) when income volatility is high. Lower minimum 
revenue combined with lower debt ceiling amounts to lower consumption, implying 
that income volatility leads to lower consumption in bad times. On the other hand, the 
expected maximum revenue (in good times) among countries with similar average 
revenue is higher where income volatility is high, leading to higher consumption in 
good times.3 Therefore, as a result of optimal solvency behaviour, fiscal policy is more 
pro-cyclical in countries with higher income volatility when there is imperfect risk 
sharing (associated with non-state contingent bonds).  
 
It is important to note that contrasting the political distortion and credit constraint 
explanations does not suggest that they would not cause fiscal policy to be less pro-
cyclical. Instead, we mean that they do not explain the effect of income volatility in 
particular on pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the sample countries. As a matter of fact, in 
most developing countries, increased savings in good times actually refers to lower 
                                                 
3
 The implicit assumption here is that developing countries are unable to run budget surpluses in good 
times. This is not farfetched because of relatively lower tax capacities and higher spending demands in 
such countries. 
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deficits (rather than surpluses) which leaves little room for subsidised spending in bad 
times. Also, making credit available in bad times would not prevent governments 
facing highly volatile incomes from behaving in a manner that would keep them 
solvent in bad times.  
    
The analysis is carried out in two stages. Firstly, we estimate the fiscal policy 
cyclicality coefficient for each of the SSA countries using time series data over the 
period 1960 to 2004; the sample comprises the same 37 countries in Thornton (2008). 
Secondly, cross-country regression is used to explain the variation of the fiscal policy 
cyclicality coefficient across countries. To allow for possible endogeneity bias in the 
results, the second stage is re-estimated using instrumental variable method but this 
does not affect the pattern of the results. With the exception of Central African 
Republic, the Gambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe, all the countries in the sample pursue a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy. The results also support the optimal solvency rationale 
argued by the present study: that is, pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy increases with 
income volatility; when plotted, the budget-deficit to GDP ratio appears to be lower in 
countries with higher income volatility;  graphical analysis shows that in countries 
with higher income volatility, there are smaller increases (or larger decreases) in the 
budget deficit to GDP ratio as GDP increases (decreases), suggesting that effort is 
made to preserve the debt ceiling even in good times (when governments become more 
solvent).   
 
In line with Thornton (2008), our cross-section results also show that income 
inequality (capturing political distortion/pressure to spend in good times) and aid 
dependability (capturing financing constraint) significantly affect fiscal policy pro-
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cyclicality with the effects being negative and positive respectively. Unlike Alesina 
and Tabellini (2005) and Thornton (2008), who had significant but contrasting 
outcomes, the present study finds the effect of corruption and democracy on fiscal 
policy pro-cyclicality to be insignificant.  
 
The study proceeds as follows. The theoretical concept underlying the analysis is 
formalised in the next section. Section 2.3 then presents an empirical model suitable 
for testing the theoretical concept. In section 2.4, the variables and sources of data 
employed in the analysis are described. Section 2.5 discusses the results of the 
analysis. Finally, the conclusions from the study and suggestions for future research 
are summarised in section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Theoretical model 
Following Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), the present study employs a theoretical model 
that rationalizes the conduction of procyclical fiscal policy in a small open (low 
income) economy that faces uncertain revenue (due to volatile business cycle) and 
reduced risk sharing (associated with incomplete asset markets). The asset market 
incompleteness considered is that associated with the external and domestic asset 
markets whereby returns on bonds issued by the government are not contingent on the 
state of the domestic economy. Therefore, the government would still have to pay high 
returns on outstanding debts even in bad times. Due to external  financing constraint, 
the government relies heavily on domestic source of debt financing, and domestic 
bonds remain non-state contingent as long as households have access to externally 
issued non-state contingent bonds; the two types of bonds are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes for simplicity. Thus, the model set up is based on the rational behaviour of 
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the fiscal authority and the household in a volatile economy with limited risk sharing. 
The former optimizes expenditure and debt levels when faced with uncertain revenue, 
whiles the latter makes optimal decisions on consumption and asset accumulation. 
Unlike Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), however, the role of the household in this study is 
just to emphasize the nature of the asset market incompleteness considered and this 
SXUSRVHLVDFKLHYHGZLWKRXWKDYLQJWRVROYHIRUWKHKRXVHKROG¶VRSWLPDO decision. The 
optimization problem of the household is therefore not formalized. An important 
feature of the model is that, in spite of being faced with revenue risk and limited risk 
sharing opportunities, the government maintains constant transfers to the private sector 
in both good and bad times. Thus, the government insures the household against 
negative shocks.  
 
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQSUREOHP LV WRFKRRVH WKHRSWLPDO OHYHOVRIGHEW td , and 
consumption expenditure, tg , when faced with the possibility of different risky 
outcomes of output and tax revenue. To formalize this problem, let us suppose the state 
of the economy facing the government at time t is associated with an endowment 
income, tY , and tax revenue tT . The latter is an increasing function of tY  but is also 
affected by shocks originating in policy and other exogenous sources. In addition to 
consumption, the government spends h on exogenous transfers to the household. The 
excess of total government expenditure over revenue is financed by the sale of non-
state contingent bonds to the household with a fixed return, r. In such an economic 
environment, the optimal levels of debt and consumption expenditure are those that 
PD[LPLVHWKHH[SHFWHGSUHVHQWYDOXHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUWHPSRUDOXWLOLW\IXQFWion 
subject to budget and debt constraint. The expected utility function is specified in a 
form that assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as follows: 
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subject to the government budget constraint, 
 
(2.2) tttt Tdrdhg d 1  
 
and the debt constraint defined by the upper debt limit, d  as4 
 
(2.3) > @
1
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
d
r
hTE
d tt  
which could also be expressed as, 
 
(2.3b)   > @ hTEddr tt d min  
 
where V  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, E  is the subjective discount rate, 
and h denotes exogenous transfers from the government to the household which is 
assumed to be constant in all periods and state of the economy. The budget constraint 
LPSOLHV WKDW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILQDQFHEDVHVKRXOGDW OHast be equal to the total fiscal 
expenditure. The interpretation of the debt constraint is that the government debt 
ceiling, which applies at all times, is set such that exogenous transfers to the household 
could be maintained in all periods and states of the economy (as emphasized in 
                                                 
4
 Footnote 3 applies. 
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equation 2.3), including when government revenue is at its lowest level, without 
defaulting on interest payment (as emphasized in equation 2.3b).5  
 
7KH VROXWLRQ WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ SUREOHP JLYHV WKH IROORZLQJ ILUVW Rrder 
condition (FOC): 
 
(2.4)     ttt grEg OE VV   ][ 1  
 
where tO  is the Langrange multiplier on the debt constraint. The FOC is a standard 
Euler equation defining the optimal pattern of government consumption expenditure 
over two periods. Note that since the marginal utility of government consumption 
(derived from a concave utility curve) is convex (expressed as Vtg and ][ 1VtgE  for 
year t and t+1), higher values of marginal utility imply lower levels government 
consumption. Also, note that tO  is positive when the debt constraint is binding and 
zero otherwise. It follows then that in good times when the debt constraint is not 
binding (i.e., > @
1
max


r
hTE
d tt  from equation 2.3, and 0 tO ), government 
expenditure in year t increases and vice versa. The model therefore suggests that 
procyclical fiscal policy is optimal when fiscal authorities with volatile income are 
faced with incomplete asset markets. A direct connotation is that pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy increases with income fluctuations when asset markets are imperfect. To 
see how this occurs, note that for a given mean revenue ( > @tt TE ), the expected 
minimum value of revenue ( > @tt TEmin ) is lower in countries with higher revenue 
                                                 
5
 See Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) and Aiyagari (1994) 
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volatility and, in accordance with equation (2.3), results in lower debt ceiling, d . 
Substituting d into (2.2), the budget constraint could be expressed as 
 
(2.5)       
1
)(

 
r
ghT
d tt  
 
Equation (2.5) shows that among governments with similar average revenue, those 
with lower debt ceilings (induced by high income volatility) are associated with larger 
decreases (increases) in consumption in bad (good) times. Therefore, fiscal policy is 
more pro-cyclical in countries with higher income volatility. The model predictions for 
governments that rely on non-state-contingent bonds are summarized as follows: 
firstly, the debt ceiling is lower in countries facing higher income volatility. Secondly, 
there is more effort to preserve the debt ceiling in both good and bad times. Thirdly, 
fiscal policy is more pro-cyclical in countries with higher income volatility. Finally, 
the effect of income volatility on pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy increases with 
dependence on non-state contingent bonds. With the exception of the fourth, which we 
are unable to test due to data limitations, the model predictions are tested empirically 
using the methods described in the empirical model section. Before we proceed, it is 
instructive to show how the model behaves with state contingent bonds as this 
constitutes the theoretical basis of our proposed solution to the effect of income 
volatility on pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
The model with state contingent bonds 
Equation (2.3) shows that when bonds are non-state contingent (i.e., when r is 
constant), the debt limit is based on the expected minimum revenue in order to ensure 
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solvency in bad times. The debt limit is therefore low, permitting less borrowing and, 
for that matter, spending in bad times.  
 
On the other hand, when bonds are state-contingent (i.e., when r is high in good times 
and low in bad times), the debt limit, d , could be based on the expected maximum 
revenue as shown below.   
  
> @
1)(
max

d
sr
hTE
d tt  
 
where s denotes the state of the world such that, where Į and ȕ denote good and bad 
times respectively, r(Į)>r(ȕ) holds. Therefore, it is possible to maintain higher 
spending as revenue falls without contravening the debt ceiling because r would also 
fall. This suggests that fiscal policy would be less pro-cyclical if fiscal authorities have 
access to state contingent bonds. 
 
2.3 Empirical model 
The empirical approach we use to determine the effect of output volatility on the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy comprises two stages. Firstly, different specifications are 
employed in estimating the cyclicality coefficient for each country in the sample. The 
second stage then utilizes a cross-sectional analysis of the sample countries to explain 
the variation in the cyclicality coefficients across countries. We address three 
objectives in the process: the first objective, which is addressed in the first stage of the 
analysis, is to re-estimate the coefficients of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality in Thornton 
(2008), using more improved empirical specifications and data series. The second 
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objective, which is addressed in the second stage of the analysis, is to investigate 
whether the explanation given in Thornton (2008) for the variations in the pro-
cyclicality coefficients across countries changes with the improved estimates of the 
pro-cyclicality coefficients. The third objective is to estimate the effect of income 
volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA. We also test the necessary 
conditions underlying our explanation for the latter. 
 
2.3.1  Stage 1: Estimation of cyclicality coefficient for fiscal policy 
The fiscal policy variable adopted in the present study is government consumption.6 
Cyclicality of fiscal policy is therefore defined as the response of government 
consumption to output fluctuations. The most basic specification for estimating the 
cyclicality between government consumption and output in their natural logarithmic 
forms is presented as follows:7 
 
(2.6)    ¨ORJ*t = Į +  ȕ¨ORJ<t +  İt 
 
where G and Y denote government consumption and output respectively, at time t. The 
response of government consumption with respect to changes in output is measured by 
the ȕ parameter with the residual İ capturing other sources of change in government 
consumption that are exogenous to the model.  
 
                                                 
6
 Fatas (2005) argues that investment should be excluded from fiscal rules because the benefits of 
investment occur over many yHDUV7KLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHµJROGHQUXOH¶RIILVFDOSROLF\ZKHUHE\
investment, when able to generate enough returns to service investment borrowing, is excluded from 
fiscal rules. Moreover, excluding investment spending allows for comparability with Thornton (2008). 
Also, investment data for the sample countries is less consistent. 
7
 See Woo (2005) and Lane (1998, 2003).  
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Although estimates of ȕ from specifications of the form in equation (2.6) are common 
in the literature,8 these may be misleading since they do not account for the adjustment 
of government consumption to disequilibrium, which is sustainable in the long-run. An 
exception is Thornton (2008) who accounts for the mean reversion of government 
expenditure by including logGt-1 as a regressor to obtain the specification in equation 
(2.7). 
   
(2.7)    ¨ORJ*t  Įȕ¨ORJ<t Į1*logGt-1 +  ȜW İt   
 
where Į1 is the coefficient capturing the mean reversion of government consumption 
and Ȝ is the coefficient on the trend term t that captures trends in logGt-1. Equation 
(2.7) may nevertheless be inadequate for the following reasons: Firstly, capturing the 
adjustment of government consumption to long-run disequilibrium is superior over 
simply accounting for mean reversion because it is also sustainable for government 
consumption to respond to the long±term income, often captured by logYt-1. Secondly, 
fundamental time series principles suggest that equation (2.7) would be rendered 
unstable where logGt is not stationary (around the trend). The latter problem, however, 
does not exist if logGt  is included with logYt-1 and the two have an equilibrium 
relationship (i.e., are cointegrated), rendering their combination stationary. We 
therefore estimate ȕ using the empirical specification in (2.8).  
 
(2.8)    ¨ORJ*t  Įȕ¨ORJ<t Į1*logGt-1Į2*logYt-1+ ȜW İt    
 
                                                 
8
 Footnote (4) applies. 
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where Į2 captures the response of government consumption to the disequilibrium of 
income from its steady state. Unlike equation (2.7), t in equation (2.8) captures 
exogenous trending effect on the long-run relationship between logGt-1 and logYt-1.  
 
As implied above, equation (2.8) is stationary only when logGt-1  and logYt-1 are 
stationary or non-stationary but have a stationary equilibrium relationship. The 
estimation of equation (2.8) is therefore preceded by tests for stationarity and 
cointegration (or equilibrium relationship) of the variables.  
 
Note that equation (2.8), which is a Single Equation Error-Correction specification, is 
henceforth labelled SECM. It is estimated using OLS to obtain the measure of fiscal 
policy pro-F\FOLFDOLW\ȕKHQFHIRUWKODEHOOHGEHWDSDUDPHWHU7KLVFRHIILFLHQWLVXVHGDV
the dependent variable in the second stage of the analysis. Note that we also estimate 
equation (2.7), henceforth labelled MEANREV, to investigate whether the results are 
different when the time series properties of the variables are not thoroughly accounted 
for. 
 
Stationarity test 
Stationarity of the variables is determined by performing an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test which involves a t-test on the OLS estimate of µ in the following 
specification for each variable Z, using special critical values. 
 
(2.9)              ¨=t =  Ȗ +  W+µZt-1 ȥ1¨=t-1 ȥk¨=t-k ȟt 
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where Ȗdenotes the constant term,  denotes the coefficient on the trend term, t, and 
the ȥs are the coefficients on the lagged differences of Z that are included to ensure 
that the residual, ȟ, is white noise. Note that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and the constant and trend terms are dropped in turns when not significant 
because the critical values for the ADF test are non-similar, meaning that they depend 
on the form of the deterministic components of the model under the null. The variable 
Z is stationary if the null (H0: µ=0) is rejected. 
 
Next, the government consumption and GDP variables are tested for cointegration, 
which involves testing for the stationarity of the residual from their long-run relation 
as expressed in (2.10). 
 
(2.10)             logGt  ĳ1ĳ2 *logYt +  ĳ3t +  Ȧt 
 
Empirically, not accounting for enough lags of Y in equation (2.10) may result in serial 
correlation problem. The cointegration test may therefore be misleading since the 
residual being tested would not be white-noise. Following Hendry (1997), therefore, 
the dynamic equivalent of equation (2.10), given in (2.11), is estimated first and 
subsequently solved for the long run parameters. These are formalized as follows: 
 
(2.11)             A(L)logGt =  B(L)logYt +  ĳ3t Ȧt 
 
where A(L) and B(L) denote the autoregressive and distributed lag polynomials in 
logG and logY respectively and are made long enough to yield a white noise residual. 
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By setting L=1 in the lag polynomial, the long run solution to equation (2.11) is 
obtained as follows: 
 
(2.12)            
ttt tYG ZMMM  321 log*log  
 
where 1M = ĳ1/A(1),  2M = B(1)/A(1), 3M = ĳ3/A(1), and  tZ = Ȧt /A(1). 
 
The test for cointegration is then carried out by performing an ADF test on the 
following equation as described above. 
 
(2.13)           tktkttt 0010110 ...... [Z\Z\ZPZ '' '   
 
Rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (H0: µ0=0) suggests that logG and 
logY are cointegrated and equation (2.8) is stationary.  
 
2.3.2 Stage 2: Model explaining cross-country variation in fiscal policy cyclicality 
In this section, we present the empirical specification that we use for explaining the 
variation in the cyclicality of fiscal policy (ȕ parameter) across countries. To answer 
our first objective ± which is to investigate whether Thornton (2008) explanation for 
the variation pro-cyclical fiscal policy changes with improved estimates of the 
coefficients of fiscal policy pro-cyclicality ± wH EHJLQ ZLWK 7KRUQWRQ¶V HPSLULFDO
specification. We then include income volatility as an additional explanatory variable 
to answer our second objective, which is to investigate whether it has a positive effect 
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on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as cross-continent 
evidence suggests.  
 
Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we predict a positive effect of income 
volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. However, in contrast with existing 
(credit constraint and political distortion) explanations, our theoretical model ascribes 
this to the optimal solvency behaviour of fiscal authorities when income is volatile and 
bonds are mainly non-state-contingent. The cross-section specification used is as 
follows: 
 
(2.15)              ȕi =  Įc +  Įvy VOLi +  Įx Xi Ȟi 
 
where the Įs are the constant term and the parameters of the corresponding variables, 
VOL denotes output volatility (which, as explained above, is excluded from initial 
estimations that update Thornton, 2008), X is a vector of control variables suggested in 
the literatureDQGȞLVWKHUHVLGXDOFDSWXULQJVRXUFHVRIYDULDWLRQLQWKHEHWDSDUDPHWHU
that are outside the model. Variables in vector X include financing constraints, 
captured by aid dependence of a country (ODAGDP);9 social fragmentation, captured 
E\DFRXQWU\¶VDYHUDJHRIWKHJLQLFRHIILFLHQW*,1,DQGWKHOHYHORIGHYHORSPHQWRID
country captured by the initial GDP per capita (GDPinitial).10  
 
                                                 
9
 Aid dependence is higher in poorer countries that are the most likely to be faced with credit 
constraints. It is however noteworthy that this proxy is not without limitation since large inflows of aid 
is indicative of a good relationship with donors and may therefore give financial institutions more 
confidence to lend to the aid recipient.  
10
 See Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Woo (2005), Thornton (2008), Lane (2003), and Talvi and Vegh 
(2000). 
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The importance of pro-cyclical fiscal policy derives from its exacerbating effect on 
business cycle fluctuation. This suggests that GDP volatility is endogenous in equation 
(2.15).11We therefore check for the robustness of the results when instrumental 
variable estimations are used. The instruments used for GDP volatility are population 
size (POP), external debt to GDP ratio (DEBT), and inflation (INFL). Population size 
is used to capture the size of government; larger governments are believed to be more 
stabilizing (Gali, 1994). Government size is often captured by government 
consumption to GDP ratio (Badinger, 2008). However, the latter ratio may be 
endogenous in equation (2.15) since it is the fiscal policy variable used in the 
estimation of the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Government consumption to GDP ratio is 
however considered to be correlated with the population size (Badinger, 2008; Fatas 
and Mihov, 2003). External debt to GDP ratio accounts for the lack of control of fiscal 
authorities over fiscal policy, while inflation captures macroeconomic instability 
(associated with domestic debt crisis and lack of monetary policy control).12  
 
To address the first objective of this (second) stage of the analysis, all the explanatory 
variables, with the exception of VOL, are of interest. We expect ODAGDP, serving as 
a proxy for financing constraint, to have a significant positive effect on ȕ since 
inability to access credit in bad times increases procyclicality of fiscal policy. We also 
expect GINI to have a significant negative effect as social fragmentation, associated 
with inequitable distribution of income, suppresses spending on social programs which 
is pro-cyclical in nature. Countries with higher income are less susceptible to income 
shocks and would therefore be less affected by imperfect risk sharing associated with 
incomplete asset market. We therefore expect GDP to have a negative effect on the 
                                                 
11
 Footnote (1) applies. 
12
 See Markus Berndt (2007). 
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pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. The effect of corruption and democracy may be 
positive or negative: improved macroeconomic management, including counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, is more likely in less corrupt and democratic governments 
(Persson et al., 1997). On the other hand, more tax revenue would be available for 
spending in good times (pro-cyclical spending) when governments are less corrupt or 
more accountable (as in democracies). Also, voters (in democracies) may require high 
spending in good times (pro-cyclical spending) to prevent governments from amassing 
wealth (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005).   
 
In addressing the second objective of the second stage of the analysis, the coefficient 
of interest is Įvy in equation (2.15). We expect Įvy to be significantly positive in 
accordance with the optimal solvency behaviour of governments as predicted by the 
underlying theoretical model. Two necessary conditions of the optimal solvency 
behaviour, also predicted by the theoretical model, are that, firstly, government deficits 
are lower in countries with higher income volatility. Secondly, in countries where 
income is more volatile, government deficits are less pro-cyclical with respect to the 
income cycle. This means that, in spite of increased solvency, the deficit does not 
increase much in good times. The reason is to remain solvent even in bad times (given 
that return on bonds is not state-contingent). To investigate the first necessary 
condition, we use a graphical illustration of the relationship between GDP volatility 
and the budget balance (deficit) and expect a positive (negative) slope.  
 
As with the first, we use a graphical illustration to investigate the second necessary 
condition for the optimal solvency behaviour of governments. We first obtain a 
measure of the cyclicality of the government deficit as the change in government 
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deficit with respect to a percentage change in GDP (labeled gama, Ȗ, henceforth). Note 
that since the budget balance series consists of negative and positive values (budget 
deficits and surpluses respectively), we are unable to convert it into logarithms. We 
therefore use the change in budget balance to GDP ratio in the estimation of Ȗ. This 
however affects the interpretation of Ȗ. If the budget deficit increases proportionately 
with GDP (pro-cyclical), then Ȗ=0 since the ratio of budget balance to GDP would 
remain the same; if the budget deficit increases more than proportionately with a 
percentage increase in GDP (highly pro-cyclical), then Ȗ<0, reflecting a fall in the 
budget balance ratio (or equivalently, an increase in the deficit ratio); if the budget 
deficit decreases (or increases less than proportionately) with a percentage increase in 
GDP (countercyclical or less pro-cyclical), then Ȗ>0 since the budget balance (budget 
deficit) ratio increases (decreases). Given that the idea of the optimal solvency 
behaviour of governments facing volatile (or uncertain) income is to remain solvent in 
bad times, then positive values of Ȗ (i.e., countercyclical budget balance to GDP ratio 
or deficit to GDP ratio) are consistent with the optimal solvency behaviour. The 
second necessary condition for the optimal solvency behaviour therefore requires a 
plot of Ȗ against income volatility to depict a positive slope. We estimate Ȗ from the 
following specification (which is analogous to the SECM specification in equation 
2.8): 
 
(2.16)    ¨BBGDPt =  a0 +  Ȗ¨ORJGDPt +  a1*BBGDP t-1+ a2*logGDPt-1+ a3*t +  ʌt  
 
where the a denotes the parameter estimates of the corresponding variables (and the 
constant term, a0), BBGDP denotes the budget balance to GDP ratio.  
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2.4 Description of variables and sources of data 
For comparability of results (with Thornton 2008), empirical estimations in the present 
study, which involves two stages, are based on annual time series data for 37 
developing countries over the period 1960 to 2004. In the first stage, coefficients of 
fiscal policy cyclicality are estimated for each country in the sample using government 
consumption and GDP variables as specified in equations (2.7), (2.8), and (2.14). Data 
on both variables were obtained from the Penn World Tables version 6.2 (PWT) in real 
laspeyre units with 2000 as the base year; data coverage for each country is reported 
with the regression output in the appendix. Alternate sources of data for these variables 
DUH WKH *RYHUQPHQW )LQDQFH 6WDWLVWLFV *)6 RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0RQHWDU\ )XQG¶V
,0) DQG WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V :RUOG 'HYelopment Indicators (WDI). However, 
coverage of government consumption data for sub-Saharan African countries is short 
in both sources, especially in the GFS, compared to the study period. It is noteworthy 
that, in several cases, data on sub-Saharan African countries are not very consistent 
across the different sources. For instance, as shown in tables A2.1(i) and (ii) of  
appendix A2, the correlation coefficients between data series from the PWT and WDI 
are not very consistent. This is especially the case for government consumption 
expenditure for which the correlation is below 90 percent in 16 out of 36 countries 
covered, with the correlation coefficients being negative in two countries. With regards 
to GDP, correlation coefficients below 90 percent are observed in 6 countries. 
Therefore, we do not expand our data with those from different sources even where 
this is possible. Combining data (especially on government consumption) from 
different sources may result in biased estimates of the procyclicality coefficient.  
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In the second stage of the analysis, variations in the cyclicality of fiscal policy are 
explained using variables such as GDP volatility, GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, 
DLG WR *'3 UDWLR DQG JDPD LH Ȗ ZKLFK FDSWXUHV WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK RSWLPDO
solvency behaviour is satisfied by fiscal authories in a given country). GDP volatility 
is obtained as the standard error of the de-trended real logarithmic GDP in 
international dollars, derived from the PWT. Aid is defined as official development 
assistance and the budget balance as the difference between revenues including aid on 
one hand, and expenditures and lending minus repayments on the other hand; for both 
variables, available data for the sample period is obtained as official development 
assistance from the African development Indicator (ADI) online data base of the 
World Bank, first transformed into ratios of GDP and then into annual averages. The 
aid data is only available from 1970. We however expect an average (as a share of 
GDP) between 1970 and 2004 to be indicative of the average for the relevant sample 
period. The budget balance data is hardly available before 1980 but this is not very 
problematic because it is not included in the objective regressions. Annual averages of 
Gini coefficients are computed from available WDI data over the sample period. 
Gama, Ȗ, is estimated in the present study as explained in section (2.3.2). In the 
estimation of gama (which involves budget balance and GDP), availability of the 
budget balance data determines the sample size used for each country, and for reason 
relating to the availability of the budget balance data, a period between 1980 and 2004 
was maintained. The estimates are summarised in table A2.4 of the appendix.  
 
Variables used as instruments for GDP volatility are external debt to GDP ratio, 
population size and inflation rate. Data on all three instruments were obtained from the 
ADI online database of the World Bank. To control for democracy, polity2 indices 
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were obtained from the Polity IV Project database; available indices for the sample 
period were averaged for each country. A polity2 index QHWV D FRXQWU\¶V VFRUHV RQ
autocracy and democracy indices and is increasing in the level of democracy on a scale 
of -10 to 10. For data on corruption, the study averages biennial corruption indices 
available between 1996 and 2000 from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). The 
LQGLFHV DJJUHJDWH D FRXQWU\¶V VFRUH RQ GLIIHUHQW JRYHUQDQFH LQGLFDWRUV DQG DUH
decreasing in the extent of corruption on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5. 
 
Finally, consequences of data limitations were as follows: Liberia was excluded from 
the second stage of the analysis because its GDP series reported in PWT did not seem 
to be consistent. For instance, the change in LibeULD¶V *'3EHWZHHQDQG
was more than 100%. GDP then fell by about 80% in 1998. This has a significant 
bearing on the measure of GDP volatility for Liberia. Also, since the ADI online 
source reported no aid data on Namibia over the study period, it was considered 
reasonable to drop Namibia from regressions that include aid. 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1  Stage I results: Estimating cyclicality of government consumption 
This section discusses the empirical results on the first stage of the analysis, which is 
to estimate the response of government consumption to a percentage change in GDP. 
As explained in section (2.3.1), the analysis essentially begins with the investigation of 
the time series properties of the government consumption and GDP variables to 
determine whether the empirical specifications employed are stationary.  
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The results, as summarised in table 2.1(i) and (ii), shows that in levels government 
consumption and GDP series are predominantly non-stationary with an order of 
integration of one (meaning that their first differences are stationary), though  
  
 
 
Table 2.1  Stationarity properties of variables 
 
2.1(i)  Benin ± Malawi 
 
COUNTRY 
STATIONARITY OF VARIABLES 
Govlasp GDPlasp LR residual 
Benin I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Botswana I(1) I(0) I(0) 
Burkina Faso I(1) 
I(0)+trend** 
I(1) I(0) 
Burundi I(0)+trend I(1) I(0) 
Cameroun I(0)+trend I(1) I(0) 
Cent. Afr. Rep I(1) 
I(0)+trend* 
I(1) I(0) 
Chad I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Congo, Rep. Of I(1) I(1) I(0) 
&RWH'¶,YRLUH I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Equitorial Guinea I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Ethiopia I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Gabon I(1) 
I(0)+trend** 
I(1) I(0) 
Gambia I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Ghana I(0)+trend I(0)+trend I(0) 
Guinea Bissau I(1) I(0)+trend I(0) 
Kenya I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Lesotho I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Liberia I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Madagascar I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Malawi I(0)+trend I(1) I(0) 
    
                  * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. Those with 
                  no stars are significant at the 1% level. 
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2.1(ii)  Mali ± Zimbabwe 
 
COUNTRY 
STATIONARITY OF VARIABLES 
Govlasp GDPlasp LR residual 
Mali I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Mauritania I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Mauritius I(1) I(0)+trend I(0) 
Mozambique I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Namibia I(0)+trend** I(0)+trend I(0) 
Niger I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Nigeria I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Rwanda I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Senegal I(1) 
I(0)+trend** 
I(1) I(0) 
Sierra Leone I(0) I(1) I(0) 
Somalia I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Swaziland 
I(0)+trend* 
I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Tanzania I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Togo 
 
I(1) 
I(0)** 
I(1) I(0) 
Uganda I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Zambia I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Zimbabwe I(1) I(1) I(0) 
                  * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. Those with 
                  no stars are significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
stationary around the trend in a few instances. The only exceptions are the GDP series 
for Botswana and Togo, and the government consumption series for Sierra Leone 
which emerge stationary in levels.13 On the other hand, all the residuals from the long-
run estimation of the Hendry (1997) dynamic specification ( tZ  in equation 2.12) were 
 
                                                 
13
 Where combinations are I(1), I(0), and I(0), cointegration must not be possible. However, we still use 
the SECM specification because the adjustment coefficient (table A2.3) suggests that there is 
cointegration. Thus, the ADF test may be less indicative.    
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stationary implying that the two series in question are cointegrated for all the sample 
countries. It follows then that the empirical specification employed in Thornton 
(2008), as specified in equation (2.7) and labelled MEANREV in the present study, is 
not stationary because it combines stationary variables (first differences) with a non-
stationary variable ( the lag of government consumption in levels). On the other hand, 
the specification proposed in the present study, as specified in equations (2.8) and 
(2.14) and labelled SECM is stationary. The latter is because the lags of government 
consumption and GDP levels form a stationary (long-run equilibrium) relationship 
when both are included in the specification.  
 
The estimates of the beta parameter, which measures the response of government 
consumption to a percentage change in GDP, are summarised in table 2.2. Columns 1 
and 2 show estimates from SECM and MEANREV specifications respectively, while 
column 3 reports estimates from Thornton (2008). Results from the different 
specifications enable us to determine whether the beta estimates are affected when the 
time series properties of the variables are not (thoroughly) accounted for. We find that 
the beta coefficients estimated from both specifications are similar though the SECM 
estimates are predominantly larger.14 As reported in table A2.2 of the appendix, the 
correlation between SECM and MEANREV estimates is about 93 percent. Even 
though MEANREV and THORN (the actual estimates obtained by Thornton (2008) 
for the same sample covered in the present study) are based on the same empirical 
specification (equation 2.7), the latter estimates are different from the former with a  
 
 
                                                 
14
 SECM has larger (absolute) magnitude in 27 out of 37 countries. 
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Table 2.2 Coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality  
 
COUNTRY SECM MEANREV THORN 
(1) BENIN 1.5772 1.3663 1.2864 
(2) BOTSWANA 0.2858 0.0127 0.7808 
(3) BURK. FASO 0.7525 0.3881 1.4944 
(4) BURUNDI 0.6946 0.9401 1.0217 
(5) CAMEROUN 0.809 0.7902 0.8683 
(6) CENT.AFR. REP. -0.9985 -0.428 0.8403 
(7) CHAD 0.5939 0.4608 0.6761 
(8) CONGO REP OF 1.0912 1.1012 0.0075 
(9) COTE D'IV. 1.344 1.3526 1.2868 
(10) EQU. GUINEA 1.1218 1.0632 1.0233 
(11) ETHIOPIA 0.2167 0.1658 0.3113 
(12) GABON 0.7733 0.7371 0.6844 
(13) GAMBIA -0.7625 -0.4654 1.3494 
(14) GHANA 0.168 0.181 0.7305 
(15) G. BISSAU 1.0011 0.9008 1.0275 
(16) KENYA -0.1952 -0.1031 0.6054 
(17) LESOTHO 0.7987 0.5838 0.7777 
(18) LIBERIA 0.8953 0.9355 0.9025 
(19) MADAGASCAR 1.2713 1.2005 1.2917 
(20) MALAWI 1.2592 0.9428 0.2994 
(21) MALI 0.4199 0.3365 0.5231 
(22) MAURITANIA 1.1437 1.4891 1.6934 
(23) MAURITIUS 0.8808 0.5374 0.8899 
(24) MOZAMBIQUE 1.2144 1.6074 1.6532 
(25) NAMIBIA 0.5668 0.2987 0.3837 
(26) NIGER 0.6798 0.4491 0.6874 
(27) NIGERIA 0.7854 0.8975 0.6755 
(28) RWANDA 1.1174 1.0556 1.0276 
(29) SENEGAL 0.5092 0.3294 1.1442 
(30) S. LEONE 1.0292 1.3837 1.0432 
(31) SOMALIA 1.1146 0.9779 1.0396 
(32) SWAZILAND 0.0906 0.009 0.9367 
(33) TANZANIA 2.0138 1.8617 1.5211 
(34) TOGO 0.9319 0.8898 0.8954 
(35) UGANDA 0.8375 0.8926 0.9793 
(36) ZAMBIA 0.5763 0.3653 0.4122 
(37) ZIMBABWE -0.4053 -0.3443 -0.1729 
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correlation of about 54 percent. Also, the correlation between THORN and SECM is 
46 percent. This suggests that the underlying data employed in the two studies are 
different. The difference may have resulted from the fact that different data sources 
(namely, the WDI and PWT) were combined to expand the government consumption 
variable in Thornton (2008). As pointed out in the previous section (2.4), however, 
data on sub-Saharan African countries obtained from different sources are usually 
inconsistent. The present study therefore uses only government consumption data 
available in PWT.  
 
Generally, the beta estimates in table 2.2, as well as the corresponding graphical 
representation in figure A2.1 of the appendix, show that, in accordance with the 
literature, the developing countries in the sample are predominantly procyclical 
(defined as positive beta coefficient) in the response of government consumption to 
output fluctuations. The only exceptions are Central African Republic, the Gambia, 
and Zimbabwe where government consumption appears to respond countercyclically 
to the business cycle. While the study proceeds to stage II of the analysis using the 
SECM estimates, results based on MEANREV are also reported in the appendix. The 
full regression output for estimating the SECM is reported in table A2.3 of the 
appendix.  
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2.5.2 Stage II results: Explaining variation in cyclicality of government 
Consumption 
 
The first objective addressed in this stage of the analysis is whether the explanation 
given in Thornton (2008) for the variation in fiscal policy pro-cyclicality across SSA 
countries changes with our improved estimates of the pro-cyclicality coefficient. The 
baseline estimations therefore consist of the explanatory variables suggested in 
Thornton (2008). The results are summarized in columns 1 to 3 of table 2.3. We find 
that, consistent with the evidence in Thornton (2008), pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is 
significantly lower in countries with higher income inequality (social fragmentation) 
and those that are more dependent on aid. Thus, social fragmentation (associated with 
income inequality) inhibits fiscal spending on social programs that are countercyclical 
in nature, and also higher aid to GDP ratios are associated with countries that face 
incomplete access to credit markets and therefore spend less during economic 
downturns. 
 
Also, consistent with Thornton (2008), we find that the initial GDP per capita is not 
significant, suggesting that the initial level of development of a country does not affect 
the cyclicality of fiscal policy significantly, ceteris paribus. Our results however 
contrastV 7KRUQWRQ¶V LQ WKDW WKH ODWWHU ILQGV Whe initial GDP per capita to have a 
significant increasing effect on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy when corruption and 
democracy are controlled for. Also in contrast is that we find no significant effect of 
democracy and corruption on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy while Thornton finds 
both effects to be significantly negative; on the other hand, Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) find both effects to be significantly positive. As shown in appendix A2.4, these 
results do not change qualitatively when MEANREV (rather than SECM) beta 
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coefficients are used. The only exception is initial GDP per capita which becomes 
statistically significant. This is not surprising, and is an indication that the beta 
coefficients are underestimated when the response of government consumption to its 
long term deviation from GDP is not accounted for (as is the case with MEANREV) ± 
it is this unaccounted effect that is being captured by the initial per capita GDP in the 
second stage.    
 
Table 2.3 Explaining the variation in fiscal policy cyclicality across countries 
± OLS estimations 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRO-CYCLICALITY COEFFICIENT (BETA COEFFICIENT) 
 
OLS_1 OLS _2 OLS _3 OLS _4 OLS_5 OLS _6 OLS _7 
GINI -0.025* -0.025* -0.025* -0.033** -0.033** -0.031** -0.031** 
. (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
AIDGDP 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
. (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDPinitial 0.483 0.502 0.496 0.443 0.428 0.483 0.471 
. (0.292) (0.298) (0.293) (0.272) (0.286) (0.288) (0.291) 
CORR -0.044 . 0.034 0.214 0.122 . . 
. (0.166) . (0.183) (0.203) (0.182) . . 
DEM . -0.014 -0.017 -0.019 . -0.005 . 
. . (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) . (0.028) . 
VOL . . . 0.565** 0.557** 0.474** 0.486** 
. . . . (0.257) (0.248) (0.214) (0.206) 
CONST 0.091 0.004 0.041 0.211 0.266 -0.016 0.042 
. (0.941) (0.935) (0.960) (0.953) (0.966) (0.949) (0.950) 
R2 0.222 0.229 0.230 0.320 0.310 0.303 0.302 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and * respectively.  
 
 
The next objective is to investigate the effect of GDP volatility on pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in SSA. The result is shown in columns of 4 to 7 of table 2.3. We find that, in 
accordance with the existing literature, GDP volatility has a significant positive effect 
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on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy.15Our explanation however differs from the 
existing ones that are associated with credit constraint and political distortion. 
Specifically, our explanation is that when income is volatile and government bonds are 
mostly non-state-contingent (as is the case in SSA), it is prudent to set low and 
constant deficit ceiling in order to remain solvent during economic downturns. This 
leads to increased spending in good times and decreased spending in bad times.  
 
Since the cyclicality of fiscal policy is also shown to affect output volatility (see 
Bardinger, 2008), the result might be misleading since OLS estimation could possibly 
be plagued with endogeneity bias. We therefore use instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques (that are robust to endogeneity bias) to check the robustness of the OLS 
results. The IV estimation output reported in table 2.4 show that the results do not 
change qualitatively; income volatility and aid to GDP ratio are significant with 
positive coefficients and the income distribution index is significant with a negative 
coefficient. Corruption, democracy and initial GDP per capita remain insignificant. 
7KH 6DUJDQ¶V WHVW IRU LQVWUXPHQW YDOLGLW\ IDLOV WR UHMHFW WKH QXOO K\SRWKHVLV WKDW WKH
omitted instruments are not jointly significant, implying that our instrumental 
variables, namely population size, external debt to GDP ratio, and inflation rate, are 
valid. In what follows we provide additional evidence in support of the optimal 
solvency explanation we give for the positive effect of income volatility on the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 See, for instance, Lane (2003) and Talvi and Vegh (2000). 
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Table 2.4 Explaining the variation in fiscal policy cyclicality across countries 
± IV estimations 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRO-CYCLICALITY COEFFICIENT 
 
IV_1 IV_2 IV_3 IV_4 
GINI -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
. (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
AIDGDP 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
. (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDPinitial 0.305 0.263 0.134 0.142 
. (0.311) (0.308) (0.270) (0.285) 
CORR 0.394 0.193 . . 
. (0.254) (0.217) . . 
DEM -0.036 . -0.015 . 
 
(0.028) . (0.028) . 
VOL 1.236** 1.050* 0.630* 0.639* 
. (0.586) (0.562) (0.375) (0.356) 
CONST -1.43 -1.024 0.187 0.147 
. (3.441) (3.372) (2.966) (3.094) 
R2 0.332 0.335 0.358 0.35 
N 35 35 35 35 
Sargan chi-square (2) = 0.0604; P-value = 0.739 
                    Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and  
                         10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. The instruments  
                         for VOL are population, external debt to GDP ratio, and inflation rate.  
                         7KH6DUJDQ¶VWHVWVWDWLVWLFIDLOVWRUHMHFWWKHQXOOK\SRthesis that the  
                          instruments are valid.  
                          
 
Necessary conditions for the optimal solvency behaviour 
The two necessary conditions that are predicted by the underlying optimal solvency 
model of the present study are that governments facing higher income volatility set 
lower and less pro-cyclical budget deficits when bonds (for financing the deficits) are 
non-state-contingent.  
 
The plot of income volatility against the budget balance in figure 2.1 reveals a positive 
relationship (equivalent to a negative relationship between income volatility and the 
budget deficit), confirming the first necessary condition. To investigate the second 
necessary condition, we use a plot of income volatility against gama (Ȗ). Gama 
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measures the response of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio to a percentage change in 
GDP. Since the idea of the optimal solvency behaviour is to remain solvent in bad 
times, positive values of gama (suggesting decreases or less than proportionate 
increase in government deficit, or constant deficit, as GDP increases) are consistent 
with this behaviour.16The regression output for the estimation of gama is reported in 
table A2.5 of the appendix.17 The plot of income volatility against gama, shown in 
figure 2.2 reveals a positive relationship, suggesting that the optimal solvency 
behaviour is more profound in countries with higher income volatility. The second 
necessary condition for the optimal solvency behaviour is therefore met. The latter 
does not support the credit constraint and political distortion explanations; in sharp 
contrast, they are inconsistent with a positive relationship between income volatility 
and gama by suggesting that constrained ERUURZLQJLQEDGWLPHVȖDQGnot saving 
enough in goRGWLPHVȖexplain why income volatility induces pro-cyclical fiscal 
spending.  
 
By contrasting the political distortion and credit constraint explanations, we do not 
imply that precautionary saving in good times and unconstrained spending in bad times 
do not result in pro-cyclical fiscal spending. Rather, we imply that they do not explain 
the effect of income volatility on pro-cyclical spending in our sample. In most SSA 
countries, partly due to low tax capacity and pressing spending demands, saving in 
 
                                                 
16
 Proportionate (or more than proportionate increase) in government deficit as GDP increases could 
render the government insolvent if the maturity of the extra non-state-contingent bonds coincide with 
bad times.  
17
 Conclusions based on gama must be treated with caution because most of the estimates were not 
statistically significant. We use them nonetheless because they are merely correlation coefficients and 
not structural estimates.  
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Figure 2.1  GDP volatility and the budget balance 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 GDP volatility and gama 
 
NB: Gama is the response of budget balance-to-GDP ratio to a percentage change in GDP. 
 
good times is more like incurring lower deficits rather than accumulating surpluses. 
Thus, the precautionary role of saving hardly exists. Also, while credit availability in 
bad times may cause fiscal policy to be less pro-cyclical, spending would generally be 
more pro-cyclical among countries with higher volatility as a result of optimal 
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solvency behaviour. Therefore, access to state-contingent bonds and policies that 
stabilize GDP are required to break the vicious cycle that exists between income 
volatility and the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
  
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The present study seeks to explain the cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA using time 
series data on 37 countries in the region over the period 1960 to 2004. The analysis 
comprises two stages. In the first stage, coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality are 
obtained for each country in the sample using more consistent data and time series 
specification that is stationary; We compare these coefficients with those estimated by 
Thornton (2008) from a non-stationary specification and the same sample. Our results 
show that, with the exception of Central African Republic, The Gambia, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, all the countries in the sample pursue pro-cyclical fiscal policy; Thornton 
however finds fiscal policy in Gambia to be pro-cyclical. The correlation between 
7KRUQWRQ¶VHVWLPDWHVRIWKHILVFDOpolicy cyclicality coefficient and those based on our 
proposed specification (which thoroughly accounts for the time series properties of the 
variables involved) is low (46%). The difference in results is more likely to be 
associated with difference in the underlying data employed in the two studies than it is 
to the extent of accounting for the time series properties of the variables. This is 
because estimates of fiscal policy cyclicality coefficients from the present study that 
DUHEDVHGRQ7KRUQWRQ¶VVSHcification KDYHDORZFRUUHODWLRQRIZLWK7KRUQWRQ¶V
estimates by are highly correlated (at 93%) with estimates from our proposed 
specification. The latter observation does not imply that accounting for the time series 
properties of the variables does not affect the estimates of the fiscal policy cyclicality 
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coefficients RXU HVWLPDWHV IURP 7KRUQWRQ¶V VSHFLILFDWLRQ ZHUH SUHGRPLQDQWO\ ORZHU
(27 out of 37 countries).   
 
The second stage of the analysis addresses the variation in the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy across countries. Two main objectives are addressed at this stage: the first is to 
investigate whether the explanation given in Thornton (2008) for pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy changes with improved estimates of the pro-cyclicality coefficients. The second 
objective addressed in stage 2 of the analysis is to investigate and explain the effect of 
income volatility on pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  We use OLS and instrumental variable 
estimation methods. The latter is employed to reduce the effect of possible 
endogeneity bias on the (relatively efficient) OLS estimates. The results are robust 
across both estimation methods. Specifically, we find that ± in line with Thornton 
(2008) ± fiscal policy is less pro-cyclical in countries with higher income inequality 
and those that are less dependent on aid. The explanation for the former is that social 
fragmentation (higher income inequality) discourages spending on social programs 
that are pro-cyclical in nature; the explanation for the latter finding is that imperfect 
access to international credit markets (captured by aid dependence) leads to reduced 
spending in bad times, contributing to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in SSA. Unlike 
Thornton, however, we do not find any significant impact of corruption and the degree 
of democracy on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. While Thornton finds fiscal policy 
to be more pro-cyclical in countries with less corruption and democracy, Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) find the opposite to be true; our finding, however, is in disagreement 
with both. Also, in contrast to Thornton, we find robust evidence that the initial level 
of development of a country has no significant influence on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy. It is noteworthy that the main results do not change qualitatively when pro-
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F\FOLFDOLW\ FRHIILFLHQWV HVWLPDWHG IURP 7KRUQWRQ¶V QRQ-stationary specification are 
used. The only exception is that initial GDP per capita becomes statistically 
significant. The latter nonetheless suggests a bias in the estimated pro-cyclicality 
coefficients when a non-stationary specification is used.  
 
With regards to the second objective of stage 2, we find that ± in line with existing 
evidence ± pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy increases with output volatility. Even though 
there is consensus on the latter finding, the underlying explanation has varied across 
different studies. Existing explanations can be categorised into the credit constraint 
argument (whereby access to international credit markets in bad times is imperfect) 
and the political distortion argument (whereby different social groups pressurize fiscal 
authorities to spend more in good times). In contrast with the existing explanations, 
however, the present study shows that the increasing effect of GDP volatility on the 
pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is the result of optimal solvency behaviour of fiscal 
authorities that are faced with imperfect risk sharing (associated with the fact that 
government bonds in most SSA countries are non-state-contingent).  
 
Knowing the underlying cause of the effect of GDP volatility on the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy is relevant for policy purposes. For instance, the credit constraint 
explanation suggests that fiscal policy would be less pro-cyclical in developing 
countries if the accessibility of international credit markets in bad times is improved. 
The political distortion explanation also suggests the need for improved institutions to 
safeguard against increased spending in good times (associated with political 
pressures). While we agree with these recommendations, we do not agree that 
implementing them will diminish the increasing effect of income volatility on pro-
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cyclicality of fiscal policy. Our finding suggests that fiscal policy would be less pro-
cyclical in volatile economies if fiscal authorities have access to state contingent 
bonds. In spite of the different policy recommendations, all three explanations 
recognize that efforts at reducing the volatility of GDP would induce less pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. 
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APPENDIX A2  
Table A2.1 Correlation between PWT and WDI series 
A2.1(i) Benin - Malawi 
 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 Gov GDP 
Benin 0.810 0.992 
Botswana 0.996 0.997 
Burkina Faso 0.983 0.992 
Burundi 0.884 0.994 
Cameroun 0.968 0.989 
Cent. Afr. 
Rep 1.000 0.938 
Chad -0.197 0.970 
Congo, Rep. 
Of 0.982 0.970 
Cote 
'¶,YRLUH 0.976 0.974 
Equitorial 
Guinea 0.930 0.977 
Ethiopia 0.810 0.882 
Gabon 0.913 0.955 
Gambia 0.857 0.988 
Ghana 0.996 0.835 
Guinea 
Bissau 0.568 0.893 
Kenya 0.998 0.983 
Lesotho 0.999 0.993 
Liberia - 0.995 
Madagascar 0.789 0.987 
Malawi 0.915 0.989 
                   Gov denotes government expenditure. 
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A2.1 continued 
 
A2.1(ii) Mali - Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Gov denotes government expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.2 
Correlation between beta estimates from different methods 
  SECM MEANREV THORN 
SECM 1   
MEANREV 0.927 1  
THORN 0.458 0.540 1 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Gov GDP 
Mali 0.882 0.977 
Mauritania 0.845 0.969 
Mauritius 0.999 0.999 
Mozambique 0.979 0.977 
Namibia 0.997 0.974 
Niger 0.573 0.850 
Nigeria 0.710 0.983 
Rwanda 0.970 0.994 
Senegal 0.967 0.993 
Sierra Leone 0.094 0.848 
Somalia 0.114 0.746 
Swaziland 0.811 0.989 
Tanzania -0.221 0.948 
Togo 0.982 0.973 
Uganda 0.991 0.996 
Zambia 0.864 0.956 
Zimbabwe 0.975 0.984 
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Figure A2.1 
Distribution of fiscal policy cyclicality coefficients for 37 developing countries in 
Africa 
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Table A2.3 Single equation equilibrium-correction (SECM) estimation of the cyclicality coefficients for 
government consumption 
 
(1960 ± 2004) 
                                     (i) BENIN - LIBERIA 
 
 
Period ¨ORJ<t 
 
logGt-1 
 
logYt-1 
 
R2 
BENIN 1960-2002 1.577*** (0.481) -0.378*** (0.133) 0.342*** (0.124) 0.320 
BOTSWANA 1970-2004 0.286 (0.265) -0.259* (0.127) 0.322* (0.165) 0.274 
BURK. FASO 1960-2004 0.753 (0.546) -0.123 (0.093) 0.159 (0.157) 0.098 
BURUNDI 1960-2003 0.695*** (0.158) -0.228*** (0.051) 0.086 (0.083) 0.699 
CAMEROUN 1960-2003 0.809*** (0.130) -0.148** (0.069) 0.116** (0.057) 0.543 
CENT.AFR.REP. 1970-2003 -0.999 (0.776) -0.087 (0.147) -0.473 (0.349) 0.096 
CHAD 1960-2003 0.594*** (0.215) -0.291* (0.144) 0.311 (0.196) 0.255 
CONGO REP. 
OF 1960-2003 1.091*** (0.130) -0.491*** (0.112) 0.461*** (0.109) 0.742 
COTE D'IV. 1960-2003 1.344*** (0.261) -0.117* (0.065) 0.094 (0.068) 0.550 
EQU. GUINEA 1960-2003 1.122*** (0.172) -0.192** (0.091) 0.092 (0.099) 0.615 
ETHIOPIA 1960-2003 0.217 (0.260) -0.350*** (0.113) 0.534*** (0.168) 0.315 
GABON 1960-2004 0.773*** (0.232) -0.248** (0.122) 0.312** (0.137) 0.534 
GAMBIA 1960-2003 -0.763** (0.327) -0.226** (0.099) -0.527 (0.312) 0.252 
GHANA 1965-2002 0.168 (0.222) -0.585*** (0.206) -0.258 (0.154) 0.468 
G. BISSAU 1960-2003 1.001*** (0.165) -0.273** (0.117) 0.263* (0.146) 0.575 
KENYA 1960-2003 -0.195 (0.316) -0.102* (0.058) 0.135 (0.104) 0.166 
LESOTHO 1960-2003 0.799*** (0.263) -0.281** (0.136) 0.406* (0.201) 0.257 
LIBERIA 1970-2003 0.895*** (0.093) -0.083 (0.112) 0.074 (0.132) 0.882 
                                        Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * 
                                                respectively. The dependent variable is change in the logarithm of government consumption. The coefficients of 
                                                ¨ORJ<t are the measures of the pro-cyclicality of government consumption. Y and G represent GDP and government  
                                                consumption respectively. 
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                                       Continuation of table A2.3  
 
                                       (ii) MADAGASCAR - ZIMBABWE                                 
 
 
Period ¨ORJ<t 
 
logGt-1 
 
logYt-1 
 
R2 
MADAGASCAR 1960-2004 1.271*** (0.373) -0.113 (0.099) 0.142 (0.098) 0.297 
MALAWI 1960-2004 1.259*** (0.307) -0.845*** (0.220) 1.006*** (0.259) 0.531 
MALI 1960-2004 0.420 (0.306) -0.317*** (0.113) -0.372 (0.261) 0.206 
MAURITANIA 1970-2003 1.144*** (0.360) -0.238** (0.099) 0.191* (0.098) 0.544 
MAURITIUS 1960-2004 0.881*** (0.206) -0.101 (0.064) 0.092 (0.068) 0.404 
MOZAMBIQUE 1960-2003 1.214*** (0.308) -0.739*** (0.190) 1.006*** (0.264) 0.608 
NAMIBIA 1970-2003 0.567** (0.257) -0.475* (0.239) 0.503* (0.265) 0.308 
NIGER 1960-2004 0.680*** (0.185) -0.158 (0.132) 0.088 (0.114) 0.346 
NIGERIA 1960-2004 0.785** (0.361) -0.176* (0.090) 0.020 (0.085) 0.287 
RWANDA 1960-2003 1.117*** (0.184) -0.352*** (0.104) 0.688*** (0.205) 0.587 
SENEGAL 1960-2003 0.509*** (0.176) -0.230** (0.102) 0.259** (0.114) 0.334 
S. LEONE 1970-2003 1.029*** (0.337) -0.475*** (0.146) -0.248 (0.168) 0.558 
SOMALIA 1970-2004 1.115*** (0.176) -0.443*** (0.154) 0.413** (0.185) 0.661 
SWAZILAND 1970-2004 0.091 (0.521) -0.419** (0.174) 0.336** (0.155) 0.220 
TANZANIA 1960-2003 2.014*** (0.135) -0.373*** (0.108) 0.632*** (0.179) 0.874 
TOGO 1960-2004 0.932*** (0.286) -0.170** (0.070) 0.350** (0.146) 0.473 
UGANDA 1960-2003 0.838*** (0.135) -0.286** (0.118) 0.256** (0.123) 0.640 
ZAMBIA 1960-2003 0.576* (0.328) -0.381*** (0.134) 0.447* (0.243) 0.279 
ZIMBABWE 1965-2002 -0.405 (0.335) 0.018 (0.092) -0.244 (0.201) 0.210 
                                      Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * 
                                              respectively. The dependent variable is change in the logarithm of government consumption. The coefficients of 
                                              ¨ORJ<t are the measures of the pro-cyclicality of government consumption. Y and G represent GDP and government  
                                              consumption respectively. 
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A2.4 Explaining the variation in fiscal policy cyclicality across countries: using 
MEANREV cyclicality coefficients 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRO-CYCLICALITY COEFFICIENT 
(MEANREV) 
. OLS_1 OLS_2 OLS_3 
GINI -0.023** -0.023** -0.022** 
. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AIDGDP 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
. (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDPinitial 0.519** 0.523** 0.538** 
. (0.252) (0.255) (0.251) 
CORR -0.197 . -0.085 
. (0.145) . (0.198) 
DEM . -0.031 -0.024 
. . (0.021) (0.029) 
CONST -0.327 -0.306 -0.398 
. (0.804) (0.865) (0.841) 
R2 0.295 0.309 0.312 
N 36 36 36 
                   Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are  
                           indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table A2.5 Estimating gama ± the response of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio to 
a percentage change in GDP 
(1980 ± 2004) 
 
 
¨ORJ<t 
 
ECMt-1 
 
R2 
BENIN 0.166 (0.309) -0.608* (0.294) 0.476 
BOTSWANA 0.526* (0.260) -0.887*** (0.214) 0.621 
BURK. FASO 0.026 (0.174) -1.005*** (0.289) 0.549 
BURUNDI 0.332 (0.226) -0.677** (0.270) 0.582 
CAMEROUN 0.824** (0.356) -0.616*** (0.214) 0.344 
CENT.AFR.REP. . . . . . 
CHAD 0.284 (0.172) -0.581** (0.222) 0.472 
CONGO REP. 
OF 0.264 (0.240) -0.746** (0.257) 0.423 
COTE D'IV. 0.651** (0.250) -0.393 (0.226) 0.377 
EQU. GUINEA 0.179 (0.098) -1.066 (0.601) 0.605 
ETHIOPIA -0.027 (0.106) -0.707*** (0.219) 0.365 
GABON 0.792*** (0.267) -0.623** (0.242) 0.463 
GAMBIA 0.013 (0.197) -0.487** (0.210) 0.471 
GHANA 0.678 (0.400) -0.461 (0.378) 0.469 
G. BISSAU 0.106 (0.307) -0.427** (0.164) 0.606 
KENYA -0.196 (0.517) -1.068*** (0.261) 0.544 
LESOTHO -0.218 (0.499) -0.347** (0.157) 0.186 
LIBERIA . . . . . 
MADAGASCAR 0.116 (0.306) -0.490* (0.261) 0.471 
MALAWI 0.4 (0.274) -0.577* (0.303) 0.598 
MALI 0.062 (0.369) -0.272* (0.146) 0.207 
MAURITANIA -0.871* (0.473) -0.726** (0.279) 0.504 
MAURITIUS 0.364 (0.281) -0.12 (0.197) 0.115 
MOZAMBIQUE -0.173 (0.130) -0.483** (0.174) 0.347 
NAMIBIA 0.006 (0.214) -0.215 (0.203) 0.065 
NIGER -0.442*** (0.146) -0.812*** (0.229) 0.607 
NIGERIA . . . . . 
RWANDA 0.235*** (0.063) -1.240*** (0.304) 0.772 
SENEGAL -0.095 (0.226) -0.838*** (0.268) 0.425 
S. LEONE 0.461 (0.274) -0.632** (0.255) 0.454 
SOMALIA . . . . . 
SWAZILAND -0.171 (0.243) -0.905*** (0.224) 0.653 
TANZANIA 0.126 (0.140) -0.386 (0.306) 0.577 
TOGO 0.344 (0.225) -0.573** (0.210) 0.362 
UGANDA 0.245 (0.253) -0.703*** (0.233) 0.393 
ZAMBIA 0.713 (0.453) -0.738 (0.489) 0.526 
ZIMBABWE -0.194 (0.198) -0.778*** (0.226) 0.389 
             Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are  
             indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. The dependent variable is the change in budget  
             balance to GDP ratio. Gamma refers to the coefficient of ¨ORJ<t and it measures the response  
             of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio to GDP. Y and ECM represent GDP and the equilibrium-             
             correction component respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE BUDGET BALANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA: THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF AID REVISITED 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A common feature of low income economies, especially in Africa, is the over-reliance 
on only a few traditional agricultural commodities as a major source of employment 
and income. The dependence of agriculture on uncertain weather combined with the 
lack of diversification in agricultural production makes such economies highly risk 
prone. Yet, governments in low-income countries are faced with relatively high 
borrowing constraints, especially during economic downturns. Uncertainty about the 
future, combined with borrowing constraints, discourages capital accumulation and 
growth, and is likely to be more severe in countries with lower income. Given that 
foreign aid is a major source of foreign capital in Africa, where it averages about 12.5 
percent of GDP and more than 92 percent of all net capital inflows (Pallage and Robe, 
2001), it could serve as an important source of finance for relaxing the credit constraint 
and for smoothing revenue. Related to this debate is the response of aid inflows to the 
budget deficit; that is, giving more foreign aid to countries facing larger budget deficits 
(associated with lower tax capacities and pressing spending demands) may enhance 
growth. This is because large budget deficits may worsen credit constraint and capital 
accumulation, retarding growth as a result, and explains why critics of the World Bank 
and IMF have advocated against conditional aid policies that lay less emphasis on 
need-based disbursement.  
 
   55 
The story however changes when we consider the incentive effects of aid. Basically, 
when larger budget deficits result in higher aid inflows, recipients may have the 
incentive not to prevent budget deficits, resulting in higher deficits (Svensson 1995, 
2000). This is perceived as one of the reasons why need-based aid inflows have not 
been effective at promoting growth. Generally, for development aid to be more 
effective, aid contracts demand that recipient governments exert an agreed amount of 
effort towards structural reform measures, an example of which is the reduction of 
budget deficits.  An implicit assumption of such aid programs is that although the 
outcome of the proposed structural reform is not certain, it increases the likelihood of a 
good economic outcome. Nonetheless, given that the reform measures may be costly, 
say politically, to the recipient governments in the short term, and that reform effort is 
not completely verifiable by donors, recipient governments may end up exerting lower 
reform effort and pursuing less productive but politically rewarding activities instead.  
Thus, a moral hazard problem arises between donors and recipients of development 
aid. It follows then that in order to encourage recipient governments to avoid deficits 
when budgetary activities are not completely verifiable, the disbursement of 
development aid needs to follow an incentive structure such that it would not be in the 
interest of recipients to run deficits. On the issue of incentive creation, Svensson 
(2000) shows that, conditioning aid disbursement on good outcomes would encourage 
recipient governments to exert higher reform effort in order to increase their chances of 
receiving more aid. Thus, successfully enforced conditional aid contracts hold the 
answer to the moral hazard problem between aid recipients and donors. Svensson 
(2000) however expands the aid incentive model to show that due to the altruism of 
donors, conditional aid contracts are difficult to enforce without a commitment 
technology. This is because, notwithstanding the contract, altruistic donors find it 
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optimal to give more aid to recipients with larger budget difficulties ex post. 
Anticipating this, recipients have the incentive not to avoid the deficits ex ante. Thus, 
even when conditional aid contracts are agreed, the moral hazard problem between aid 
donors and recipients may persist because such contracts are not time-consistent. 
Therefore, the fundamental idea of the Svensson (2000) aid incentive model is that, 
generally, larger budget deficits lead to higher aid inflows and aid induces larger 
budget deficits. To test this empirically, Svensson (1995) estimates the response of aid 
inflows to the budget balance of recipients, and the reverse effect from aid inflows to 
the budget balance. They do so using a system of simultaneous equations and a cross-
continent sample of aid recipients from Africa, Asia, and Latin America between 1970 
and 1989. They find that, consistent with their model prediction, donors respond to 
larger budget deficits of recipients by giving more aid and aid, so disbursed, induces 
larger budget deficits. Thus, aid has a negative effect on the development effort of 
recipient governments. This finding explains the effort of International Financial 
Institutions to commit aid donors to conditional aid contracts ± i.e., the coordination of 
aid disbursement from different sources has been advocated for ( Bulir and Hamann, 
2003, 2005); many bilateral agencies are encouraged to strengthen their ties as well as 
delegate aid disbursement to the World Bank and the IMF (Svensson, 1995). It is 
noteworthy that eventhough aid conditionality typically refers to a broad range of 
policy conditions, it only refers to budget conditions in the context of the present 
study.  
 
Given the relative importance of aid to sub-Saharan Africa recipients and later effort at 
coordinating and improving aid disbursement, a relevant contribution to the literature 
would be to re-examine the empirical test of Svensson (1995) separately for this 
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region, and to do so using more recent data. Therefore, the main objective of the 
present study is to re-examine the aid-budget deficit relationship, using data on a 
sample of 37 sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 1980 ± 2004. We find 
that, in line with Svensson (1995), larger budget deficits attract higher aid inflows, and 
aid inflows induce larger budget deficits. An important finding, however, is that 
whereas the magnitude of the response of aid to the budget balance of African 
countries is similar to that of the cross-continent evidence (ibid), the magnitude of the 
negative effect of aid on the budget balance of African recipients is approximately half 
of what the cross-continent evidence suggests.18 While this may be ascribed to recent 
effort to enforce conditional aid contracts, we find further evidence suggesting that the 
incentive effect of aid may be independent of what determines aid disbursement across 
countries. Investigating the latter is however beyond the present chapter.19  
 
In general, our results show that aid donation to sub-Saharan African countries is 
predominantly for humanitarian or poverty alleviation objectives. For instance, in 
addition to responding to budget difficulties, aid inflows increase to recipient countries 
with lower levels of GDP and life expectancy rates as well as those with higher infant 
mortality rates. What we cannot say is that aid rewards recipient governments that 
exert higher development effort. This is because aid inflows neither increase 
significantly to recipient countries that avoid budget deficits nor those with higher 
growth rates.20  
 
Following Svensson (1995), we apply both cross-sectional and panel techniques to a 
simultaneous system of equations for aid and the budget balance. Our cross-sectional 
                                                 
18
 Coefficients are compared in footnote 29 of result section 3.6.2.1. 
19
 This constitutes the subject of the next chapter. 
20
 This point assumes that high growth rate is the result of increased development effort. 
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approach is similar to Svensson¶V. With regards to the panel estimation, however, we 
use a different approach that enables us to increase our instrument validity by 
including lags of aid and the budget balance to our list of instruments without 
departing from the baseline equations for aid and the budget balance specified in 
Svensson (1995). Specifically, we treat the baseline equations as given and estimate 
each of them in a separate system of (two) equations. In each system, the baseline 
equation is the conditional equation while the second equation is the marginal 
equation. When the aid equation is the conditional equation, the budget balance 
equation is the marginal equation and vice versa. This approach enables us to improve 
upon the validity of our instruments by including the lags of aid and the budget 
balance only in the marginal equations while keeping the baseline specifications for 
the panel estimation free of these lags and comparable to our cross-section 
specification and to 6YHQVVRQ¶V cross-section and panel specifications. To see another 
importance of our panel approach, note that a time-invariant (or slow-changing 
variable) is likely to be as correlated with the lag of an autoregressive variable as it is 
contemporaneously with that variable. Therefore, if the lags of aid and the budget 
balance variables (that are potentially autoregressive) were to be included in the 
objective equations, the effect of time-invariant and slow-changing variables could be 
masked to an extent that depends on how autoregressive aid and budget balance are. 
With our panel approach, however, we are able to draw inferences on the role of time-
invariant or slow-changing variables and, at the same time, take advantage of the lags 
of the dependent variables (aid and the budget balance) as additional identifying 
restrictions.  
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The study is organised as follows: In section 3.2, we review some literature to reveal 
major contrasting views on the effective determination of aid disbursement and how 
relevant the relationship between aid and fiscal policy (including the budget deficit) is 
in aid effectiveness studies. We then present the theoretical model that underlies the 
present chapter in section 3.3, and the empirical specifications used for estimating our 
results in section 3.4. The definition and sources of data are briefly discussed in section 
3.5. Section 3.6 reports and discusses the empirical results, followed by a summary of 
the chapter in section 3.7.       
 
3.2 Literature review I 
(IIHFWXDOGHWHUPLQDQWRIDLGGLVEXUVHPHQWUHFLSLHQW¶VQHHGRU 
         performance? 
While there is consensus across studies that aid effectiveness depends on the objective 
for aid disbursement, the same cannot be said about what constitutes an effective 
objective for disbursement. A review of the literature on aid disbursement reveals two 
major schools of thought; those that support performance-motivated aid disbursement 
and those that support need-motivated aid disbursement. The former follows from 
incentive models of aid, while the latter is associated with the importance of income-
smoothing and relaxing the budget constraint. 
 
Income smoothing may have important welfare implications for low income countries. 
Pallage and Robe (2000) show that the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuation in 
low income countries is about 15 to 30 times that of the United States. They also show 
that while the most risk-averse representative consumer in the United States would 
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prefer 1% increase in growth to a complete wipe-out of income fluctuations, the 
opposite is true for a moderately risk-averse representative consumer in low income 
countries. Given that Pallage and Robe (2000) abstract from the effect of economic 
fluctuations on growth, their results may even be an underestimation of the true 
importance of income smoothing in low income countries. Regarding the importance 
of aid in smoothing income, Pallage et al (2007) find that, at least, three-quarters of the 
welfare cost of economic fluctuations could be prevented by a counter-cyclical 
disbursement. The latter however uses an inter-temporal utility maximisation model 
which assumes (on the basis of existing empirical evidence) that aid has no significant 
effect on growth; relaxing this assumption may yield different results. Generally, these 
findings suggest, in accordance with Bulir and Hamann (2003, 2005), that aid should 
be used as an insurance instrument by increasing disbursement when income falls.  
 
Another line of argument in favour of using aid to smooth income is in relation to 
macroeconomic management in developing countries. Particularly, uncertainty 
associated with income volatility complicates macroeconomic policy and investment 
decisions, and may lead to weak growth (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Bulir and 
Hamann, 2003 and 2005). Also, the neoclassical and endogenous growth models 
suggest that increased saving rate leads to increased investment rate, resulting in 
higher growth rate. However, slow growth in low income countries implies that, even 
though the marginal propensity to save is high, growth is too slow to generate enough 
increase in income and savings (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Therefore, aid could 
serve as an instrument for boosting capital investment and growth when used to relax 
the budget constraint facing low income governments.  
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On the contrary, studies that consider the incentive effect of aid suggest that 
disbursement should be tied to good policy or development effort (see for instance, 
6YHQVVRQDQG&RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD*ROGVEURXJKDQG&KHHOR
2007). The idea is that when aid disbursement is tied to improved performance, 
recipient governments are likely to exert more development effort in order to receive 
more aid. Svensson (2000) uses an aid incentive model comprising a representative 
donor and two recipients to show that, abstracting from information asymmetry, aid is 
best disbursement on the basis of need. However, when donor and recipient interests 
are different, and actions of the latter cannot be monitored, aid induces higher 
development effort when disbursement is conditioned on good outcome. Similarly, 
&RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLDVKRZWKDWZKHQGRQRUVFDQQRWGHWHUPLQHWKHOevel of 
commitment of a given recipient to development, it is best to impose higher levels of 
conditionality. Goldsbrough and Cheelo (2007) support the IMF¶s plan to give more 
aid on the basis of need and absorptive capacity, but only when recipients are 
committed to sound economic policies. While there is evidence that aid inflows are 
motivated by need, including fall in income and budget difficulties, our review of the 
literature reveals no evidence of performance-motivated aid disbursement (see, for 
instance, Svensson, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2003 and 
2005). To add to the existing literature on the incentive implications of aid 
disbursement, the present study investigates the response of aid inflows to the budget 
balance of sub-Saharan African countries and what the incentive implications are for 
their budget balance. In what follows, we present further review of existing literature 
to establish the relevance of the budget balance in our aid incentive study.  
   62 
3.2.2 Fiscal Policy as a link between aid and growth 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of aid at promoting growth has varied across 
studies. While this may suggest a variation in aid effectiveness across countries (or 
samples), the influence of the choice of control variables cannot be over-emphasized 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2001). It can be drawn from the endogenous growth model that the 
effect of aid on growth is indirect (Lensink and White, 2001). Specifically, aid induces 
higher growth rate when used in a manner that improves marginal productivity of 
capital in the recipient country, resulting in increased investment and growth. This can 
be achieved when the recipient government uses aid towards improved policy 
(including reduced domestic borrowing), for infrastructure (such as roads), and also to 
create demand for output produced by investors. Generally, several studies have 
identified policy and investment as major links between aid and growth (See for 
instance Svensson, 1995; Goldsbrough and Cheelo, 2007; Lensink and Morrissey, 
2000; Lensink and White, 2001). If this is indeed the case, then aid may appear to be 
an insignificant determinant of growth when policy and investment are controlled for. 
The reason is that the aid variable would only be capturing its effects that occur 
through channels that have not been controlled for.  
 
The evidence shows that, generally, aid becomes insignificant in growth regressions 
when policy and/or investment are included as control variables, confirming that they 
are important links between aid and growth. For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2003 
and 2005) find aid (on its own) to be an insignificant determinant of growth using a 
specification that controls for policy. Similarly, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) control 
for initial level of policy in their aid-growth specification and find the effect of aid to 
be insignificant.  
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Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Hansen and Tarp (2001) established, using separate 
estimations, that aid has a positive effect on investment level and growth. However, 
when they include both aid and investment in their base growth model, aid becomes 
insignificant, suggesting that the impact of aid on growth occurs mainly through 
investment (and in certain group of countries, through efficiency of investment as 
well). The latter finding does not imply that policy is not an important channel. Rather, 
it suggests that the effect of aid-influenced policies on growth occurs through 
investment as well. For instance, lower budget deficits may result in a fall in domestic 
borrowing and a rise in private investment for that matter. It therefore appears that, in 
accordance with the endogenous growth model, the effect of aid on growth is indirect, 
through policy and investment. It follows then that aid effectiveness studies could be 
more reliable if the concentration is on the effect of aid on the policy and/or 
investment channel(s). The present study addresses the policy channel, focusing on the 
budget balance in particular.  
 
Evidence on the effect of aid on policy is abundant in the literature on fiscal response 
to aid, where aid is shown to affect the budget balance and fiscal aggregates of 
recipient countries: Svensson (1995) finds the effect of aid on the budget balance 
(fiscal policy) to be negative in a cross-continent sample of developing countries; Osei 
et al. (2005) finds a close association of aid inflows with reduced domestic borrowing 
and improved tax effort in Ghana; aid inflows to Zambia is associated with increased 
domestic borrowing and decreased tax effort (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a); aid 
inflows are associated with reduced domestic borrowing in Ethiopia (Martins, 2010). 
Thus, as with the aid-growth relationship, there is variation in the aid-policy 
relationship across countries, suggest that it is an empirical question. 
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3.3 Theoretical model 
A major reason for giving development aid to low income countries is that it may 
facilitate welfare improvement through the provision of structural reform assistance. 
Therefore, it is often required by donors that recipients of aid exert an agreed amount 
of reform effort in return for aid. Since aid resource is limited, it is important for 
recipient governments to be able to sustain welfare improvements without having to 
continually depend on aid. For that matter, the achievement of fiscal stability, 
particularly reduced budget deficits, is a core objective of most structural reform 
agreements between aid donors and recipients.  
 
For humanitarian reasons, altruistic donors would find it desirable to allocate more aid 
to recipients who need it most. In the present context, therefore, recipient countries 
with less fiscal stability, including larger budget deficits (to GDP ratio), receive more 
aid. However, given that the preferences of aid donors and recipients are not 
necessarily the same and that the reform effort exerted by recipients is not completely 
verifiable, the altruism of donors may have some incentive implications that 
undermine the objective for aid donation. For instance, knowing that, ex post, altruistic 
donors would give more aid to those who need it most, recipients would not have the 
incentive to exert higher reform effort ex ante; possibly, recipients would want to 
express more need by exerting lower reform effort ex ante. The Svensson (2000) aid 
incentive model therefore predicts that increased fiscal deficits lead to increased 
inflows of aid, and aid induces increased fiscal deficits. In what follows, we present a 
summarised exposition of the aid incentive model of Svensson (2000) that formalises 
the incentive implications of aid disbursement. 
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3.3.1 The Model 
The model is characterized by a two-period horizon, one altruistic donor and n 
recipients. In the first period, recipient government i budgets endowment, z, for non-
development spending, g1i, and development spending, ei as summarised by the budget 
constraint in (3.1).     
 
(3.1) zeg ii d1    
 
Resource available to government i in the second period, R, is also budgeted for non-
development spending, g2i, and development spending di as given by period 2 budget 
constraint in (3.2).     
 
(3.2) iii Rdg d2   
 
The available resource in the second period, R, is an increasing function of 
development spending in the first period, ei, but also depends on the state of the world. 
Expected R is therefore summarised by the probability expression in (3.3). 
  
(3.3) ®¯­ q(e)-1y  probabilit with 
 q(e)y  probabilit with 
E
J
R  
 
where Ȗ> ȕ>0 (implying that Ȗ and ȕ represent R in good and bad states respectively), 
and q is an increasing and concave function of the adjustment effort such that q
q(z)<1. 
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The donor is altruistic and so derives satisfaction from giving aid, a i, in period 2 for 
producing goods and services for the poor in country i according to the following 
increasing and concave production function. 
 
(3.4) hi = h(a i) 
 
Thus, the poor consumes goods, di, provided by the recipient government from its own 
resources and from aid proceeds. The total (public) consumption, Ci, of the poor in the 
recipient country i is as given in (3.5). 
 
(3.5) ))(( iiii ahRdC   D    
 
where ĮLVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIWKHUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VWRWDOUHVRXUFHVXVHGWRSURGXFH
goods for consumption by the poor public. 
 
,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWWKHUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQLVDGGLWLYHDQGVHSDUDEOH
and is defined as:  
 
(3.6)  )(1 iii xugW  G  
 
where G denotes the constant marginal utility of non-development spending in the first 
period, and )( ixu  is a differentiable, increasing and concave function that denotes total 
utility from both non-development spending and consumption of the public in the 
second period. To cut down on notation, xi is defined as follows: 
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(3.7)  > @iii Cgx ,2min  
 
Equation (3.7) implies that, in the second period the recipient government is willing to 
trade off non-development spending for higher public consumption at the margin. 
Thus, by assuming that public consumption is low, equation (3.6) could be written as  
 
(3.8)  )(1 iii CugW  G  
 
3.3.3 Incentive Implications of Altruistic Aid Donation 
To show the incentive implications of altruistic aid disbursement for reform effort 
exerted by recipients ex ante, it is convenient to first solve for the optimal level of 
reform effort when there is no aid (henceforth, the non-aid equilibrium). In the non-aid 
equilibrium, the optimal composition of spending by the recipient government in the 
second period is obtained by equating the marginal utilities of non-development and 
development spending. Therefore, the optimal composition of spending is obtained by 
simply halving the given level of government resources, Ri as follows: 
   
(3.9) 2/2 inai Rg   and 2/inai Rd   
 
where superscript na denotes the non-aid equilibrium. 
 
From the consumption function in (3.5), it could be deduced that in the absence of aid, 
consumption goods are produced from development spending in the second 
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period, naid , on a one to one basis. Therefore in the equilibrium without aid, the 
consumption function becomes (3.10). 
 
(3.10) 2inaii RdC    
 
Given that at the time of exerting reform effort, naie , in period 1, the recipient 
government could only form expectations about the outcome, Ri, of reform effort, the 
optimal level of reform effort depends on the expected gains. Therefore, to solve for 
the optimal level of reform effort, first incorporate the expectations in (3.3) into 
equation (3.10). The expected utility of the recipient government in (3.8) can then be 
maximised with respect to the first period development effort, naie , to yield the 
following first order condition (FOC): 
 
(3.11) GEJ  »¼
º«¬
ª  )
2
1()
2
1()(' uueq nai    
 
In compact form, equation (3.11) is written as 
 
(3.12) > @ GEJ   ))(())(()(' iinai CuCueq  
 
Thus, the optimal level of reform effort is obtained by equating the expected marginal 
gain of reform effort (left hand side) to the marginal gain of non-development 
spending (right hand side). The expected marginal gain of reform effort is the product 
of the marginal increase in the probability of a good state and the gain in utility when a 
country moves from a bad state to a good state. Given the trade-off between 
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development and non-development spending (equation (3.1)), the marginal gain of 
non-development spending could be perceived as the marginal cost of development 
spending. When the gain in utility, associated with a move from bad to good state (in 
square bracket) is small, the marginal increase in the probability of a good state 
required to satisfy equation (3.12) is large, implying that, by reason of concavity of the 
probability function, a low level of reform effort would be exerted. The incentive 
effect of aid derives from the fact that aid can be used to alter the gain in utility 
associated with a move from bad to good state, and for that matter the amount of 
reform effort exerted by the recipient. 
 
In the aid equilibrium, tKHGRQRU¶VDLGEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWLV as given in (3.13). 
 
(3.13) )(
1
saA
n
i
i¦
 
    Ss  
where )(sa i is aid donated to country i in aggregate state s, with S representing all 
possible aggregate states. The allocation of the aid budget depends on the relative state 
RI DOO WKH UHFLSLHQW FRXQWULHV 7KHUHIRUH D JLYHQ UHFLSLHQW¶V H[SHFWHG JDLQ LQ XWLOLW\
associated with a move from bad to good state also depends on the expected state of all 
other potential aid recipients. In the case of two recipients, it follows from (3.3) that 
there are four possible aggregate states as follows: 
 
(3.14) 
°°¯
°°®
­
 
))q(eq(ey probabilit with ),(
 ))q(e-)(1q(ey probabilit with ),(
)))q(eq(e-(1y probabilit with ),(
))q(e-))(1q(e-(1y probabilit with ),(
),(
21
21
21
21
21
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EJ
JE
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RR      
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The aggregate state, ),( EE , represents the situation whereby both recipients are in a 
bad state. Incorporating all four possibilities into equation (3.12) yields the 
corresponding FOC for the aid equilibrium, which for recipient country 1 is written as 
follows: 
 
(3.15) > @ G )< 111)(' eq  
where: 
          )),(())(1()),(()( 12121 EJJJ CueqCueq  <  
and: 
          )),(())(1()),(()( 12121 EEJE CueqCueq  )  
 
Subscripts 1 and 2 denote countries 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
To see the incentive implication for the reform effort when recipients anticipate 
altruistic aid donation (consumption smoothing) ex post, note that giving more aid 
when country 1 is in a bad state (equivalent to increasing 1) in equation (3.15)) lowers 
the expected gain in utility when country 1 moves from bad to good state. Therefore, 
the recipiHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VRSWLPDOHIIRUWUHquired to satisfy equation (3.15) would be 
lower by reason of the concavity of the probability function, q. It follows from the 
model that when the recipient governments correctly anticipate that, ex post altruistic 
donors would prefer to give more aid to those who need it most, the recipients would 
exert lower reform effort in order to express more need. Hence, the model prediction is 
that fiscal deficits lead to increased inflows of aid, and aid induces fiscal deficits. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the aid incentive model of Svensson (2000) assumes 
implicitly that all recipients have similar characteristics and therefore differences in 
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fiscal deficits across recipients is mainly due to differences in fiscal discipline 
(&RUGHOOD DQG 'HOO¶$ULFFLD  5HOD[LQJ WKLV DVVXPSWLRQ LQ IXWXUH UHVHDUFK PD\
yield different conclusions about the incentive implications of giving more aid to those 
who need it most.  
 
3.4. Empirical Framework 
The concept underlying the empirical analysis of the present study is summarised by 
the framework in figure 3.1 which illustrates two major alternate objectives for the 
disbursement of development aid. First, aid is used as an incentive instrument to 
induce high development effort from recipient governments. In this case aid 
disbursement is conditioned on observable reform effort. This creates the incentive for 
aid dependent recipients to exert high development effort even when it is costly (say 
politically) in the short-run, with the advantage of increasing the likely the likelihood 
of growth and welfare.  
 
The second major objective for the disbursement of aid is to alleviate poverty, in 
which case there are increased inflows to countries with increased economic 
difficulties, including low income and high budget constraints. On a similar note, 
altruistic donors prefer to give more aid to recipients with larger budget deficits in 
order to achieve fiscal stability.  The latter approach to aid disbursement may however 
serve as a disincentive for fiscal discipline since recipients may want to express need 
by exerting less effort in order to receive more aid. On the other hand, conditioning aid 
disbursement on better economic outcome (including lower fiscal deficits) may have 
adverse implications for poverty alleviation.  
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The primary objective of the present study is to re-examine the hypotheses of 
Svensson (1995), that aid induces fiscal indiscipline and that fiscal deficits attract more 
aid. Unlike Svensson, we do so using a sample of sub-Saharan African countries and 
more recent data. Before we specify our empirical model, we conduct a brief review of 
the relevant empirical literature to identify and, as much as possible, account for 
limitations of previous studies.    
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework 
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3.4.1 Literature review II: Review of empirical issues in aid effectiveness studies 
There are several determinants of aid disbursement that are not necessarily consistent 
among donors. That is, donors respond differently to these determinants, reflecting 
different objectives for aid disbursement. It follows then that different categories of 
aid, depending on the objective for disbursement, may have different impact in the 
recipient country. This partly explains the different conclusions on aid effectiveness 
across studies.   
 
A review of the literature on aid effectiveness reveals some salient empirical issues 
that may also have contributed to the differences in existing results. These issues are 
discussed in this section as follows: Firstly, we identify issues relating to the choice of 
instrumental variables for aid and how these affect empirical results on aid 
effectiveness. Even though the different categories or components of aid have different 
implications for development, several studies on aid effectiveness use instrumental 
variables that purge total aid of the components that are relevant for economic 
development, resulting in the conclusion that aid is ineffective.  Secondly, we address 
the importance of controlling for shocks in aid effectiveness studies. Adverse shocks 
may create a negative relationship between aid and policy/investment/growth. This is 
because adverse shocks induce increased inflows of aid but impacts negatively on 
policy/investment/growth.  
 
Determinants of aid disbursement 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) conduct a thorough investigation of the main determinants 
of aid disbursement. They test whether aid inflows respond to variables that suggest a 
proper use of aid for poverty reduction (such as economic needs, institutions, 
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corruption ± suggested by Lumsdaine, 1993), and policies that are effective and open 
(democratisation and trade liberalization), or whether aid responds to political and 
strategic interests (such as alliances and former colonies ± suggested by Maizels and 
Nissanke, 1984). They find political and strategic interests (captured by years of being 
a colony in the 20th century) to be significant determinants of aid allocation, just as 
economic needs and effective policies (such as democratization ± which attracts 50% 
increase in aid). Unlike economic need, which explains the variation in aid 
disbursement both across countries and over time, political factors and strategic 
interest explains the cross-country variation and policies (such as democratization and 
µRSHQQHVV¶ H[SODLQ WKH YDULDWLRQ RYHU WLPH21 Also, they find evidence of the well 
known population bias whereby countries with large population size receive less aid 
(as a ratio of GDP). It is noteworthy that different donors do respond to the identified 
determinants of aid differently. For instance, in contrast to Alesina and Dollar (2000), 
Hook and Taylor (1998) reject an altruistic motive for aid disbursement and Svensson 
(1995) found no evidence that aid rewards effective development policies. Therefore, 
having established the general trend in aid determination and the impact of aid, country 
specific studies would be a useful next step.    
 
Choice of instruments for aid 
In determining what might be a good choice of instruments for aid, it would be 
essential to know the main determinants of aid. Generally, determinants of aid 
allocation across countries, identified in the literature, include colonial past and 
population, and determinants of aid disbursement over time include policies. Economic 
need determines aid disbursement both across-countries and over time. Given that 
                                                 
21
 This suggests a divergence between aid determination across countries and within countries (over-
time). 
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different determinants (as well as different donor responses to some determinants) of 
aid may impact differently on policy, investment, and/or growth, using only a subset of 
aid determinants as instruments may purge aid of some relevant components. We 
therefore suggest the lag of aid as an adequate instrument in time-series and panel 
estimations since it engulfs all the different determinants of aid discussed and is 
exogenous to contemporaneous aid. Even though the lag of aid is not available in 
cross-section estimations, this poses a lesser problem. This is because there is no 
evidence that development effort determines aid disbursement across countries. 
Determinants of aid disbursement across countries include economic need, population 
size, and political and strategic interests.    
 
The popular finding of Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), that the effect of aid on 
growth is only positive in a good policy environment, may have been influenced by 
not appropriately controlling for shocks (as discussed in the following section) as well 
as the choice of instruments for aid ± namely population, infant mortality rate, and 
SUR[LHV IRU GRQRUV¶ VWUDWHJLF interests. With the exception of population, the other 
instruments are likely to be correlated with poor economic performance or ineffective 
use of aid. For instance, infant mortality is likely to be high in economies performing 
poorly. With regards to doQRUV¶ VWUDWHJLF LQWerest, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) 
show, in their empirical investigation of aid determination, that the allocation of 
bilateral aid to donor friends tends to direct aid to poor policies. Related to this 
argument is Ali and Isse (2005) conclusion that aid could have a disastrous effect when 
donor interests and geopolitical considerations overwhelm good policies. On the other 
hand, Collier and Dollar (1998) show that aid allocated as a function of the recipient-
FRXQWULHV¶ OHYHO RI SRYerty and quality of economic institutions and policies has the 
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maximum effect on poverty reduction. Other studies that have used instruments based 
RQ GRQRU DQG UHFLSLHQW UHODWLRQ RU GRQRU¶V LQWHUHVW LQFOXGH &KHUYLQ DQG YDQ
Wijnbergen (2009) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) both of which use an 
instrument constructed by the latter based on political, historic, and strategic alliance 
between donor and recipient of aid. The Rajan and Subramanian (2005) instrument is 
expected to be highly correlated with non-economically-motivated aid (particularly 
bilateral aid) that is unlikely to be disbursed based on economic performance. In other 
words, the part of aid conditional on economic performance is likely to be purged off, 
resulting in estimates of the effect of aid on growth that are not statistically significant. 
None of the instruments mentioned is likely to be correlated with effective use of aid. 
Therefore the instrument is likely to purge aid of the part used for growth.  
 
Also, Ali and Isse (2005) used ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable as an 
instrument for aid and concluded that aid has a significant negative effect on growth. 
However, this negative effect of aid is not significant in their OLS estimation. The 
reason could be that the effect of aid in the IV estimation is negatively biased since the 
instrument (ethnolinguistic fractionalization) is likely to be negatively correlated with 
growth. Another instance is where Svensson (1995) uses population, infant mortality 
rate, and life expectancy rate as instruments for aid in their 2SLS estimation of the 
effect of aid on policy (budget balance) and conclude that aid has a deteriorating effect 
RQ WKH EXGJHW EDODQFH 1RWH WKDW ZLWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI SRSXODWLRQ 6YHQVVRQ¶V
instruments are likely to cause a negative correlation between aid and policy. This is 
because the part of aid disbursement that is strongly correlated with infant mortality 
and life expectancy is motivated by need, implying that it is given to countries with 
economic difficulties and policies are likely to be weaker in such countries.    
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Studies that do not use non-holistic instrumental variables often find a positive effect 
of aid on growth. For instance, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) who find the effect of 
aid on growth to be significantly positive irrespective of policy do not use instruments 
for aid. Rather, they conduct stability analysis to ensure the validity of their results 
when several different combinations of variables are used. Also, Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) use panel GMM estimators (system-GMM and difference-GMM), which make 
use of appropriately lagged variables (including aid) as instruments, and find a positive 
effect of aid on growth (that does not depend on good policy).  
 
Another evidence of a possible influence of inappropriate instruments on estimation 
results is Rajan and Subramanian (2005). They find that different sub-categories of aid 
(economic, social, food aid, bilateral and multilateral aid) have similar (insignificant) 
effects on growth, and interpreted this as evidence of a high degree of fungibility. 
However, the similarity in the findings across sub-categories of aid may be the result 
of using the same instrument for the various categories of aid. Given that the 
instrument is constructed from variables related to the political/historical/strategic 
alliance between donors and recipients (or simply non-economic instrument), it could 
be inferred that, for all categories of aid, it is mainly the part that is strongly correlated 
with political/strategic alliance between donor and recipient that is analysed. 
Therefore, for aid effectiveness studies to be more reliable, instrumental variables that 
do not purge aid of any of its components (including need- and performance-motivated 
components) must be used. The present study suggests the use of the lag of aid as 
instrument for aid. 
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Controlling for shocks in aid-effectiveness regressions  
Since aid inflow is likely to increase during adverse shocks (which affect growth 
negatively), aid is likely to be negatively correlated with growth when such shocks are 
not controlled for (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). It could therefore be argued that the 
positive effect of the aid±policy interaction term on growth found by Burnside and 
Dollar (2000, 2005) could simply be reflecting the correlation between aid inflows and 
growth in recipient economies that is explained by adverse shocks. Following the same 
argument, aid and policy may not be entirely independent; aid inflows and policy may 
be correlated when they are both affected by similar shocks. It may also be the case 
that aid, by reason of its volatility, may be capturing macroeconomic instability which 
is not conducive for growth. It is therefore essential to control for shocks before 
inferences on aid effectiveness (with respect to policy or growth) are drawn.22 Newlyn 
(1990) found that foreign aid is effective for growth, but the positive effects are offset 
by negative oil shocks, debt crises and other exogenous shocks. Such offsets must 
therefore be controlled for. 
 
To control for VKRFNV WRDQDLG UHFLSLHQW¶VHFRQRP\LQ WKHHPSLULFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQRI
the aid-growth relationship, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) include a measure of 
uncertainty (associated with both negative and positive shocks). Using a cross-country 
empirical growth specification similar to Barro (1996), Lensink and Morrissey (2000) 
find a significant positive effect of aid on growth that does not depend on good policy. 
It is noteworthy, however, that when they use aid instability (that includes both 
predictable and unpredictable changes in aid inflows) rather than uncertainty 
                                                 
22
 Even when adverse shocks are controlled for, an interaction between aid and policy in a growth equation may be 
contentious. This is because the choice of policy may in itself be endogenous to aid. For instance, unpredictability 
and reduction of aid, just like an adverse shock, may affect policy.  
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(unpredictability of aid), they do not find any significant positive effect of aid on 
growth. An important note here is that we only emphasize on how important it is to 
appropriately control for shocks in aid effectiveness regressions. We do not imply that 
aid becomes more effective once this is done. The effectiveness of aid varies across 
countries and samples. Generally, existing evidence shows that there are differences in 
the way shocks are measured and that the results on aid effectiveness (when shocks are 
controlled for) vary in different studies. For instance, in contrast to Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000), Chervin and van Wijnbergen (2009) find that aid instability has a 
negative effect on economic growth and aid has a positive effect on economic growth 
once aid instability is controlled for. Unlike Lensink and Morrissey (2000), however, 
Chervin and van Wijnbergen conduct a panel analysis in which aid is instrumented for. 
Also, when GDP level and GDP growth (possibly capturing income shock) are 
controlled for, Svensson (1995) find a robust positive correlation between aid and 
budget deficit and conclude that aid induces a weak fiscal discipline. Other measures 
of shock in the literature include change in per capita GDP for income shock (Bulir 
and Hamann, 2005) and average growth and changes in TOT for economic shocks in 
general (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). In the context of the present study, shocks to 
GDP may cause an increase in aid inflow whiles influencing budget balance negatively 
so it is essential that such shocks are appropriately controlled for before inferences are 
made.  
  
In conclusion, the evidence from the literature suggests that aid effectiveness should be 
examined through the effect of aid on determinants of growth. Clearly, results on aid 
effectiveness are more reliable when appropriate instruments for aid are used and 
shocks are controlled for.  
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As a final remark, further review of the literature on aid effectiveness ± to be addressed 
in the next chapter ± revealed that there may be divergence in the cross-country and 
within-country aid determination. Aid effectiveness across countries may be a function 
of the within country dimension of aid determination, supporting the notion that aid 
effectiveness is nonlinear. This extension is a key subject of the next chapter.  
 
3.4.2 Empirical specification 
In this section, we first present the baseline empirical specifications for testing the 
empirical predictions of the aid incentive model; note that these loosely follow 
Svensson (1995) for comparability of results. Secondly, we outline what we do 
differently to improve the estimations. 
  
3.4.2.1 The baseline empirical model 
The fundamental idea of Svensson (2000) aid incentive model is twofold. The first is 
that, for humanitarian reasons, altruistic donors find it optimal to give more aid to 
countries with larger budget deficits (smaller budget balances). Secondly, by 
anticipating correctly that more aid would be received when there are large budget 
deficits, recipient governments may lack the incentive to prevent budget deficits. Thus, 
the model prediction, which was previously tested in Svensson (1995), is that aid 
induces budget deficits and budget deficits attract more aid. The model prediction is 
represented empirically by the following simultaneous system of equations: 
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(3.16)   iiiiii XGROWTHGDPBBAID SGGGGG  43210 log  
 
(3.17)  iiiiii ZGROWTHGDPAIDBB Xwwwww 43210 log  
 
where AID and BB respectively denote official development assistance and the budget 
balance, both measured as ratios to the gross domestic product. Also, GDP and 
GROWTH denote initial per capita real GDP level and the initial rate of growth 
respectively. The vectors X and Z contain standard controls in the literature for aid and 
budget balance determination respectively.  
 
In the aid equation, X contains variables such as infant mortality and life expectancy 
that capture long term development characteristics of the recipient, and population that 
controls for the well known population-bias of foreign aid disbursement (Svensson, 
1995; Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 2005). The symbol S  denotes the residual 
capturing exogenous shocks to aid disbursement. The coefficient of interest in equation 
(3.16) is 1G . Based on the model prediction, this coefficient is expected to be negative. 
Thus, due to altruism, aid inflows increase when a recipient faces fiscal difficulties. 
Also, given that humanitarian spending is desirable to altruistic donors, the coefficients 
on GROWTH, GDP, and life expectancy are expected to be negative, and the 
coefficient on infant mortality is expected to be positive.  
 
In the budget balance equation (3.17), Z contains variables such as change in terms of 
trade that captures the effect of exogenous trade shocks, ethnic polarisation, and 
political stability. The coefficient of interest in the budget balance equation, (3.17), is 
1w . This coefficient is expected to have a negative sign because, by expecting more aid 
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inflows when there are larger fiscal deficits, recipients do not exert enough effort to 
prevent deficits ex ante. In the budget balance equation (3.17), the coefficients on 
GROWTH, and change in terms of trade are expected to be positive, and the 
coefficient on GDP is expected to be ambiguous; higher GDP may lead to higher 
revenue and higher expenditure alike. The residual X  captures all exogenous shocks to 
the budget balance. Equations (3.16) and (3.17) are, respectively, the baseline aid and 
budget balance specifications suggested by Svensson (1995).  
 
As in Svensson (1995), we employ both cross-section and panel techniques to estimate 
the baseline equations. We however follow a different approach in our panel 
estimations. What we do differently is that we exploit the panel technique to improve 
upon the choice of instruments for aid and budget balance. Specifically, we include the 
lags of aid and the budget balance as additional instruments for the aid and the budget 
balance variables respectively.23While we do so, it is essential that we do not depart 
from the baseline equations in order to ensure that differences between the results of 
the present study and past results are not ascribable to different specifications. We 
therefore treat the two baseline equations as given and estimate each of them in a 
separate system of equations. This is further explained in the next section. It is 
noteworthy, however, that maintaining the baseline equation for aid also enables us to 
draw more general conclusions about the motive for aid disbursement based on the 
role of humanitarian variables like life expectancy, infant mortality, per capita GDP 
level and GDP growth. To see why, note that these humanitarian variables are either 
time-invariant or slow-changing over time and therefore, as determinants of aid 
                                                 
23
 Given the Svensson (1995) system of simultaneous equations (3.16) and (3.17), the instruments for 
aid are population, infant mortality, and life expectancy, and the instruments for the budget balance are 
the change in terms of trade, ethnic polarisation, and political instability.  
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inflows, they are likely to be as strongly correlated with the lag of aid as they are with 
contemporaneous aid. Therefore including the lag of aid in the baseline equation could 
mask the effect of the humanitarian variables on aid determination. Similarly, 
including the lag of the budget balance in the baseline equation for the budget balance 
could mask the effect of time-invariant and slow-changing control variables like ethnic 
fragmentation, political stability, and GDP growth. In what follows, we explain how 
the lags of aid and the budget balance are included as instruments without varying the 
baseline specifications. 
 
3.4.2.2 Response of aid flows to the budget balance  
Following Svensson (1995), we use the baseline specification in (3.16) to estimate aid. 
Unlike Svensson, however, the latter is estimated as a system with a marginal equation 
(rather than the baseline equation) for the budget balance. The marginal equation only 
serves as a first stage estimation in a typical instrumental variable approach in which 
budget balance is instrumented for within an aid determination equation. For reasons 
explained in the preceding section, this method is used to ensure that we improve the 
validity of instruments for the budget balance in the aid equation. Conversely, we 
maintain the baseline equation for the budget balance (3.17) when we address its 
response to aid. The panel estimation for the baseline aid equation is obtained within 
the following simultaneous system:24   
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Note that equation (3.22) is the same as (3.24)(a). 
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(3.18) (a) itititititit XGROWTHGDPBBAID SGGGGG  43210 log  
   
(3.18) (b) ititititititit ZGROWTHGDPBBAIDBB XJJJJJJ   5431210 log  
 
where 1itBB is the lag of the budget balance variable, which in a 5 year pooled cross-
section data refers to the previous 5 year average. All other variables are as defined in 
(3.16) and (3.17). Note that the empirical specification for aid determination in 
(3.18)(a), which is of interest here, remains the same as the baseline equation for aid in 
(3.16) and is the conditional equation of the system. The marginal equation of the 
system, which identifies the budget balance variable included in the conditional 
equation for aid, is given in (3.18)(b). The marginal equation includes the lag of 
budget balance as an additional identifying restriction for the aid determination 
equation in (3.18)(a). As in equation (3.16), the coefficient of interest is 1G , which we 
expect to be negative given the model prediction that aid flows from altruistic donors 
increase when the budget deficit is large.  
 
3.4.2.3 Response of the budget balance to aid inflows 
As with aid in the previous section, the systems panel estimation of the baseline budget 
balance equation is carried out within a system which includes the marginal equation 
for aid as specified below.25 
 
(3.19)(a)   itititititit ZGROWTHGDPAIDBB Xwwwww 43210 log     
 (3.19)(b)   
              ititititititit XGROWTHGDPAIDBBAID SDDDDDD   5431210 log  
                                                 
25
 Note that equation (3.19)(a) is the same as equation (3.17). 
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where 1itAID denotes the lag of the aid variable, which refers to the previous 5 year 
average when 5 year pooled cross-section data is used. All other variables are as 
defined in (3.16) and (3.17). The budget balance equation in (3.19a) and the aid 
equation in (3.19b) are, respectively, the conditional and marginal equations of the 
system. Unlike equation (3.17), the marginal equation (3.19b) includes the lag of aid in 
order to improve the instrument validity for aid. Of interest is the conditional equation 
for the budget balance in (3.19a), which is the same as the baseline equation in (3.17). 
The coefficient of interest is 1w , which we expect to be negative a priori. Thus, 
knowing that aid inflows increase when there are fiscal difficulties, recipients are 
unlikely to prevent deficits ex ante, resulting in deficits ex post.  
 
Unlike the panel analyses, we employ the same estimation approach as Svensson 
(1995) in our cross-section analyses. Thus, we estimate the baseline equations for aid 
and the budget balance together in a system of simultaneous equations because it is 
impossible to introduce lagged instruments. In what follows, we explain the relevance 
of including the lags of the aid and budget balance variables as additional identifying 
restrictions and specifying separate simultaneous systems for the aid and budget 
balance objective equations in (3.18) and (3.19).  
 
3.4.2.4 The importance of lagged aid as instrument for total (incentive and 
             humanitarian) aid 
Generally, the lags of autoregressive variables present as useful instruments because 
their relatively strong correlation with the corresponding contemporaneous variable 
reduces the weak-instrument problem associated with instrumental variable 
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estimations. For this reason, we exploit the panel estimation by using the lags of aid 
and budget balance as additional identifying restrictions.    
 
In addition to reducing the weak-instrument problem, using lagged values as 
instruments has useful implications for the validity of instruments, especially for the 
aid variable in particular. To see this, note that there are different objectives for aid 
disbursement, ranging from the creation of development incentives to the alleviation of 
poverty. Incentive aid is given to recipients with increased development effort, 
whereas aid for alleviating poverty is given to recipients with increased economic 
difficulties. With regards to the recipiHQW¶VEXGJHW VLWXDWLRQ WKHUHIRUH WKHFRUUHODWLRQ
between aid and budget deficits is likely to be negative for incentive aid and positive 
for poverty alleviation aid. It follows then that the effect of different types of aid on the 
budget balance may vary. Given that the present study analyses the effect of total aid, 
it is essential not to choose instrumental variables that are strongly correlated with a 
particular type of aid as this could bias the results. For instance, the baseline 
specifications for aid and the budget balance in Svensson (1995) system of 
simultaneous equations, as given in (3.16) and (3.17), use population, infant mortality 
and life expectancy as instruments for aid. Meanwhile, both infant mortality and life 
expectancy are likely to be strongly correlated with humanitarian aid but not incentive 
aid. Also, population is likely to be correlated with non-incentive-motivated aid. 
Therefore, the three instrumental variables are likely to purge the aid variable of the 
incentive-motivated-part, resulting in estimates that are indicative of the effect of 
poverty-alleviation aid rather than total aid. To circumvent this problem (of 
biasedness), we use the lag of aid as instrument for aid in the panel estimation.  
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3.5. Description and sources of data 
The present study applies panel and cross-sectional analytical techniques on 
transformed annual time series data for 37 developing African countries over the 
period of 1980 to 2004; the data is transformed into pools of five-year averages and 
country averages for the panel and cross-section estimations respectively. Variables 
used include foreign aid, budget balance, GDP level, GDP growth, population, infant 
mortality, life expectancy, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, war dummy, and change 
in terms of trade.  
 
The source of data for foreign aid (ODA), budget balance and GDP are as discussed in 
chapter 2. To keep GDP levels comparable across countries, constant international 
dollar price numeraire was used. Data on GDP level is adjusted for population size 
since the ultimate focus of the study is on the welfare of recipients. Growth is obtained 
as the annual percentage change in GDP per capita (in constant international dollars). 
It is noteworthy that GDP level and GDP growth are potential endogenous regressors 
in an aid determination equation: the former occurs when aid spending increases GDP 
level through private consumption, investment, and government expenditure. The latter 
derives from the fact that aid donors may treat poor growth as evidence of need for 
need-based disbursement, and improved growth as evidence of good performance for 
incentive-based disbursement, both of which are likely to influence the effort of 
recipient governments at promoting growth. This explains why instrumental variables 
are often used to identify aid in growth regressions of developing countries (see 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 2005). Given that the relationships between aid and the 
GDP and growth variables are not the focus of the present study and that the sample 
size is relatively small, identifying both GDP level and growth with instrumental 
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variables would only compromise useful degrees of freedom. Therefore, following 
Svensson (1995), we curb the potential endogenous bias associated with these two 
variables by using their initial values. Data on terms of trade (TOT), infant mortality 
and life expectancy are obtained from the ADI online database ± infant mortality is 
measured as the number of infants out of 1000 live births that die before the age of 
one, and life expectancy is defined as the number of years a newborn is expected to 
live based on the existing pattern of deaths.     
 
We measure political instability with a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for 
countries where there have been incidences of war over the study period. This measure 
is relevant in the context of foreign aid effects because it is unreasonable to give any 
other form of aid other than humanitarian help to recipients when there is war. 
Therefore, the estimated effect of aid on the budget balance becomes more reliable 
when the effect of war is controlled for. Svensson (1995) captures political instability 
with a measure of major government change. The measure is however based on pre-
1982 era and would therefore not be relevant for the present study given our study 
period and the major political changes in the post-1982 period. To control for the 
effect of ethnic fragmentation on budget balance, we use ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation data from the 1964 Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of People of the 
World) reported in Taylor and Hudson (1972). The ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
index for a country is interpreted as the probability that any two randomly selected 
persons from the population belong to different tribes.  
 
A summary of the main variables is presented in appendix A3. Given that the sample 
size is relatively small, outliers are likely to affect the results tremendously. Therefore, 
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following the conventional rule of thumb, the analyses exclude data points that are not 
within a range of three standard deviations from the mean.    
 
 
3.6 Empirical estimation and discussion of results 
Svensson (1995) uses data on a sample of recipient governments from Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America over the period of 1970 and 1989 to investigate the relationship 
between foreign aid inflows and the budget balance. Their finding supports the 
fundamental idea of their aid incentive model that, due to altruism of donors coupled 
with the enforcement problem associated with conditional aid contracts, aid induces 
fiscal indiscipline. That is, aid flows from altruistic donors is need-based and knowing 
this ex ante, aid recipients have the incentive to express more need by exerting lower 
effort to prevent budget deficits. Aid therefore affects the fiscal performance of 
recipient governments negatively. We report our results for sub-Saharan Africa as 
follows: First, we report the response of aid inflows to the budget balance, followed by 
the effect of aid inflows on the budget balance. 
 
3.6.1 The response of aid flows to the budget balance 
The regression results for the response of aid inflows to the budget balance, based on 
the estimation of equation (3.18)(a), are reported in tables 3.1 to 3.3. Estimates in table 
3.1 and 3.2 are based on panel techniques, using 5 year pooled cross-section data, 
whereas estimates in table 3.3 are obtained using cross-section methods and annual-
average data for the whole study period (1980-2004). We find that, indeed, larger 
budget deficits induce significant increases in aid inflows. Thus, aid donors do not 
appear to reward recipients who exert higher effort to avoid budget deficits. We also 
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find that countries with lower levels of income (per capita GDP) receive more aid and 
so do countries with lower life expectancy. The findings are robust across different 
estimation methods.  
 
3.6.1.1 Panel (pooled cross-section) analysis 
OLS estimates 
Columns 1(a) and 1(b) of table 3.1 show the results of OLS regressions without and 
with time dummies (labelled NODUM and DUM) respectively. The budget balance 
appears to be a significant determinant of the total amount of aid received (at the 1% 
level) such that countries with larger budget deficits receive more aid. Also, life 
expectancy and the level of per capita GDP have significant negative effect on total aid 
receipts (at the 1% level). These findings suggest that the motive for aid disbursement 
is predominantly need-based rather than performance-based. Also in support of this 
view is that there is an insignificant effect of growth in determining total aid receipts, 
given that growth requires improved development effort. The implication of the need-
motive of aid disbursement for the budget balance of recipients is addressed in the next 
sub-section. Surprisingly, however, high infant mortality appears to have a significant 
reducing effect on aid inflows but, as would become clear, this finding is not robust 
across different estimation methods. Finally, the OLS results is consistent with the well 
known population bias in aid allocation, in that population size has a significant 
negative effect on aid inflows (as a percentage of GDP) at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.1  Panel estimation of aid determination equation 
 
AID/GDP 
 OLS_NODUM OLS_DUM RE_NODUM RE_DUM FE_NODUM FE_DUM 
 1(a) 1(b) 1(c) 1(d) 1(e) 1(f) 
BB -0.349*** -0.318*** -0.292*** -0.251*** -0.234** -0.184* 
 (0.116) (0.099) (0.097) (0.091) (0.107) (0.104) 
GDPGROWTH 0.189 0.245 0.100 0.154 0.036 0.121 
 (0.162) (0.167) (0.123) (0.122) (0.129) (0.128) 
GDPLEVEL -0.264*** -0.258*** -0.283*** -0.270*** -0.256*** -0.258*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.061) (0.06) 
LOGPOP -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.114*** -0.124*** -0.027 -0.031 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.075) (0.197) 
LIFEXP -0.318*** -0.312*** -0.223* -0.246** -0.078 -0.180 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.116) (0.115) (0.146) (0.142) 
INFMORT -0.716*** -0.595*** -0.948*** -0.623* -0.862 -0.677 
 (0.244) (0.225) (0.347) (0.347) (0.704) (0.669) 
Dum8589 . 0.049***  0.043***  0.034* 
 . (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
Dum9094 . 0.075***  0.066***  0.049* 
 . (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.026) 
Dum9599 . 0.043***  0.038***  0.017 
 . (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.035) 
Dum0004 . 0.047***  0.044***  0.02 
 . (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.045) 
CONS 1.988*** 1.926*** 1.980*** 1.949*** 1.223* 1.266 
 (0.197) (0.183) (0.23) (0.211) (0.655) (1.405) 
R2 0.638 0.683   0.149 0.269 
N 153 153 153 153 153 153 
B-P .  40.10*** 50.04***   
Fd . 7.37***  26.84***  4.38*** 
H .    10.55 69.87*** 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
OLS_NODUM is read as estimation of Aid determination equation using OLS on the model without time dummy. The symbol 
µ'80¶ UHIHUV WR WKH PRGHO ZLWK WLPH GXPP\ The DUM8589 variable refers to the time dummy capturing the 5-year pool 
between 1985 and 1989; the nomenclature applies to all other time dummies.  
 
 
It may however be argued that the OLS estimates could possibly be inefficient and 
biased due to uncontrolled country fixed effects and the fact that the budget balance, as 
a regressor, is potentially endogenous to aid (as implied in the model prediction). We 
therefore check the results against more robust estimation methods in what follows. 
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Controlling for country-specific fixed effects 
Columns 1(c) and 1(d) of table 3.1 report estimation results of random effects models, 
without and with time dummies, that are robust to the inefficiency associated with 
omitted fixed effects when they are uncorrelated with the regressors. The Breusch-
Pagan LM test on the random effect model rejects the null of zero-variance of the 
intercept component of the composite error term implying that, indeed, the efficiency 
of the OLS estimator is affected by omitted country fixed effects. A much stronger 
argument against the OLS results is that there may be endogeneity bias associated with 
omitted country fixed effects. In columns 1(e) and 1(f) the results from the fixed-effect 
models, with and without time dummies, which are robust to endogeneity bias 
associated with omitted country fixed effects are reported. The Hausman specification 
test result based on the fixed-effect and random effect models with time dummies 
supports the existence of endogeneity bias in the random effect model associated with 
country fixed-effects. Nonetheless, the results do not vary qualitatively with the 
estimation method; the random- and fixed-effect estimates show that whereas larger 
budget deficits and lower levels of GDP lead to significant increases in aid inflows, 
growth does not influence aid inflows significantly. Consistent with the OLS results 
(columns 1(a) and (b)), infant mortality, life expectancy, and population have 
significant negative effect on aid in the random effect estimation (columns 1(c) and 
(d)). However, all three variables do not affect aid inflows significantly in the fixed-
effect estimations (columns 1(e) and (f)).  
 
The time dummies are added in order to alleviate possible estimation biases caused by 
time-varying shocks that are common to all the cross-sectional units. The F-test results 
(Fd) indicate that the time dummies are jointly significant in all the three estimation 
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methods. It is therefore necessary to include them in the specification. For this reason 
we proceed with the specification with time dummies only.  
 
It is noteworthy that even though the Hausman specification test result suggests that 
there is endogeneity bias in the random effect and OLS models associated with country 
fixed-effects, we do not limit our analysis to fixed-effect model estimates. This is 
because fixed-effect estimates are based on RQO\WKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶YDULDWLRQLQ WKH
data even though we are interested in the cross-section variation as well.26 Including 
ERWK µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DQG FURVV-section variations in the analysis is advantageous in 
two respects. Firstly, it permits us to determine whether there is divergence in the 
cross-section and time-series dimensions of aid disbursement. For instance, it may well 
be that in the absence of negative income shocks a given recipient government 
receives more aid in periods of improved budget balance but less aid than recipients 
with higher budget deficit that exert a similar level of development effort. Secondly, 
fixed effect models are inefficient for estimating variables that change slowly and 
those for which changes are rather seldom (Plumper and Troeger, 2007).  
 
Controlling for endogenous regressors 
This far, we have not allowed for the possibility of some regressors being endogenous 
in the aid disbursement equation. As it is with omitted country-fixed-effects, not 
allowing for endogenous regressors could cause estimates to be biased. In this case 
however, not even the fixed effects model would yield consistent estimates. Issues of 
endogenous regressors may not be far-fetched because if total aid responds to budget 
                                                 
26
 :HDOORZIRUSRVVLEOHGLYHUJHQFHLQWKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶DQG µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDLG
disbursement. 
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balance, then the reverse causality may also exist considering that recipient 
governments may target levels of budget balance that attract more aid.  
 
To obtain consistent estimates for the aid disbursement equation in the presence of 
endogenous regressors we employ the two commonest techniques in the literature, 
namely the instrumental variable and the lagged-regressors method. The advantage 
with the instrumental variable method is that it is able to produce more consistent 
structural estimates. The disadvantage is that it may be less efficient due to the weak ±
instrument problem, and may still be associated with a degree of biasedness due to 
instrument-validity problem. On the other hand, treating the regressors as pre-
determined by lagging them prevents the problem of having to obtain appropriate 
instruments but does not generate structural estimates, and the comparability of the 
qualitative results with structural methods depends on the extent to which the lagged 
and contemporaneous regressors are correlated ± the structural and reduced form 
results are more comparable qualitatively when the lagged regressors are highly 
correlated with their contemporaneous counterpart.  
 
The instrumental variable (IV) methods used to estimate the aid equation are 2SLS, 
3SLS, random effect IV and fixed effect IV. Obviously, in the 2SLS and 3SLS 
methods the (baseline) aid equation, which is the conditional equation in this context, 
is estimated as a system with a marginal budget balance equation. For two reasons, 
however, we do not report the results of the marginal budget balance equation in the 
panel (pooled cross-VHFWLRQDQDO\VLVWKHILUVWLVWKDWLWVSXUSRVHLVRQO\WRµDSSO\¶WKH
instruments for budget balance as over-identifying restrictions; the second is that, by 
including the lag of the budget balance as an additional regressor (identifying 
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restriction), the specification of the marginal budget balance equation is different from 
Svensson (1995) with which we intend to compare our results. We however report the 
6DUJDQ¶VWHVWUHVXOWWRVKRw that the instruments are valid.   
 
The results of the instrumental variable methods are reported in columns 2(a) to 2(d) of 
table 3.2 for the 2SLS, 3SLS, random effect and fixed effect methods respectively. In 
all four columns we find the GDP level to have a significant negative effect on the 
total amount of aid received. Also, with the exception of the fixed effect method of 
estimation, the coefficient of the budget balance is negative and significant. Contrary 
to this, Svensson (1995) finds the effect of the budget balance on aid receipt to be 
insignificant once they control for regional effects on their cross-continent sample of 
countries.27While the difference in results suggests that the aid-budget balance 
relationship varies across regions, the possible influence of the choice of instruments 
cannot be over-emphasized. Specifically, Svensson (1995) uses ethnic polarisation, 
institutional quality, and change in terms of trade as instruments for the budget 
balance. These instruments however have limited or no variation over time and would 
therefore estimate a budget balance with limited variation over time compared to the 
aid variable it is supposed to explain. Our choice of instrument is more valid because 
in addition to the three instruments of Svensson (1995), we include the lag of budget 
balance which is correlated with the contemporaneous value, shows more variation 
over time, and is not biased towards explaining only part of the variations in the budget 
balance.  
 
 
                                                 
27
 We find the budget balance as an insignificant determinant of aid disbursement only in the cross-
country estimation where it is not possible to control for the effect of time dummies and to use the 
lagged values as instruments (see table 3.3). 
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Table 3.2  Applying IV and lagged regressors techniques to the panel 
estimation of the aid determination equation 
 
 
AID/GDP 
 2SLS 3SLS RE FE LAG_OLS LAG_RE LAG_FE 
 2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(d) 
BB -0.517* -0.536*** -0.386* -0.194 -0.293*** -0.163* -0.093 
 (0.269) (0.207) (0.201) (0.244) (0.098) (0.087) (0.096) 
GDPGROWTH 0.352 0.389 0.226 -0.445 0.021 -0.123 -0.212 
 (0.527) (0.476) (0.67) (1.128) (0.168) (0.138) (0.147) 
GDPLEVEL -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.247*** -0.174* -0.247*** -0.232*** -0.091 
 (0.03) (0.025) (0.04) (0.092) (0.028) (0.037) (0.074) 
LIFEXP -0.251 -0.249* -0.138 -0.102 -0.316** -0.165 0.020 
 (0.165) (0.138) (0.159) (0.216) (0.146) (0.148) (0.198) 
INFMORT -0.532* 0.456 -0.542 -0.563 -0.513* -0.305 -0.541 
 (0.314) (0.304) (0.488) (0.841) (0.278) (0.425) (0.824) 
LOGPOP -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.098*** 0.155 -0.107*** -0.100*** 0.037 
 (0.02) (0.014) (0.024) (0.296) (0.018) (0.022) (0.239) 
Dum8589 0.04 0.043 0.052* 0.035 0.037 0.036 0.011 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041) (0.028) (0.033) 
Dum9094 0.062 0.066* 0.065** 0.018 0.069* 0.066** 0.027 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.031) (0.048) (0.041) (0.028) (0.04) 
Dum9599 0.037 0.04 0.037 -0.014 0.036 0.03 -0.018 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.03) (0.058) (0.041) (0.029) (0.049) 
Dum0004 0.044 0.048 0.042 -0.02 0.043 0.037 -0.018 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.031) (0.071) (0.041) (0.03) (0.059) 
CONS 1.671*** 1.632*** 1.622*** -0.281 1.774*** 1.593*** 0.197 
 (0.29) (0.202) (0.307) (2.059) (0.243) (0.277) (1.709) 
R2 0.633 0.664 0.621 0.285 0.659 0.647 0.258 
N 105 105 105 105 113 113 113 
^ĂƌŐĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚ ?Śi-square(3) = 4.209; P-value = 0.283 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
OLS_NODUM is read as estimation of Aid determination equation using OLS on the model without time dummy. The symbol 
µ'80¶ UHIHUV WR WKH PRGHO ZLWK WLPH GXPP\ The DUM8589 variable refers to the time dummy capturing the 5-year pool 
between 1985 and 1989; the nomenclature applies to all other time dummies. 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR BUDGET BALANCE (BB): Lag of budget balance, change in terms of trade, ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation, and war dummy. 7KH6DUJDQ¶VWHVWIDLOVWRUHMHFWWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVWKDWRPLWWHG
instruments are not jointly significant, implying that our list of instruments are valid.  
 
 
 
The insignificant effect of the budget balance on total aid receipt in the fixed effect 
µZLWKLQ¶ HVWLPDWLRQ suggests a divergence in the cross-VHFWLRQ DQG µZLWKLQ-country¶
responses of aid flows to the budget balance. Thus, whereas countries with higher 
budget deficits generally receive more aid, the relationship between aid and the budget 
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balance within a recipient country (over time) may vary from one country to another. 
With regards to the effect of the budget balance and the level of GDP on aid inflows, 
the result of the lagged-regressors method, as reported in columns 2(e) to 2(g), is 
similar to the IV estimations qualitatively; Both variables have significant negative 
effect on aid inflows in the lagged-regressors OLS and random-effect estimations and 
are insignificant in the lagged-regressor fixed-effect estimation. The only qualitative 
difference is that the level of GDP has a significant negative effect on aid inflows in 
the IV fixed-effect estimation. 
 
In all the IV and lagged-regressors estimation methods (table 3.2), growth appears to 
be an insignificant determinant of total aid receipts. On the other hand, the significant 
negative effect of population on aid inflows (observed in previous estimations) is 
robust to the latter methods.28 Also, unlike the OLS estimation (table 3.1), infant 
mortality and life expectancy do not affect aid inflows significantly in the IV and 
lagged-regressors estimation methods, with the only exceptions being in the lagged-
regressors OLS estimation, 2SLS (in the case of infant mortality) and the 3SLS (in the 
case of life expectancy) where their effect is significantly negative. Thus, the 
unexpected significant negative coefficient for infant mortality obtained in OLS aid 
determination equations is not robust. 
 
So far, our hypothesis, that lower budget deficit induces increased inflows of aid, has 
been tested using different panel-data estimation methods, some of which are based on 
WKH  µFRPELQHG¶ µEHWZHHQ¶ DQG µZLWKLQ¶ YDULDWLRQ RI WKH GDWD DQG RWKHUV RQ WKH
µZLWKLQ¶ YDULDWLRQ RI WKH GDWD ± OLS, random-effect, 2SLS, and 3SLS methods are 
                                                 
28
 The only exception is the fixed-effect method, and is understandable because population size does not 
vary much within a country over time.   
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EDVHG RQ WKH µFRPELQHG¶ YDULDWLRQ RI WKH GDWD ZKHUHDV WKH IL[HG-effect methods are 
EDVHGRQWKHµZLWKLQ¶YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWD,QZKDWIROORZVZHFKHFNWKHUREXVWQHVVRI
our key results to cross-section estimation methods. The latter are based on the 
µEHWZHHQ¶YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWD$Q advantage of using cross-section regressions is that 
averaging the data for the whole period reduces bias caused by measurement error 
(Kennedy, 2008). However, the joint significance of the time dummies as shown in 
table 3.1 indicates that cross-sectional estimation results may be biased by 
uncontrolled common time effects. Another source of bias may be that the cross-
section method compromises on sample size (and degrees of freedom for that matter). 
Also, not being able to control for country-specific fixed-effect in cross-section 
regressions may result in endogeneity bias. We therefore interpret the results with 
caution.  
 
3.6.1.2 Cross-section analysis 
The result of the cross-section estimation of the aid equation is reported in table 3.3. 
Column 3(a), (b), and (c) show the OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS estimates respectively. 
Similar to the panel estimates, GDP level and population have significant negative 
effect on aid inflows, with the magnitudes of their respective coefficients being similar 
across all three estimation methods (i.e., -0.203, -0.202 and -0.201 for GDP level, and -
0.102, -0.115 and -0.116 for population in the OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS estimations 
respectively). Unlike the panel estimates, however, the budget balance appears not to 
affect aid inflows significantly in all three cross-section estimations. Since the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the budget balance in the cross-section OLS estimation 
is similar to its counterpart in the panel estimation, the insignificance of the former 
may have resulted from inefficiency associated with the omission of common time 
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effects. On the other hand, the insignificance of the budget balance variable in the 
cross-section 2SLS and 3SLS estimations of the aid equation may be ascribed mainly 
to the weak instrument problem (evidenced by the large standard errors) since it is not 
possible to use lags of budget balance as additional instruments. Nonetheless, the 
instrXPHQWVDUHYDOLGWKH6DUJDQ¶VWHVWUHSRUWHGin table 3.3, fails to reject the null that 
omitted instruments are not jointly significant.   
 
 
Table 3.3 Using OLS and IV method for cross-sectional estimation of the aid 
determination equation 
 
                             AID/GDP 
 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 
BB -0.307 -0.257 -0.286 
 (0.247) (0.914) (0.842) 
GDPGROWTH 0.992** 0.469 0.500 
 (0.357) (1.416) (1.141) 
GDPLEVEL -0.203*** -0.202*** -0.201*** 
 (0.033) (0.04) (0.035) 
LOGPOP -0.102*** -0.115*** -0.116*** 
 (0.02) (0.031) (0.028) 
LIFEXP -0.217* -0.258** -0.262 
 (0.109) (0.092) (0.165) 
INFMORT -0.405 -0.461 -0.457 
 (0.369) (0.567) (0.554) 
CONS 1.559*** 1.681*** 1.679*** 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.306) 
R2 0.759 0.714 0.713 
N 33 30 30 
^ĂƌŐĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚ ?Śŝ-square (2) = 1.008; P-value = 0.694 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR BB: change in terms of trade, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, and war dummy. The 
6DUJDQ¶VWHVWIDLOVWRUHMHFWWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVWKDWRPLWWHGLQVWUXPHQWVDUH not jointly significant, implying that our 
list of instruments are valid. 
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Consistent with the panel estimates, life expectancy and infant mortality have negative 
coefficients. However, the latter variable is not significant in all three cross-section 
estimation methods and the former is insignificant in the 3SLS method. Thus, the 
puzzling OLS result (table 3.1) suggesting a significant negative relationship between 
aid inflows and infant mortality is not robust across different estimation methods. 
 
In summary, we find that countries with budget difficulties receive more aid when 
common time effects are controlled for. Thus, this result is not robust to cross-section 
estimation methods. We find robust evidence that more aid is given to countries with 
lower levels of per capita GDP. There is however no evidence that aid rewards 
countries that exert higher development effort. Our results are consistent with the 
finding of Svensson (1995) on a sample that comprised sub-Saharan African, Latin 
American, and Asian countries. However, the latter does not find a significant effect of 
the budget balance on aid receipt when regional effects are controlled for. The 
interpretation of their finding is that generally regions characterised by larger budget 
deficits receive more aid. However, among countries in the same region, differences in 
aid receipt are not determined by the budget balance ± a finding that contrasts with the 
present study. We suggest that this difference in results may partly be due to our 
choice of instruments. Specifically, including the lag of the budget balance as an 
instrument for the budget balance reduces the effect of weak instrument problem on 
the present results vis a vis Svensson (1995). 
 
3.6.2 Effect of aid on the UHFLSLHQWV¶ budget balance 
Having established that lower income (per capita GDP level) and larger budget deficits 
induce higher inflows of aid, we proceed by investigating what the implications of 
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such need-motivated aid disbursement are for the budget balance of recipient 
governments. The a priori expectation based on the underlying aid incentive model is 
that aid induces lower budget balances (i.e. larger deficits). Estimates of the response 
of the budget balance to aid inflows, obtained from equation (3.19)(a), are reported in 
tables 3.4 to 3.6. The results in tables 3.4 and 3.5 are based on panel techniques, using 
5-year pooled cross-section data and those in table 3.6 are estimated from annual-
average data over the whole period (1980-2004) using cross-section regressions. We 
find that aid inflows have a significant negative effect on the budget balance of 
recipients. Qualitatively, the results are consistent with Svensson (1995). However, our 
estimates of the negative impact of aid on the budget balance based on the African 
sample and more recent data is approximately half of what Svensson (1995) obtains 
for their cross-continent sample using older data. This suggests that allocating more 
aid where the budget deficit is larger may not be the reason why aid induces larger 
deficits. The result is robust across different estimation methods and specifications as 
shown below.    
 
3.6.2.1 Panel (pooled cross-section) analysis 
OLS, random-effect, and fixed effect estimates 
Panel OLS estimates of the budget-balance equation, without and with time-dummies, 
are reported in columns 4(a) and (b) of table 3.4 respectively. Both estimations show 
that aid has a significant negative effect on the budget-balance. Given previous results 
(in section 3.5.1) that increased budget deficit significantly induces higher inflows of 
aid, the negative effect of aid on the budget balance is consistent with the prediction of 
Svensson (2000) aid incentive model. As expected, the effect of GDP growth on the 
budget-balance is positive and significant ± all things being equal, growth leads to 
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higher fiscal revenue and higher budget-balances. The level of per capita GDP, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and the time dummies do not affect the budget balance 
significantly. Surprising, however, is that change in terms of trade has a significant 
negative effect on the budget-balance. A likely explanation is that positive (negative) 
terms of trade shocks make governments more (less) solvent leading to more than 
proportionate increase (decrease) in government expenditure in sub-Saharan African 
countries.29 It is also surprising that political instability (captured by the WAR 
variable) has a positive effect on the budget balance but, as would become clear, the 
latter finding is not robust. As explained previously, OLS estimation does not allow for 
unobserved country-fixed effects and may be inefficient and biased as a result. We 
therefore employ random-effect and fixed-effect methods as robustness check in what 
follows.  
 
The random- and fixed-effects estimates of the budget balance equation (with and 
without time dummies) are reported in columns 4(c) to 4(f) of table 3.4. In all four 
columns, and consistent with the OLS results, aid has a significant reducing effect on 
the budget balance. The magnitude of this negative effect is similar across all the three 
estimation methods (i.e. OLS, random-effect, and fixed-effect methods), and is 
approximately half of what Svensson (1995) obtains.30 It is noteworthy that the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test does not reject the existence of unobserved country-fixed 
effect. Nonetheless, the similarity of the result across the different estimation methods 
is not surprising because the Hausman test, based on both the specification with and 
                                                 
29
 This interpretation is consistent with pro-cyclical fiscal policy in sub-Saharan African countries (see 
Thornton, 2008). 
30
 In Svensson (1995), the coefficient for aid obtained from 5 year pooled cross-section OLS estimation 
of the budget balance is -0.607 as compared to -0.267 in the present study. 
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without time dummies, shows that the unobserved (country-fixed) effect is not 
significantly correlated with the regressors even at the 10% level of significance, 
indicating that the country-fixed effect does not cause OLS and random-effect 
estimates to be biased. Thus, the existing country-fixed effect only affects the 
efficiency of the estimated coefficients. We also find that, unlike what the OLS  
 
Table 3.4 3DQHOHVWLPDWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWRIWRWDODLGRQUHFLSLHQWV¶EXGJHW 
balance 
 
BUDGET BALANCE/GDP 
 OLS_NODUM OLS_DUM RE_NODUM RE_DUM FE_NODUM FE_DUM 
 4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d) 4(e) 4(f) 
AID -0.268*** -0.267*** -0.250*** -0.243*** -0.251*** -0.227** 
 (0.07) (0.074) (0.058) (0.062) (0.082) (0.094) 
GDPGROWTH 0.389*** 0.380** 0.339*** 0.333*** 0.343*** 0.318*** 
 (0.148) (0.17) (0.101) (0.111) (0.108) (0.119) 
GDPLEVEL -0.015 -0.016 -0.024 -0.022 -0.130** -0.133** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.056) (0.0590 
ѐdKd -0.105** -0.108** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.103** -0.100** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
ELF -0.028 -0.028 -0.031 -0.031   
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.031)   
WAR 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.041 0.038   
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.032) (0.031)   
Dum8589  -0.004  -0.006  -0.004 
  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Dum9094  0.003  -0.001  -0.004 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Dum9599  0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Dum0004  0.007  0.002  0.004 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
CONS 0.033 0.033 0.064 0.056 0.376** 0.386** 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.084) (0.083) (0.181) (0.189) 
R2 0.305 0.31   0.224 0.229 
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 
B-P   32.07*** 31.53***   
Fd  0.26  0.58  0.16 
H     4.53 13.13 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
OLS_NODUM is read as estimation of the budget balance equation using OLS on the model without time dummy. The symbol 
µ'80¶ UHIHUV WR WKH PRGHO ZLWK WLPH GXPP\ The DUM8589 variable refers to the time dummy capturing the 5-year pool 
between 1985 and 1989; the nomenclature applies to all other time dummies. 
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estimates suggest, political stability (WAR) does not affect the budget balance 
significantly in the random-effect estimation. As a time-invariant variable, however, 
political stability is excluded from the fixed-effect estimation. Another finding of 
interest is that GDP per capita has a significant negative effect on the budget-balance 
only when the fixed-effect estimation methoGZKLFKLVEDVHGRQWKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶
YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWDLVXVHG7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWDOOWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDODFRXQWU\¶VSHU
capita GDP level does not determine its budget-balance but an increase in the level of 
per capita GDP leads to more than proportionate increase in fiscal expenditure vis a vis 
fiscal revenue.     
 
Given that aid is a potential endogenous regressor in the budget balance equation, we 
proceed with the instrumental variable and the lagged-regressor methods. Even though 
the F-test results (Fd) in table 3.4 indicate that there is no significant common time 
effect, we still proceed with the model that includes time dummies to show that our 
result is not conditional on the omission of the time dummies.31   
 
 
2SLS, 3SLS, IV random- and fixed-effects, and lagged-regressor estimation methods 
The 2SLS, 3SLS, random effect IV and fixed effect IV methods constitute the 
instrumental variable methods used to estimate the budget balance equation. For 
reasons explained in section 3.6.1, we do not report the result of the marginal aid 
equation that is estimated as a system with the baseline budget balance equation.  The 
6DUJDQ¶VWHVWUHVXOWV in table 3.5 however shows that the instruments (over-identifying 
restrictions) contributed by the marginal aid equation are valid LH 6DUJDQ¶V FKL-
square (2) of 3.533 (P-value = 0.171) fails to reject the null hypothesis that omitted 
                                                 
31
 Equivalent estimations in Svensson (1995) to which we compare our results do include time dummies. 
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instruments are not jointly significant. An important remark on the instruments used 
for aid is that, even though the baseline aid equation suggests population, life 
expectancy and infant mortality as instruments (over-identifying restrictions), we use 
RQO\SRSXODWLRQDQGOLIHH[SHFWDQF\LQDGGLWLRQWRWKHODJRIDLGEHFDXVHWKH6DUJDQ¶V
test rejects infant mortality as a valid LQVWUXPHQW6DUJDQ¶VFKL-square (3) of 9.582 (P-
value = 0.0225). This is not the case in the cross-section analysis as would become 
clear, suggesting that there may be a significant correlation between the infant 
mortality and the budget balance when the data is pooled into sub-periods (5 years in 
the present case) but diminishes when the entire series is averaged.  
 
Columns 5(a) to 5(d) of table 3.5 report the estimates of the budget balance equation 
using the 2SLS, 3SLS, IV random effect, and IV fixed effect methods respectively. 
Results for the lagged-regressors method are reported in columns 5(e) to 5(f). With the 
exception of the fixed-effect methods (columns 5(d) and 5(g)), all the results show that 
the effect of aid inflows on the budget balance remains significantly negative and the 
size of the coefficients are less than half of what Svensson (1995) obtains.32 The IV 
fixed-effect method in column 5(d) shows that the within effect of total aid on the 
budget balance is positive though not significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the 
lagged-regressor fixed effect method shows that the effect of total aid on the budget 
EDODQFHLVQRWVLJQLILFDQW7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHPD\EHDGLYHUJHQFHLQWKHµZLWKLQ-
FRXQWU\¶DQGµEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶HIIHFWRIDLG inflows on the budget balance such that 
WKH µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶ HIIHFW RI DLG IORZV LV QHJDWLYH ZKHUHDV WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶
effect may be simply insignificant as it appears, or a combination of positive and 
 
                                                 
32
 In their 5 year pooled cross-section estimation of the budget balance equation, Svensson (1995) 
obtains coefficients of -0.878 and -0.668 for aid using 2SLS and 2SLS-fixed methods respectively. 
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Table 3.5 Applying IV and lagged-regressors techniques to panel estimation 
RIWKHHIIHFWRIWRWDODLGRQUHFLSLHQWV¶EXGJHWEDODQFH 
 
BUDGET BALANCE/GDP 
 2SLS 3SLS RE_IV FE_IV LAG_OLS LAG_RE LAG_FE 
 5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) 5(e) 5(f) 5(g) 
AID -0.287*** -0.328*** -0.222** 0.383 -0.227*** -0.149** -0.041 
 (0.085) (0.065) (0.093) (0.275) (0.077) (0.065) (0.099) 
GDPGROWTH 0.449 1.022*** 0.439 -0.628 0.216* 0.134 0.054 
 (0.326) (0.288) (0.325) (0.761) (0.127) (0.125) (0.124) 
GDPLEVEL -0.02 -0.032* -0.019 -0.032 -0.024 -0.022 -0.250*** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.028) (0.086) (0.022) (0.023) (0.076) 
ѐdKd -0.085* -0.089* -0.089* -0.089* -0.005 -0.004 0.009 
 (0.045) (0.05) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.047) (0.046) 
ELF -0.023 -0.02 -0.018 . -0.039* -0.038 . 
 (0.02) (0.021) (0.035) . (0.023) (0.033) . 
WAR 0.045** 0.037 0.041 . 0.016 0.012 . 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.043) . (0.023) (0.039) . 
Dum8589 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.011 0 0.005 -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) . (0.012) (0.011) 
Dum9094 0.002 0.007 0 -0.052 0  -0.024** 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.016)  (0.01) 
Dum9599 -0.003 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 0.031* 0.029*** -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.01) 
Dum0004 0.002 -0.01 -0.001 0.011 0.025 0.024** 0 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.01) . 
CONS 0.05 0.088 0.036 0.01 0.052 0.034 0.741*** 
 (0.093) (0.069) (0.104) (0.287) (0.085) (0.09) (0.247) 
R2 0.228 0.264 0.224 0.143 0.233 0.222 0.238 
N 128 128 128 128 113 113 113 
^ĂƌŐĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚ ?Śŝ-square(2) = 3.533; P-value = 0.171 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and * respectively. 
OLS_NODUM is read as estimation of the budget balance equation using OLS on the model without 
WLPHGXPP\7KHV\PEROµ'80¶UHIHUVWRWKHPRGHOZLWKWLPHGXPP\7KH'80YDULDEOHUHIHUs 
to the time dummy capturing the 5-year pool between 1985 and 1989; the nomenclature applies to all 
other time dummies. 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR AID: Lag of aid, life expectancy, and population. 7KH6DUJDQ¶VWHVWIDLOVWRUHMHFWWKH
null hypothesis that omitted instruments are not jointly significant, implying that our list of instruments are valid.   
 
 
 
  108 
negative effects (in different countries) that cancel out ± This is however beyond the 
present chapter and is therefore addressed in the next chapter.   
 
The significant negative effect of terms of trade growth on the budget-balance  
observed in previous estimation methods appears to be robust to the 2SLS, 3SLS, and 
the IV random- and fixed-effect estimations, but only at the 10% level of significance. 
Also robust to the latter estimations are that ethno-linguistic fractionalization and time 
dummies do not influence the budget balance significantly even at the 10% level. With 
regards to GDP growth, per capita GDP level, and political stability, the levels of 
significance, but not the signs of their coefficients, are not consistent across the 
different estimation methods in most cases; any inferences drawn on them would 
therefore be weak.  
 
 
In the lagged-regressor estimations (columns 5(e) to 5(g)), only inferences on aid (in 
the budget balance equation) are consistent with previous OLS and IV results. Thus, 
the effect of the lagged-aid variable on the budget-balance in the OLS and random-
effect (fixed-effect) estimations is significantly negative (insignificant). The remaining 
regressors are either insignificant or their levels of significance are not consistent 
enough for reliable inferences to be drawn. The weak results from the lagged-regressor 
method are not surprising because estimates are reduced-form rather than structural.  
 
This far, we have tested our hypothesis, that aid has a significant negative effect on the 
budget-EDODQFH RQ SDQHO HVWLPDWLRQ PHWKRGV WKDW DUH EDVHG RQ WKH µFRPELQHG¶
µEHWZHHQ¶ DQGµZLWKLQ¶YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWDQDPHO\2/6UDQGRP-effect, 2SLS, and 
6/6 PHWKRGV DQG WKH µZLWKLQ¶ YDULDWLRQ RI WKH data (i.e. fixed effect method). We 
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finally check the robustness of our findings to cross-section estimation methods for 
insight RQWKHµEHWZHHQ¶YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWD 
 
3.6.2.2 Cross-section estimation  
The result of the cross-section estimation of the budget balance equation is shown in 
table 3.6. The OLS and 3SLS estimates in columns 6(a) and 6(c) show that the effect 
of aid flows on the budget balance is significantly negative. Thus, aid induces larger 
budget deficits across countries. In the 2SLS estimation, however, aid appears not to 
influence the budget-balance significantly. The latter finding is possibly because the 
2SLS method is less efficient compared to the 3SLS method. The instruments 
(identifying restrictions) for aid are population, life expectancy and infant mortality; 
the lag of aid is obviously not available as an additional identifying restriction in the 
cross-VHFWLRQ DQDO\VLV 7KH 6DUJDQ¶V WHVW Chi-square(2) = 2.053; P-value = 0.358) 
suggests that the list of instruments are valid.  
 
As expected, GDP growth has a significant positive effect on the budget balance in all 
cross-section estimation methods. Also consistent with previous results from the panel 
estimation (tables 3.4 and 3.5), the level of GDP is not a significant determinant of a 
FRXQWU\¶V EXGJHW-balance. Other findings are that, generally, the change in terms of 
trade, ethnic-fractionalisation, and political stability (WAR) do not influence the 
budget balance significantly. The only exceptions are in the 2SLS estimation where the 
effects of change in term of trade and political stability (WAR) on the budget balance 
are negative and positive respectively (at the 10% level of significance).  
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Table 3.6 Using OLS and IV method for cross-sectional estimation of the 
HIIHFWRIWRWDODLGRQUHFLSLHQWV¶EXGJHWEDODQFH 
 
                                                                        BUDGET BALANCE/GDP 
 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 
6(a) 6(b) 6(c) 
AID -0.283** -0.205 -0.273** 
 
(0.128) (0.165) (0.130) 
GDPGROWTH 0.995** 1.280* 1.224*** 
 
(0.435) (0.648) (0.446) 
GDPLEVEL -0.021 -0.009 -0.018 
 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.025) 
ѐdKd -0.151 -0.156* -0.122 
 
(0.132) (0.077) (0.131) 
ELF -0.012 -0.006 -0.017 
 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.034) 
WAR 0.02 0.022* 0.023 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.034) 
CONS 0.028 -0.026 0.016 
 
(0.115) (0.131) (0.101) 
R2 0.371 0.394 0.384 
N 33 30 30 
^ĂƌŐĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚ ?Śŝ-square(2) = 2.053; P-value = 0.358 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
%%B2/6B5LVUHDGDVHVWLPDWLRQRIEXGJHWEDODQFHGHWHUPLQDWLRQHTXDWLRQXVLQJ2/6RQWKH5HVWULFWHGPRGHO7KHV\PEROµ8¶
refers to the unrestricted model. 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR AID: life expectancy, infant mortality, and population. 7KH6DUJDQ¶VWHVWIDLOVWRUHMHFWWKH
null hypothesis that omitted instruments are not jointly significant, implying that our list of instruments are valid.   
 
While the pros and cons of using the cross-section method are outlined in section 
(3.6.1), it is noteworthy that it has an additional advantage in estimating the budget 
balance equation because, unlike in the aid determination equation, the result is not 
likely to be biased by omitted time-effects since the time dummies in the panel 
estimation (table 3.4) were not jointly significant. Also, previous results (table 3.4) 
indicate that not being able to control for unobserved country-fixed effects in the 
cross-section budget balance regressions does not result in biased estimates. The latter 
is because the unobserved effects, according to Hausman test, are not correlated with 
the regressors. The existence of unobserved fixed-effects (according to Breusch-Pagan 
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test in table 3.4) however suggests that the cross-section estimates would be less 
efficient than the random- and fixed-effect estimates. 
 
We conclude that more aid is given to countries with relatively larger budget deficits 
and those with lower income levels, and that aid, so disbursed, induces lower effort at 
preventing budget deficits. Qualitatively, these findings are in line with Svensson 
(1995). Contrary to Svensson (1995), however, we find that even within one continent, 
which is Africa in our case, the response of aid inflows to the budget deficit is 
significant.33We acknowledge that the latter may imply different aid-budget balance 
relationship across continents. We however do not lose sight of the fact that the 
difference in findings may be due to our choice of instruments for the budget balance. 
We improve upon the validity and efficiency of instruments for the budget balance by 
including its lag as an additional instrument. We also find that the magnitude of the 
negative impact of aid inflows on the budget balance in Africa is approximately half of 
what the evidence based on a cross-continent sample in Svensson (1995) suggests.    
 
3.7 Summary 
Characteristics such as risky and undiversified sources of income combined with 
imperfect access to credit in bad times provide a strong argument in favour of need-
based aid disbursement to developing countries. Yet, aid disbursement, which is 
predominantly need-based, has been ineffective at promoting growth. An explanation 
that originates in the aid incentive literature is that need-motivated disbursement is a 
disincentive for exerting development effort, especially when such effort is costly (say, 
                                                 
33
 Svensson (1995) finds that the response of aid flows to the budget deficit is not significant when 
regional dummies are included. The difference with our finding may be due to our choice of instrument. 
We include the lag of the budget balance as an instrument for the budget balance. 
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politically). Existing evidence, based on a cross-continent sample of countries (from 
Asia, Latin America and Africa) between 1970 and 1989 shows that, indeed, countries 
with larger budget deficits receive more aid, and aid, so disbursed, induces larger 
budget deficits.  
 
The answer to the aid effectiveness problem seems to lay in the implementation of aid 
conditionality whereby aid disbursement is conditioned on development performance 
(indicative of development effort). It is however suggested in the incentive aid 
literature shown that enforcing conditional aid contracts is difficult without a 
commitment technology. This is because conditional aid contracts are time-
inconsistent as a result of the altruism of donors. That is, notwithstanding a conditional 
aid contract, altruistic donors find it optimal to give more aid to recipients with larger 
budget deficits expost. Knowing this, recipients have less incentive to avoid deficits ex 
ante. This has generated effort from International Financial Institutions to coordinate 
disbursements from different sources, strengthening the ties between bilateral donors, 
and delegating disbursements to the World Bank and IMF (Bulir and Hamann, 2003 
and 2005; Svensson, 2000). In the light of this, the present study investigates how the 
budget balance affects aid disbursement and the effect of aid on the budget balance in 
recent times (i.e., between 1980 and 2004). The research question is most relevant for 
countries that are highly aid dependent. Therefore, we use a sample of 37 sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
 
The results show that, in line with past evidence (Svensson, 1995), countries with 
larger budget deficits receive more aid, and aid induces larger budget deficits. An 
important finding, however, is that whereas the effect of the budget balance on aid 
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inflows is of a magnitude of the order of what Svensson obtains, the magnitude of the 
HIIHFWRIDLGRQWKHEXGJHWEDODQFHLVDERXWKDOIRI6YHQVVRQ¶VHVWLPDWH7KLs suggests 
that the implementation of conditional aid contracts may be independent of the need-
based aid disbursement across countries, suggesting the need for further research on 
the implementation of aid conditionality. These findings are robust across different 
estimation methods. 
 
The results also show that more aid is received by countries with lower levels of per 
capita GDP and life expectancy rates, suggesting that significant amount of aid 
receipts are for humanitarian and poverty alleviation purposes. We however find no 
evidence of performance-based aid disbursement across countries; as it is with low 
deficit countries, those with higher growth rates receive less aid.    
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APPENDIX A3 
 
 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Annual Averages(1980-2004) 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ODA/GDP 0.115 0.074 0.005 0.364 
Budget balance/GDP -0.061 0.044 -0.172 0.056 
Log of GDP per capita (const. 2000 Int'l $) 3.154 0.341 2.639 4.016 
Growth (GDP per capita const. 2000 Int'l $) 0.011 0.035 -0.031 0.183 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLAINING THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF AID ON THE BUDGET 
BALANCE  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The model of Svensson (2000) suggests an aid incentive structure whereby a common 
µSRW¶ RI DLG LV VKDUHG DPRQJ UHFLSLHQWV HDFK \HDU VXFK WKDW Whose with lower budget 
deficits receive more aid. Empirical evidence however shows that, all things being 
equal, more aid is given to recipients that face larger budget deficits, and that aid 
induces increased budget deficit (Svensson 1995, and previous chapter).34 According 
to the aid incentive model of Svensson (2000), the reason why aid induces increased 
budget deficit is that giving more aid to recipients facing larger budget deficits does 
not create the incentive for recipients to avoid deficits. Thus, Svensson (2000) appears 
to discourage aid policies that allocate more aid to recipients facing higher budget 
difficulties. However, an implicit assumption made is that all recipients have similar 
characteristics in which case differences in budget deficits are ascribable to fiscal 
GLVFLSOLQH &RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD7KHUHIRUHJLYLQJPRUHDLG WRFRXQWULHV
facing larger budget deficits means incentive-creating aid conditionality is not being 
enforced. The incentive structure of aid disbursement however changes when this 
assumption is relaxed. In reality, aid recipients have different characteristics, such as 
different tax capacities, that make it non-practical to ascribe differences in budget 
balance across countries to differences in fiscal discipline. More realistically, therefore, 
we first consider a need-based aid disbursement in which countries facing higher fiscal 
                                                 
34
 Svensson (1995) used data on a sample of low-income countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America over the period 1970-1989.  
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GLIILFXOWLHV UHFHLYHD ODUJHU VKDUHRI WKHDLG µSRW¶:H WKHQFRQVLGHUDQ DLG LQFHQWLYH
VWUXFWXUH ZKHUHE\ D JLYHQ FRXQWU\¶V VKDUH RI WKH DLG µSRW¶ LV GLVEXUVHG RYHU VHYHUDO
years such that less aid is received during years of poor fiscal performance.  Therefore 
the incentive structure of aid, which is characterised by a positive correlation of the 
year to year disbursement with the budget balance, would be better described by the 
strategic disbursement of aid to one recipient over time, rather than the strategic 
disbursement of aid to several recipients each year that Svensson (2000) describes.  
  
Relaxing the implicit assumption of SveQVVRQ¶VDLGLQFHQWLYHPRGHOWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\
argues that giving more aid to countries facing larger budget deficits is not the 
underlying reason why aid induces larger deficits. Rather, we show that it is because 
the year to year disbursement to a given country is such that more aid is received 
during years of larger deficits. It follows then that, aid induces lower budget deficits 
when a given country receives more aid during years of reduced budget deficits (but 
not necessarily more aid than what countries with higher budget difficulties receive), 
and conversely, when a given country receives less aid during years of increased 
budget deficits (but not necessarily less aid than what countries with less budget 
difficulties receive). This aid disbursement structure constitutes the within-country 
(year to year) aid conditionality with respect to the budget balance.35 Thus, incentive-
creating aid conditionality is country-specific and depends on the within-country (year-
to-year) rather than between country response of aid inflows to the budget balance. 
 
                                                 
35
 What determines the successful implementation of the within-country dimension of aid conditionality 
is beyond the scope of the present study. 
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To show how such country-specific aid incentive structure operates when countries 
with larger budget deficits are receiving more aid, the study first establishes that there 
is divergence in the between-country (cross-country) and within-country (year to year) 
dimensions of the determination of aid disbursement.36  It is therefore possible for 
donors to budget more aid for recipients facing larger budget deficits, and yet 
condition the year-to-year disbursement of aid to a given recipient country on 
improved budget performance, ceteris paribus.  
 
To understand the between-countries dimension of aid disbursement, note that the 
fundamental reason for giving foreign aid to low-income countries is that they are 
unable to raise enough resources from taxation and private capital markets (Chervin 
and Wijnbergen, 2010), and that resource constraints are not necessarily the result of 
weak development policies.37 It is therefore optimal to budget more aid for recipients 
with higher budget constraints, provided they are willing to pursue sound policies 
(Goldsbrough and Cheelo, 2007).38 This explains why the between-countries 
dimension of aid disbursement shows a pattern of giving more aid to countries with 
larger budget deficits.  To see how the within-country dimension of aid disbursement 
diverges from the between-countries dimension (which is need-based), first note that  
 
                                                 
36
 In the literature, studies that consider both between-countries and within-country dimensions of aid 
disbursement patterns treat the two dimensions as the same. Examples are Svensson (1995, 2000), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004). 
37
 Practically, complete convergence of the reform capacities between recipient countries could be 
perceived as a long- rather than short-term phenomenon. Therefore, implementing incentive conditional 
aid across recipient countries means that in the short to medium term, relatively poorer countries would 
be disadvantaged in that they would continue to receive less aid irrespective of the amount of reform 
effort they exert. Aid donors are therefore not likely to implement aid conditionality across countries. 
38
 In October, 2004, donors were entreated by the Development Committee of the IMF and the World 
Bank to provide timely financial assistance to countries that are committed to sound policies, (IMF, 
2004 in Bulir and Hammann, 2005).  
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during aid agreements between donors and recipients, in which country-specific 
reform targets are set, donors typically make aid commitments covering a number of 
years. Therefore, after more aid has been budgeted for recipients with larger budget 
deficits, the aid budget is disbursed over a number of years, allowing donors to create 
the incentive for reduced budget deficits by disbursing less than the promised amount 
of aid during episodes of defaulted budget-GHILFLW DJUHHPHQWV $OVR WKH µZLWKLQ-
FRXQWU\¶ GLPHQVLRQ RI DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW GLYHUJHV IURP WKH µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶
dimension when donors promise less aid during periods when a given recipient does 
not agree to lower budget-deficit targets ± the key point however remains that when 
ORZHUUHIRUPHIIRUWLVµSXQLVKHG¶E\GRQRUVWKHUHFLSLHQWGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHFHLYH
less aid than what countries with lesser budget difficulties receive. This description of 
aid determination renders Svensson (2000) aid incentive model less realistic.  
 
While the within-country (year to year) disbursement of incentive aid is expected to be 
SRVLWLYHO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK WKH UHFLSLHQW¶V Eudget balance, not all aid received is for 
incentive creation purposes. As Burnside and Dollar (2000) rightly pointed out, foreign 
aid donation to a given recipient country is for different purposes which are, to a large 
extent, inconsistent. For instance, unlike the incentive objective for aid disbursement, 
there are increased inflows of humanitarian (poverty alleviation) aid during episodes of 
increased budget deficits. Therefore, depending on what aid disbursement objective is 
dominant, the year to year receipts of total aid in a given country may be positively or 
negatively correlated with the recipient governments budget balance. When incentive-
creating objective is dominant, we expect a positive correlation between the budget 
balance and aid inflows. On the other hand, we expect a negative correlation between 
the budget balance and aid inflows when humanitarian (poverty alleviation) objective 
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is dominant. The resulting year to year correlation between aid and the budget balance 
constitutes the extent of implementation of within-country aid conditionality, whiles 
the resulting pattern of year to year aid inflows constitutes the within-country 
dimension of aid disbursement. 
 
We finally investigate empirically whether, in spite of allocating more aid to recipients 
facing larger budget deficits, it is possible for aid to induce lower budget deficits when 
the within-country (year to year) dimension of aid conditionality is implemented. To 
do so, we obtain, for each recipient country, the coefficient of aid conditionality which 
measures the extent of implementation of within-country aid conditionality. We then 
estimate cross-section budget balance regressions to show that aid induces lower 
deficits as the coefficient of aid conditionality increases.  
 
Unlike Svensson (1995), we define aid conditionality as a within-country 
phenomenon.39 In line with Svensson (1995), however, we measure aid conditionality 
with respect to the budget balance of a given recipient. The budget balance is a 
relevant policy choice in the context of the present study for two reasons: Firstly, 
avoiding large budget deficits has been at the fulcrum of most reform measures 
proposed in conditional aid contracts, dating from the Structural Adjustment Era of the 
1980s to the Budget Support era of the second half of the 1990s and 2000s, and the 
recent Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt relief era. Secondly, when aid forms a 
UHODWLYHO\VPDOOSURSRUWLRQRIWKHUHFLSLHQW¶VUHVRXUFHVLWLVPRUHHIIHFWLYHWRXVHLWDV
part of a larger development programme rather than to use it for separate projects 
                                                 
39
 Svensson (1995) implicitly assumes that there is no divergence in aid determination across countries 
and within a country over time. 
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&RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD7KHUHIRUHJLYHQWKHOLPLWHGDYDLODELOLW\RIIRUHLJQ
aid, it is likely to be more effective when fiscal stability and reduced budget deficits 
are the main focus of conditionality. On this basis, we define the extent of 
implementation of within-country aid conditionality as the extent to which year to year 
aid disbursement to a given recipient punishes increased budget deficits.   
 
Based on our empirical set-up and analysis, the study concludes that there is 
GLYHUJHQFH LQ WKH µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWULHV¶ DQG WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ GLPHQVLRQV RI DLG
determination, and that incentive-FUHDWLQJ DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ LV D µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶
phenomenon. Most importantly, we confirm that, despite giving more aid to countries 
that need it most, aid indeed induces lower budget deficits across countries if the 
within-country (year to year) aid conditionality is implemented, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, giving more aid to countries facing higher budget deficits is not the 
underlying reason why aid induces higher deficits. 
 
The chapter is organised into eight main sections. In section 4.2, we present a brief 
literature review to show that there may be a divergence between cross-country and 
within-country dimensions of aid determination. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively 
describe the theoretical and empirical frameworks employed. We then present the 
empirical specifications in section 4.5. In section 4.6, we conduct a pre-analysis of our 
research hypotheses based on inspection of the data. This is followed by econometric 
estimations and discussion of results in section 4.7. The main findings of the study are 
then summarised in section 4.8.    
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4.2 Evidence of divergence between cross-country and within-country dimensions        
of aid determination; implication for the non-linearity of aid effectiveness 
 
In this section, we highlight the evidence in the literature that there may be divergence 
in aid determination across countries and within a given country over time and how 
this may support the notion that aid effectiveness is nonlinear.  
 
Generally, more aid is given to countries with more economic difficulties. This may 
result in a negative correlation between aid and growth across countries (Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2000). For instance, Hansen and Tarp (2001) find that, within their sample, 
countries with relatively large aid to GDP ratios are characterised by low growth. In 
addition, however, they find that increases in the aid to GDP ratios are associated with 
increasing growth rates. In other words, the correlation between aid and growth was 
found to be negative for the levels but positive for the differences, implying divergence 
of information in the cross-section and time-series dimensions. An intuitive 
expODQDWLRQLVWKDWLQSUDFWLFHWKHOHYHORIDLGFRPPLWPHQWGHSHQGVRQWKHUHFLSLHQW¶V
need and absorptive capacity (Svensson, 1995 and Goldsbrough and Cheelo, 2007). 
However, the portion of the commitment that is actually received each year is 
influenced b\WKHUHFLSLHQW¶VDFWLRQV0F*LOOLYUD\DQG0RUULVVH\)RULQVWDQFH
aid is disbursed when required to finance agreed expenditure. It is therefore essential to 
allow for this divergence, not only in aid-growth studies, but in aid effectiveness 
studieV LQJHQHUDO ,W LVQRWHZRUWK\QRQHWKHOHVV WKDW WKHµFURVV-FRXQWU\¶DQGµZLWKLQ-
FRXQWU\¶ GLPHQVLRQV RI DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW DUH QRW DOZD\V GLYHUJHQW )RU LQVWDQFH
Alesina and Dollar (2000) find a weak positive correlation between aid and GDP 
across recipienW FRXQWULHV DV GR RWKHU VWXGLHV RQ WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ FRUUHODWLRQ
Examples of the latter include Bulir and Hamann (2005) and Pallage and Robe (2001). 
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This gives rise to an interesting question as to whether or not the observed differences 
in aid effectLYHQHVV DFURVVFRXQWULHV DUHDVFULEDEOH WR WKHLUGLIIHUHQW µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶
patterns or characteristics of aid inflows.  
 
To account for the different dimensions of aid, Hansen and Tarp (2001) suggest that 
both aid in level and difference should be included in panel estimation (as is the case 
with system panel GMM estimators). Obviously, this is not possible in cross-country 
VWXGLHV VXFK DV LQYHVWLJDWLQJ KRZ µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ SDWWHUQ RI DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW
influences the variation in aid effectiveness across countries. A more adequate 
approach would be to include, in the aid effectiveness regression, an interaction term 
EHWZHHQ DLG DQG D FRHIILFLHQW WKDW PHDVXUHV WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ SDWWHUQ RI DLG
disbursement. This approach suggests that aid effectiveness may be non-linear. Non-
linearity of aid effectiveness has been accounted for in several studies with mixed 
results. For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) estimate the effect of aid on 
growth using an empirical specification that is similar to Hudson and Horrell (1987) 
and Boone (1994, 1996). Unlike the latter two, however, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 
2004) include an interaction term between aid and policy and find that aid has a 
positive effect on growth in developing countries with good policies. Recently, Ali and 
Isse (2005) also found the effect of aid on growth to be non-linear, and dependent on 
the level of policy. In contrast to this, however, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find no 
robust non-linear (squared and interaction with policy) effects of aid. Although Hansen 
and Tarp (2005) find a decreasing return to aid, they also find that the positive effect of 
aid on growth does not depend on good policy (in accordance with Lensink and 
Morrisey, 2000). Given that these studies focus mainly on aid-growth relationship, 
controlling for non-linearity of aid effectiveness on policy (as a channel through which 
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aid may affect growth) adds a new perspective to the existing literature. This extension 
to aid effectiveness studies is central to the present chapter.   
 
4.3 Theoretical model 
Foreign aid is a useful resource for supporting structural reform of developing 
economies, especially in the area of attaining fiscal stability. It is therefore reasonable 
that altruistic donors would want to give limited aid resources to recipients with larger 
budget deficits. In the incentive aid literature, however, it is argued theoretically that 
allocating more aid to recipients with larger budget deficits rather discourages 
recipients from avoiding budget deficits (Svensson, 2000). The importance of this 
finding is that it discourages the allocation of more structural reform assistance to 
those who need it most. Of great concern is that Svensson (2000) arrive at their results 
by assuming implicitly that all recipients have similar characteristics and for that 
matter differences in the budget balance across countries is ascribable to fiscal 
indiscipline and the state of the world. Contrary to this assumption, low income 
countries differ in tax capacity and the ability to obtain resources from capital markets 
(Chervin and Wijnbergen, 2010). In the present study, therefore, we present a variant 
of the Svensson (2000) aid incentive model in which we relax the assumption that 
recipients have similar characteristics. To do so, we separate the optimal allocation of 
aid across countries (between-country dimension) from the year to year disbursement 
of allocated aid to a given recipient (within-country dimension). Given the theoretical 
and empirical evidence, we consider the need-motivated allocation of aid across 
countries as a known fact, and we show that the incentive role of aid is embedded in 
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the year to year disbursement to a given country and not the allocation of aid across 
countries.  
 
 
Optimum reform effort ± aid and non-aid equilibrium  
We adapt the Svensson (2000) aid incentive model in section (3.3). What we do 
differently is that we focus on the interaction between a single donor and a single 
recipient over time (rather than two recipients across countries and over time). This 
permits us to lay emphasis on the incentive implication of the within country (year-to-
year) dimension of aid disbursement. 
 
In the non-aid equilibrium, the first order condition for the optimal reform effort 
remains the same as in equation (3.11) but without the subscript i (since there is only 
one recipient). This is re-written below for readability. 
 
(4.1)        GEJ  »¼
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4.3.2 The aid equilibrium 
In the aid equilibrium, total revenue of the recipient government (and consumption of 
the public for that matter) is a function of aid as shown in equation (3.5). Therefore, 
the FOCs for the optimum reform effort are as in (4.2) and (4.3) respectively for aid 
given during bad state of the world and aid conditioned on improved reform effort 
respectively. 
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Equation (4.2) and (4.3) can be used to explain the incentive implications of year-to-
year aid disbursement as follows: giving aid in bad outcomes (i.e. using aid to increase 
the second term in the square bracket) implies that a lower reform effort (higher 
marginal returns to effort) would be required to satisfy equation (4.2). On the other 
hand, equation (4.3) shows that conditioning aid on improved reform effort (expected 
to be associated with good outcomes) would induce higher reform effort. Therefore, 
using aid to reward good outcomes serves as an incentive for recipient governments to 
exert higher reform effort. This shows that, independent of the allocation of aid across 
recipient countries, a given recipient country exerts higher reform effort when the year 
to year inflows of aid is such that aid is used to increase the gain associated with a 
move from bad to good state.  
 
4.4 Empirical Framework 
The illustration in figure 4.1 sums up the underlying concept of the empirical analysis 
which is that, contrary to the implicit assumption in the incentive aid literature of a 
convergence in the within-country and between-countries patterns of aid disbursement, 
there is a divergence in the two dimensions: (i) the between-country dimension is 
associated with need-motivated disbursement. We therefore expect a positive 
correlation between aid inflows and the budget deficit across countries. (ii) The year to 
year disbursement of aid to a given recipient country, which constitutes the within-
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country dimension, may be positively or negatively correlated with the recipient 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V EXGJHW GHILFLW GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH GRPLQDQW REMHFWLYH IRU DLG
disbursement. The two main objectives for aid disbursement considered in the present 
study are incentive creation and humanitarian assistance (poverty alleviation). The 
disbursement of incentive aid is conditioned on improved budget performance (lower 
budget deficit) in order to create the incentive for the recipient government to avoid 
deficits. We therefore expect incentive aid to be associated with reduced (increased) 
budget deficit (budget balance). This connotes a negative (positive) correlation 
between year to year inflows of incentive aid and the recipients budget deficit (budget 
balance). On the other hand, we expect the disbursement of humanitarian aid to be 
associated with increased (reduced) budget deficit (budget balance). The reason is that 
there is increased inflow of humanitarian aid to a given recipient country during 
episodes of fiscal difficulties (including larger budget deficits). This connotes a 
positive (negative) correlation between year to year disbursement of humanitarian aid 
DQGWKHUHFLSLHQW¶VEXGJHWGHILFLWEXGJHWEDODQFH7KHUHIRUe, the correlation between 
\HDUWR\HDUGLVEXUVHPHQWRIWRWDODLGDQGWKHUHFLSLHQW¶VEXGJHWEDODQFH± and, for that 
PDWWHU WKH LQFHQWLYH HIIHFW RI WRWDO DLG UHFHLSW RQ WKH UHFLSLHQW¶V EXGJHW EDODQFH ± 
depends on which objective for aid disbursement is predominant. If the year-to-year 
inflows of aid are predominantly for poverty alleviation purposes, then the recipient 
government would have less incentive to avoid deficits, and the likely result would be 
increased budget deficits. On the other hand, if the year to year inflows are 
predominantly for creating development incentive, then less aid would be received 
during episodes of weak fiscal discipline. The recipient government would therefore 
have the incentive to exercise fiscal discipline in order to receive more aid.40Thus, the 
                                                 
40
 The assumption is that exerting high development effort increases the likelihood of improved growth 
and welfare. 
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incentive effect of aid is a within-country rather than between-country phenomenon. 
Therefore, the underlying concept of the present study suggests that, contrary to what 
Svensson (1995) suggests, giving more aid to recipients faced with larger budget 
deficits is not the underlying reason why aid induces weak fiscal discipline. Rather, the 
effect of aid on the fiscal performance of a given recipient country is influenced by the 
dominant objective for aid disbursement, and for that matter, the pattern of year to year 
aid inflows. This leads to the hypothesis that, despite allocating more aid to recipients 
with higher budget difficulties, aid induces lower budget deficit when the within-
country dimension of aid conditionality is successfully implemented. Aid 
conditionality is said to be successfully implemented only when donors punish default 
of aid agreements. How this is enforced is beyond the scope of the present study.   
 
In the rest of the study, we set out our empirical approach and carry out the 
examination of our research hypotheses as follows: first, we show that there is a 
divergence in the between-countries and the within-country dimensions of aid 
disbursement. We then estimate the coefficient of aid conditionality as our empirical 
measure of the extent of implementation of aid conditionality within a given recipient 
country.41 Finally, we investigate the effect of aid on the budget balance (budget 
deficit) as the coefficient of aid conditionality increases. Specifically, we construct an 
interaction term between aid and the estimated coefficient of aid conditionality for 
each recipient country in order to determine the differential effect of aid on the budget 
balance as aid conditionality improves.  
 
 
                                                 
41We obtain the coefficient of aid conditionality as the short-run elasticity of aid with respect to reform 
effort. Countries where the implementation of aid conditionality is more successful have more positive 
values of the coefficient. 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework 
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4.5 Empirical Specification 
In this section, we present the empirical specifications that we use in testing our 
research hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that there is divergence in the within-
country and between-countries dimensions of the determination of aid disbursement 
(with respect to the budget balance of recipients). The second is that, even though aid 
conditionality is not implemented across countries, it is still possible to implement it 
within a given recipient country. The within-country aid conditionality is whereby 
year-to-year aid disbursement to a given country is associated with reduced budget 
deficits (increased budget balance). The third hypothesis is that, in spite of giving more 
aid to countries that have larger budget deficits, aid induces lower budget deficits when 
the within-country (year to year) aid conditionality is implemented.  
 
4.5.1 Determination of Aid disbursement 
The test for the first hypothesis (that there is divergence in the within-country and 
between-country dimensions of aid determination) is based on cross-section and fixed-
effect estimates of the aid equation from the previous chapter. The cross-section 
estimate is based on variations in the between-country dimension of the data, whereas 
the fixed-effect estimate is based on the within-country (year to year) variation in the 
data. Panel OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS estimates, also from the previous chapter, are used 
as benchmark since these are based on variations in both the within- and between-
countries dimensions of the data, and could be perceived as the net of the estimates 
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from the two dimensions. Aid is estimated within the system of simultaneous 
equations in (3.18);42this is re-written below for readability. 
 
(4.4) (a) itititititit XGROWTHGDPBBAID SGGGGG  43210 log  
   
(4.4) (b) ititititititit ZGROWTHGDPBBAIDBB XJJJJJJ   5431210 log  
   
All variables are as defined previously. 
 
To show the divergence in the two dimensions of aid determination with respect to the 
budget balance, the coefficient of interest is 2G in the aid determination equation. We 
show that 2G is different for the cross-section, fixed-effect, and panel (OLS, 2SLS, and 
3SLS) estimates. It is noteworthy that the lag of BB in equation (4.4)(b), as an 
additional identifying restriction for the BB in equation (4.4)(a), does not exist in the 
cross-section and would therefore be omitted.  
 
4.5.2 Aid conditionality as a within-country phenomenon and the incentive effect 
of aid 
In this section we address our second and third hypotheses. We begin with the second 
hypothesis, that it is possible to implement year to year aid conditionality within a 
given recipient country even though aid conditionality is not implemented across 
countries. To show this, we estimate the coefficient of aid conditionality for each of 
the sample countries using time-series data. The coefficient of aid conditionality 
                                                 
42
 The specification is based on Svensson (1995) system of simultaneous equations. What we do 
differently is that we include the lag of the budget balance in the marginal (budget balance) equation as 
an additional identifying restriction. 
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measures the short-term correlation between the year-to-year disbursement of aid and 
the corresponding budget balance of the recipient, and is obtained for each recipient 
country within a single equation equilibrium-correction model (SECM). The empirical 
SECM model is formalised as follows:  
 
(4.5) ttt BBGDPAID '' ' EDD log10  
                            tttt trendBBGDPAID ZJJJT   312111 loglog  
 
where 0D  denotes the constant term, 1D and E  denote the short-run coefficients, and 
T denotes the equilibrium adjustment coefficient. The cointegrating vector is denoted 
by Ȗ,
 
and the residual by Ȧt. All other variables remain as already defined. Of interest is 
the coefficient of aid conditionality, denoted by the short-run parameter, E .43 Positive 
values of E  suggest that year to year disbursement of aid is associated with reduced 
budget deficit, implying successful enforcement of aid conditionality.  
 
2QH OLPLWDWLRQ RI RXU PHDVXUH RI WKH ȕ FRHIILFLHQW LV WKDW LW LV HVWLPDWHG ZLWKLQ D
contemporaneous specification. Yet, in the real world, the implementation of aid 
conditionality is not always a contemporaneous process ± it varies across countries, 
over time, and between countries. For instance, aid may be withheld from some 
recipients for repeated default in the past. Nonetheless, our measure is valid because, 
over time, the extent of implementation should reflect in the contemporaneous 
relationship between aid and the budget balance since aid conditionality is a repeated 
                                                 
43
 We do not identify the direction of causality (between aid and the budget balance) in the estimation of 
ȕEHFDXVHZHDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHH[WHQWRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\± that includes not only 
punishment of non-compliance but also the enforcement of the intended use for aid. There is therefore 
no need to separate the feedback effect from aid to the budget balance. 
 132 
 
game. Another limitation is that an increase in the budget deficit caused by the 
disbursement of less-than-promised amount of aid cannot be differentiated from 
µSXQLVKLQJ¶ LQFUHDVHGGHILFLWV7KLV OLPLWDWLRQ LVKRZHYHUXQOLNHO\ WRKDYHDQ\PDMRU
impact on the results. The reason is that it only applies if recipients commit to aid 
projects before receiving aid, and is less likely to recur since aid conditionality is a 
repeated game. Conversely, giving more than the promised amount of aid, by reason of 
lowering the budget deficit (net of aid), may be misinterpreted as rewarding lower 
deficit. However, this is also unlikely since donors have limited aid budget.  The 
strength of the SECM method lies in the fact that it separates the short- and long-run 
elasticities of aid with respect to the budget balance within a stationary specification 
and, where there is a long run relationship between variables, short-run adjustment to 
disequilibrium is accounted for. We control for the per capita GDP level in order to 
capture, as much as possible, the influence of income shocks on aid conditionality.  
 
Having defined the coefficient of aid conditionality ± as the measure of the extent to 
which year to year aid inflows are associated with reduced budget deficits ± we 
address our third hypothesis, which is that, in spite of committing higher aid budget to 
recipients facing larger budget deficits, aid induces lower budget deficits if the within-
country dimension of aid conditionality is enforced. To test this, we introduce an 
interaction term between aid and the coefficient of conditionality into a cross-section 
budget balance determination equation to investigate whether aid induces lower budget 
deficits as the coefficient of aid conditionality increases.44 Drawing from the baseline 
equations (3.16) and (3.17) in the previous chapter, we estimate the budget balance 
determination equation within the following simultaneous system of equations.  
                                                 
44
 We use only the cross-section method in this case because the coefficient of aid conditionality was 
estimated from time-series data and would therefore be correlated with the time dimension of the budget 
balance by construction when the panel method is used.  
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(4.6a)    iiiiii GDPAIDAIDBB log)*( 43210 wwwww EE  
                            iii ZGROWTH Sww 65  
 
(4.6b)   iiiiii XGROWTHGDPBBAID WIIIII  43210 log  
 
All variables are as defined above. The coefficient of interest is 3w  which measures the 
differential effect of aid on the budget balance as the aid conditionality coefficient, E , 
increases. A positive 3w  implies that, among countries with a similar level of aid, the 
effect of aid on the budget balance is more positive in those within which the 
implementation of inter-temporal aid conditionality is more successful. A priori, we 
expect 3w  to be significantly positive since the aid incentive theory predicts that 
conditioning aid on the budget balance serves as an incentive for recipient 
governments to improve upon the budget balance in order to attract more aid.   
 
In a nutshell, 3w  within our empirical set-up measures the effect of incentive aid on the 
budget balance. We use this stylized empirical approach because we are unable to 
perform a separate empirical examination of aid used for incentive purposes only. This 
is because foreign aid is donated for different, and at times inconsistent, purposes 
including incentive creation and the alleviation of poverty among others (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000) ± yet aid data for African countries is not disaggregated according to its 
objectives. We however expect the year-to-year inflows of incentive aid, by reason of 
punishing non-compliance to agreements, to be negatively (positively) correlated with 
budget deficits (budget balance). Therefore we consider countries in which the year-to-
 134 
 
year inflows of aid is negatively (positively) correlated with the budget deficit (budget 
balance), reflected by positive coefficients of aid conditionality, as those for which aid 
receipts are predominantly for incentive purposes. The current chapter uses the same 
data as the previous chapter.  
 
4.6 Pre-analysis: Data distribution and behaviour of the aid and the budget 
balance variables 
 
In this section, we use graphs to show the distribution of the aid and budget balance 
data. This enables us to examine whether the behaviour of these variables at a glance is 
consistent with the hypothesis of the present study.  
 
For the data to be consistent with need-based pattern of aid disbursement across 
countries, as existing evidence suggests,45 we expect a plot of the average annual aid 
receipt against the average annual budget balance across our sample countries to depict 
a negative relationship. The dense region of figure 4.2 shows that, indeed, there is a 
negative relationship between the average annual level of aid and the budget balance 
across countries. Given the small number of sample countries, however, figure 4.2 is 
less pronounced. Besides, the negative relationship perceived is influenced by outliers. 
We therefore repeat the illustration using a 5year pooled cross-sectional data for aid 
and the budget balance in figure 4.3. The dense region of the plot in figure 4.3 is 
relatively more pronounced in showing that there is a negative relationship between 
average annual aid receipts and the average annual budget balance.   
 
                                                 
45
 See Svensson (1995) and chapter 3 of the thesis. 
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Figure 4.2 Between-country relationship between aid and the budget balance, 
using cross-sectional data 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Between-country relationship between aid and the budget balance, 
using 5 year pooled cross-sectional data 
 
 
 
Next, we examine the data for the µwithin-country¶ relationship between aid and the 
budget balance. The objective here is to determine whether, in accordance with the 
second hypothesis of the present study, it is possible to implement aid conditionality 
even when the relationship between aid and the budget balance (deficit) across 
countries is negative (positive). Our a priori expectation, which constitutes the 
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necessary condition, is that the µwithin-country¶ relationship between the two variables 
is positive in some countries and negative in others. Rather than voluminously 
illustrating the within-country relationship between aid and the budget balance with a 
graphical representation for each of our sample countries, we summarise the result 
with correlation coefficients. Thus, we obtain the correlation coefficient between de-
trended aid and budget balance series for each recipient country. The result is as 
reported in table 4.1. The correlation between de-trended aid and budget balance series 
is positive for 11 recipient countries and negative for 22 recipient countries. We do not 
obtain correlation coefficients for 4 countries due to insufficient time series data. With 
these results, we categorise our sample countries into those for which the year-to-year 
relationship between aid and the budget balance is negative and those for which the 
relationship is positive (henceforth negative and positive correlation-beta countries 
respectively). 
 
To confirm that the distribution of the data is consistent with the second hypothesis ± 
i.e., divergence in the cross-country and within-country dimensions of the aid-budget 
balance relationship ± WKHVXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQLVWKDWWKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶GLPHQVLRQRI
the aid-budget balance relationship is not endogenous to the determination of aid 
disbursement, relative to the budget balance, across countries. Two implications of the 
VXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQDUHLQYHVWLJDWHGDVIROORZVWKHILUVWLVWKDWWKHµEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶
dimension of aid disbursement, relative to the budget balance, is similar and need-
based for both negative and positive correlation-beta countries. Otherwise, it may be 
DUJXHG WKDW WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶DLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\GHSHQGVRQ
WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶ DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW LV PRWLYDWHG E\ QHHG RU
performance. To investigaWHWKLVZHUHSURGXFHWKHµEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶UHODWLRQVKLS 
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Table 4.1 Correlation between de-trended aid and budget balance series 
 
Country CORLNBETAPOLICY 
Benin -0.212 
Botswana 0.091 
Burkina Faso -0.011 
Burundi 0.02 
Cameroon -0.156 
Central African Rep . 
Chad -0.198 
Congo 0.02 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.098 
Equatorial Guinea -0.325 
Ethiopia -0.081 
Gabon 0.148 
Gambia 0.063 
Ghana 0.47 
Guinea-Bissau -0.535 
Kenya -0.163 
Lesotho -0.042 
Liberia . 
Madagascar 0.137 
Malawi -0.663 
Mali 0.102 
Mauritania -0.017 
Mauritius -0.374 
Mozambique -0.234 
Namibia 0.279 
Niger -0.385 
Nigeria . 
Rwanda -0.331 
Senegal -0.323 
Sierra Leone -0.372 
Somalia . 
Swaziland -0.201 
Tanzania 0.086 
Togo 0.317 
Uganda -0.515 
Zambia -0.233 
Zimbabwe -0.083 
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between average annual aid and budget balance variables in figures 4.2 and 4.3 using 
separate markings for the positive and negative correlation-beta countries. Figure 4.4 
shows that the latter relationship is not different for positive and negative correlation-
beta countries. However, there are not enough positive correlation-beta countries to 
depict a clear pattern. We therefore resort to the 5 year pooled cross-section data to 
confirm in figure 4.5 that the relationship is similar and negative for both positive and 
negative correlation-beta countries. The distribution of aid and budget balance data in 
our sample is therefore consistent with the suggested GLYHUJHQFH LQ WKH µZLWKLQ-
FRXQWU\¶ DQG µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶ dimensions of aid disbursement and, for that matter, 
its connotation that it is possible to implement aid conditionality within a given 
country even when aid disbursement across countries is need-based.  
 
7KH VHFRQG LPSOLFDWLRQ RI DQ H[RJHQRXV µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ ZLWK
respect to the deficit-induced aid disbursement across countries) is that, in its 
implementation, a given country receives more aid during episodes of improved 
budget performance but not necessarily more aid than what countries with larger 
budget deficits receive. Conversely, a given country receives less aid during episodes 
of poor budget performance but not necessarily less aid than what countries with lesser 
budget difficulties receive. This has two testable connotations that are key to the 
concept of µwithin-country¶ aid incentive. The first is that, irrespective of the year-to-
year variation of aid inflows to a given recipient country, those facing higher budget 
constraints due to non-policy causes such as lower tax capacities persistently receive 
more aid on average. The second is that the implementation of within-country aid 
conditionality is neither influenced by the relative size of average annual aid receipt  
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Figure 4.4 Between-country relationship between aid and the budget balance, 
                  using cross-sectional data for positive and negative correlation-beta 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5  Between-country relationship between aid and the budget balance:  
              using 5 year pooled cross-sectional data for positive and negative 
correlation-beta countries 
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nor the relative size of the average annual budget deficit of the recipient country, 
ceteris paribus. These two connotations are tested in what follows. Since both 
FRQQRWDWLRQV IRFXV RQ WKH VXFFHVVIXO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DLG
conditionality, the final graphical analysis is based on positive correlation-beta 
countries only. So far, our graphical illustrations have shown relationships between aid 
and the budget balance that are relatively less pronounced because there are other 
need-based determinants of aid inflows across countries, such as the level of per capita 
GDP, which are not controlled for. For a more pronounced illustration, we limit our 
final graphical analysis to three recipient countries that are selected in a manner that 
minimizes the masking effect of other uncontrolled cross-country determinants of aid 
receipts on the relationship between aid and the budget balance. Also, in order for any 
possible influence of the relative size of aid and the relative size of the budget balance 
on the successful implementation of within-country aid conditionality to be 
conspicuous, we select countries that are clearly different in their annual averages of 
aid receipts and budget balances. To do so, we first rank all the sample countries in 
descending order of the average amount of aid received. We then choose a country 
each from the upper, middle, and the bottom third of the aid ranking. To minimize the 
possible masking effect of other uncontrolled cross-country determinants of aid 
receipts, we treat the negative relationship between aid and the budget balance across 
countries as a fact, given that it is proven empirically, and we select positive 
correlation-beta countries that best satisfy that fact. Specifically, we choose the 
country with the highest budget deficit from the upper third of the aid ranking. We 
then choose the country with the lowest budget deficit in the bottom third of the aid 
ranking, and the country with the budget deficit in-between the lowest and highest is 
chosen from the middle third of the aid ranking.  
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The three countries selected for the final graphical analysis are - in decreasing order of 
average annual budget deficit and average annual aid receipt - Mali, Ghana, and 
Congo. Figure 4.6 shows the time profile of aid for the three positive correlation-beta 
countries. We find that there is variation in the year-to-year aid inflows to each of the 
recipient countries. However, the amount of aid received each year is nearly 
consistently highest for Mali, followed by Ghana and then Congo. 
 
Figure 4.6 Time profile of aid for Congo, Ghana, and Mali 
 
 
 
Figures 4.7 to 4.9 show the time profile of de-trended aid and budget balance series for 
Mali, Ghana, and Congo respectively. The series show that aid inflows to Ghana is 
more closely associated with reduced budget deficits than the two other countries, with 
Congo showing the least association of aid inflows with reduced budget deficit.46By 
our definition, therefore, the implementation of aid conditionality is most successful in 
Ghana, followed by Mali and then Congo. However, this ordering neither coincides 
                                                 
46
 The correlation-beta coefficients are 0.470, 0.102, and 0.020 for Ghana, Mali and Congo respectively. 
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with the ordering of the three selected countries based on the size of average annual aid 
receipts nor the ordering based on the size of the average annual budget balance. For 
instance, Mali, with the highest average annual aid receipt and budget deficit neither 
shows the strongest nor weakest association of year-to-year aid inflows with the 
budget deficit, just as Ghana, with the strongest association of year-to-year aid inflows 
with reduced budget deficit, is not the highest or the lowest in either of the rankings 
based on the size of average annual aid receipts and the average annual budget balance. 
This suggests that the extent of implementation of within-country aid conditionality is 
not influenced by the relative size of average annual aid receipt and the relative size of 
the average annual budget deficit of the recipient country, ceteris paribus. 
  
 
Figure 4.7  Time profile of de-trended aid and budget balance series for Mali47 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 We use de-trended series because we are interested in the short-run correlation. This is similar to the use of first 
differences of the ratios but with the advantage of not losing one data point. Time profiles of the first differences of 
aid and budget balance variables as ratios to GDP are shown in the appendix to this chapter.  
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Figure 4.8 Time profile of de-trended aid and budget balance series for Ghana 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Time profile of de-trended aid and budget balance series for Congo 
 
 
 
We therefore conclude that the distribution of aid and budget balance data is consistent 
with the fundamental idea of the present study, which is that it is possible to implement 
µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ HYHQ ZKHQ DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW DFURVV FRXQWULHV LV
need-based. We however treat this conclusion with caution because the graphical 
analysis does not formally control for the effect of other variables that influence the 
determination of aid inflows and the budget balance. Also, with the graphical analysis, 
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we are unable to examine whether the data is consistent with our third hypothesis ± 
which is that, even when aid disbursement across countries is need-based, aid induces 
ORZHU EXGJHW EDODQFH RQFH WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ LV LPSOHPHQWHG ± 
because it requires us to identify the causal effect of aid on the budget balance. 
Therefore, we examine all three hypotheses in the next section, using econometric 
methods. 
 
4.7 Empirical estimation and discussion of results 
Panel, cross-section and time series techniques, as well as data on 37 developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980 - 2004, are used for the empirical 
estimations. In what follows, the estimation results are reported and discussed in turn 
for the three hypotheses. 
 
4.7.1 Empirical results for aid determination 
7R H[DPLQH RXU ILUVW UHVHDUFK K\SRWKHVLV WKDW WKHUH LV GLYHUJHQFH LQ WKH µZLWKLQ-
FRXQWU\¶ DQG µEHWZHHQ-countULHV¶ GLPHQVLRQV RI DLG GLVEXUVHPHQW ZH GUDZ RQ
estimates of the empirical aid equation in (4.4a) from chapter 3. However, our focus in 
this section is different. Specifically, we examine how the coefficient on the budget 
balance differs across the panel, cross-section and fixed effect estimations. Therefore, 
we do not discuss other variables in the estimation. We first obtain OLS estimates. 
However, given that aid inflows may also impact upon the budget balance, we also use 
estimates of the aid equation from instrumental variable (IV) methods that are more 
robust to endogeneity bias.  Results based on panel (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS, fixed-effect) 
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and cross-section estimates are reported in table 4.2. Panel OLS, panel 2SLS and panel 
6/6DUHODEHOOHGµFRPELQHG¶SDnel henceforth.  
 
The panel OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimates, in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively, show 
that increased budget deficit leads to significantly higher aid inflows. Since the 
µFRPELQHG¶SDQHOPHWKRGVREWDLQHVWLPDWHVEDVHGRQFRPELQHGYDULDWLRQLQthe within- 
and between-countries dimensions of the data, the negative coefficient for the budget 
balance is simply the resultant effect of the budget balance on aid when the cross-
section and within-country effects are combined. We are however unable to determine 
IURPWKHµFRPELQHG¶SDQHOHVWLPDWHVZKHWKHUWKHVLJQVRUPDJQLWXGHVRIWKHFRHIILFLHQW
IRU WKH EXGJHW EDODQFH YDULDEOH DUH WKH VDPH IRU WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ DQG µEHWZHHQ-
FRXQWULHV¶ GLPHQVLRQV RI DLG GHWHUPLQDWLRQ DV ZRXOG EH WKH FDVH LI WKHUH ZDV no 
divergence in the two dimensions. To investigate this, we re-estimate equation (4.4a) 
using fixed-effect and cross-sectional methods for estimates EDVHG RQ WKH µZLWKLQ-
FRXQWULHV¶and µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWULHV¶YDULDWLRQRIWKHGDWD respectively.  
 
In column 4, the ordinary fixed-effect estimate shows that the budget balance is a 
significant determinant of year to year aid inflows to a given recipient country such 
that increased budget deficit leads to increased inflow of aid. However, the magnitude 
of the negative coefficient on the budget balance in the ordinary fixed-effect estimation 
is considerably lower than what the panel OLS estimate suggests (i.e., -0.184 in the 
ordinary fixed effect and -0.318 in the panel OLS). The fixed-effect results may be 
indicative of the situation in most aid recipient countries or it could well be the case 
that increased budget deficit leads to increased aid inflows to some countries but 
decreased inflows to others, with the net effect being of a lower negative magnitude 
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than the panel OLS estimate suggests. Either way, the results suggest that the within-
country effect of the budget balance on aid inflows, estimated from the ordinary fixed-
effect method, is not comparable to the combined (within- and between-countries) 
effect estimated from the panel OLS estimation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Determination of aid disbursement: Panel, fixed effect, and 
cross-section estimations 
 
                                         AID/GDP 
 PANEL_OLS PANEL_2SLS PANEL_3SLS FE FE_IV CSECTION_OLS CROSS_2SLS CROSS_3SLS 
 2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(g) 2(h) 
BB -0.318*** -0.517* -0.536*** -0.184* -0.194 -0.307 -0.257 -0.286 
 (0.099) (0.269) (0.207) (0.104) (0.244) (0.247) (0.914) (0.842) 
GDPGROWTH 0.245 0.352 0.389 0.121 -0.445 0.992** 0.469 0.500 
 (0.167) (0.527) (0.476) (0.128) (1.128) (0.357) (1.416) (1.141) 
GDPLEVEL -0.258*** -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.258*** -0.174* -0.203*** -0.202*** -0.201*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.060) (0.092) (0.061) (0.06) (0.035) 
LOGPOP -0.123*** -0.251 -0.099*** -0.031 -0.102 -0.102*** -0.115*** -0.116*** 
 (0.014) (0.165) (0.014) (0.197) (0.216) (0.02) (0.031) (0.028) 
LIFEXP -0.312*** -0.532* -0.249* -0.180 -0.563 -0.217* -0.258** -0.262 
 (0.102) (0.314) (0.138) (0.142) (0.841) (0.109) (0.092) (0.165) 
INFMORT -0.595*** -0.100*** 0.456 -0.677 0.155 -0.405 -0.461 -0.457 
 (0.225) (0.02) (0.304) (0.669) (0.296) (0.704) (0.669) (0.554) 
CONS 1.926*** 1.671*** 1.632*** 1.266 -0.281 1.559*** 1.681*** 1.679*** 
 (0.183) (0.29) (0.202) (1.405) (2.059) (0.27) (0.32) (0.306) 
R2 0.683 0.633 0.664 0.269 0.285 0.759 0.714 0.713 
N 153 105 105 153 105 33 30 30 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
OLS_NODUM is read as estimation of Aid determination equation using OLS on the model without time dummy. The panel 
estimations include unreported time dummies (see Chapter 3). 
 
INSTRUMENTS FOR PANEL AND FIXED EFFECTS: Lag of budget balance (not available in cross-section 
estimation), change in terms of trade, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, and war dummy.  
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Column 5 of table 4.2 shows the results for the fixed-effect IV estimation. We find 
that, with respect to the sign and magnitude, the coefficient of the budget balance 
variable is not very different from the corresponding coefficient from the ordinary 
fixed-effect estimate.  However, the budget balance is not significant in the fixed-
effect IV estimation. This finding may be representative of the aid recipient countries 
in the sample, but may possibly be the net effect when increase budget deficit leads to 
increased aid inflows to some recipient countries and decreased inflows to others. Both 
ways, the fixed-effect IV result is not consistent with the panel 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimates (i.e., -0.194 in the fixed-effect IV estimations respectively, and -0.517 and -
0.536 in the panel 2SLS and 3SLS respectively). Given that the budget balance is 
potentially endogenous in the aid equation, the fixed-effect IV results, that the budget 
balance is not a significant determinant of periodic aid inflows to a given recipient 
FRXQWU\PD\EHPRUHLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDLGDQG
the budget balance across countries than the ordinary fixed-effect results. Generally, 
the fixed-effect results (especially, the IV fixed-effect estimates) are not consistent 
ZLWK WKH µFRPELQHG¶ SDQHO UHVXOWV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKH ODWWHU LV SULPDULO\ GULYHQ E\
variation in the cross-sectional dimension of the data. To establish the latter 
suggestion, we turn to the cross-section estimation of the aid equation. 
 
Column 6 reports the cross-section OLS estimates of the aid determination equation. 
We find that the magnitude and sign of the coefficient on the budget balance is 
consistent with the panel estimates (i.e., -0.307 and -0.318 in the cross-section and 
panel OLS estimations respectively). This suggests that, as expected, the panel result is 
mainly driven by the cross-section variation in the data. The coefficient of the budget 
balance is however not significant in the cross-section OLS estimation. This may be 
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due to the small sample size for the cross-section estimation. Given that the 
µFRPELQHG¶ SDQHO DQG IL[HG HIIHFW HVWLPDWLRQV DUH EDVHG RQ ODUJHU VDPSOH VL]HV DQG
that their results suggest that the panel result is driven primarily by the cross-sectional 
variation of the data, we ascribe the insignificance of the budget balance coefficient in 
the cross-sectional estimate to the small sample size. This argument is also reinforced 
by the fact that, in the previous section, there was no clear and pronounced negative 
relationship between average annual aid and the average annual budget balance in 
figure 4.2 due to the small sample size, but a clearer and more pronounced negative 
pattern emerged in figure 4.3 when the 5 year pooled cross-sectional data was 
employed to increase the sample size.  
 
In the 2SLS and 3SLS cross-section estimations of columns 7 and 8, we find that the 
FRHIILFLHQW RQ WKH EXGJHW EDODQFH LV ORZHU LQ PDJQLWXGH WKDQ WKH µFRPELQHG¶ SDQHO
estimates and the OLS cross-section estimate, although the signs are the same (i.e., -
0.257 and -0.286 in the 2SLS and 3SLS cross-section estimates respectively).  We 
however interpret this with caution because we expect the biasing effect of small 
sample size on the estimated coefficients to be greater in the cross-section IV estimates 
(2SLS and 3SLS) than in the cross-section OLS estimates due to lower degrees of 
freedom and instrument validity problem in the former. This may explain why the 
standard errors of the budget balance coefficient in the 2SLS and 3SLS cross-section 
estimations are largest (0.914 and 0.842 respectively). We therefore conclude that the 
significant negative coefficient of the budget balance in the panel estimation is mainly 
driven by the cross-VHFWLRQDO µEHWZHHQ¶ FRXQWU\ GLPHQVLRQ RI WKH GDWD DQG LV QRW
DOZD\V WUXHDERXW WKH µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶GLPHQVLRQ7KHUH LV WKHUHIRUH DGLYHUJHQFH LQ
WKHµEHWZHHQ-FRXQWULHV¶DQGµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶GLPHQVLRQVRIDLGGLVEXUVHPHQW 
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4.7.2 Estimation of aid conditionality coefficients and the incentive effect of aid 
Empirical evidence shows that aid conditionality is not implemented across-countries. 
$LG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ LV WKHUHIRUH QRW D µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWULHV¶ SKHQRPHQRQ )XUWKHU
empirical evidence from the present study however confims that there is divergence in 
the within-country and between-countries dimensions of aid determination, suggesting 
that it may still be possible to implement aid conditionality within countries (based on 
year-to-year disbursement to a given country). A natural next step in the present study 
therefore is to investigate whether aid conditionality is implemented within some of 
the recipient countries in our sample. To do so, we estimate the SECM representation 
of aid determination in equation (4.5) for each recipient country. The extent of 
implementation of aid conditionality is captured by the coefficient on the budget 
balance variable, which we refer to as the coefficient of aid conditionality. A summary 
of the coefficient estimate for the sample countries is reported in table 4.3 (and the 
regression output in table A4.1 of the appendix). A positive coefficient implies that, on 
average, the year to year inflows of aid to a given recipient country are associated with 
increased budget balance and vice versa. We find that aid conditionality was 
implemented in 16 countries, aid inflows were associated with higher budget deficits 
in 17 countries, and coefficients were not obtained for 4 countries due to insufficient 
time-series data.  
 
Given that DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ LV D µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶ EXW QRW D µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶
phenomenon, and that aid induces larger budget deficits across countries, the study 
finally investigates whether the effect of aid on the budget balance across countries is 
influenced by WKHH[WHQWRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶DLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\
The purpose of this final step is to investigate whether giving more aid to countries  
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Table 4.3  Equilibrium-correction model estimates of coefficients of aid 
conditionality (beta policy) 
 
COUNTRY BETA POLICY 
Benin -0.389 
Botswana 0.037 
Burkina Faso 0.460 
Burundi 0.290 
Cameroon 0.019 
Central African Rep . 
Chad -0.096 
Congo -0.067 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.543 
Equatorial Guinea 0.140 
Ethiopia -0.018 
Gabon 0.020 
Gambia 0.299 
Ghana 0.350 
Guinea-Bissau -0.272 
Kenya -0.067 
Lesotho -0.032 
Liberia . 
Madagascar 0.330 
Malawi -0.340 
Mali 0.121 
Mauritania 0.003 
Mauritius -0.077 
Mozambique -1.620 
Namibia 0.220 
Niger -1.390 
Nigeria . 
Rwanda 0.039 
Senegal 0.096 
Sierra Leone -0.477 
Somalia . 
Swaziland -0.079 
Tanzania -0.631 
Togo 0.137 
Uganda -1.014 
Zambia -0.146 
Zimbabwe -0.1000 
                                     The regression output is summarized in table A4.1 
                                               of the appendix. 
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with higher budget deficits is the underlying reason why aid induces higher budget 
deficits across countries as implied by the Svensson (2000) aid incentive model.    
 
We estimate the cross-section budget balance equation in (4.6a) which has an 
interaction term between aid and the coefficient of aid conditionality as a regressor. 
The respective results from OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS methods of cross-section estimation 
are reported in columns 8(a) to 8(c) of table 4.4. Of interest is the coefficient on the 
interaction term between aid and the aid conditionality variable, which is positive and 
significant. This means that aid induces higher budget balances (lower budget deficits) 
as the coefficient of aid conditionality increases, ceteris paribus.  
 
An important point to note is that the influence of the aid conditionality variable 
(betapolicy) on the effect of aid on the budget balance is not by construction of the aid 
conditionality variable. To see this, note that positive correlation between year-to-year 
inflows of aid and the budget balance of a given country (positive aid conditionality 
coefficient), for instance, may be associated with increases in aid inflows and budget 
balances or decreases in aid inflows and budget balances. Therefore, between two 
countries with equal amount of aid (on average) and aid conditionality coefficient, it is 
not obvious a priori whether aid would induce a higher budget balance. After all, 
punishing non-compliance to aid agreements (or refusing to promise aid disbursement 
when an agreement is not reached) does not guarantee that recipient governments 
would change their stance. Neither would the use of aid to reward µeffective policies¶ 
guarantee further pursuit of such policies. We therefore suggest that it is the 
HQIRUFHPHQW RI µZithin-FRXQWU\¶ DLG FRQGLWLRQDOLW\ that actually causes aid to induce 
lower budget deficits. 
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Table 4.4 Cross-section determination of the effect of aid on the budget 
balance  
 
BUDGET BALANCE/GDP 
 OLS 2SLS 3SLS OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
 3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 3(d) 3(e) 3(f) 
AID -0.061 -0.018 -0.034 -0.283** -0.205 -0.273** 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.114) (0.128) (0.165) (0.130) 
BETAPOLICY -0.058 -0.067 -0.085    
 (0.047) (0.05) (0.053)    
AID*BETAPOLICY 0.768* 0.830* 1.021**    
 (0.433) (0.442) (0.410)    
GDPGROWTH 1.113** 0.936* 0.915*** 0.995** 1.280* 1.224*** 
 (0.431) (0.474) (0.355) (0.435) (0.648) (0.446) 
GDPLEVEL 0.023 0.039 0.028 -0.021 -0.009 -0.018 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033) (0.025) 
ѐTOT -0.230** -0.223** -0.176 -0.151 -0.156* -0.122 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.139) (0.132) (0.077) (0.131) 
ELF 0.046 0.054 0.044 -0.012 -0.006 -0.017 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.036) (0.025) (0.029) (0.034) 
WAR 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.030 0.020 0.022* 0.023 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) 
CONS -0.168 -0.225 -0.184* 0.028 -0.026 0.016 
 (0.126) (0.136) (0.101) (0.115) (0.131) (0.101) 
R2 0.561 0.565 0.548 0.371 0.394 0.384 
N 31 30 30 33 30 30 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively 
 
INSTRUMENTS: life expectancy, infant mortality, population, life expectancy* beta coefficient, infant mortality* 
beta coefficient, and population* beta coefficient. 
 
 
 
It is also noteworthy that the aid conditionality coefficient (betapolicy), on its own, is 
not significant in the cross-section budget balance equation, indicating that a given aid 
conditionality coefficient may be associated with both countries with higher and lower 
inflows of aid (and by implication, countries with larger and lower budget deficits). 
Therefore, giving more aid to countries with larger budget deficits is not the 
underlying reason why aid induces larger budget deficits. Rather, the incentive effect 
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RIDLGRQWKHEXGJHWEDODQFHGHSHQGVRQWKHH[WHQWRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHµZLWKLQ-
coXQWU\¶ \HDU-to-year) aid conditionality. Incentive-creating aid conditionality is 
WKHUHIRUHDµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶SKHQRPHQRQDQGQRWDµEHWZHHQ-FRXQWULHV¶SKHQRPHQRQ 
 
 
4.8 Summary 
Empirical evidence shows that countries with larger budget deficits receive more aid 
and aid, so disbursed, induces larger budget deficits. The explanation based on the 
incentive aid literature is that such need-based pattern of aid disbursement is a 
disincentive for recipient governments to avoid deficits. The policy implication of this 
view is that, in order to create the incentive for lower budget deficits, more aid should 
be given countries with lower budget deficits. An implicit assumption, however, is that 
aid recipients have similar characteristics in which case differences in fiscal outcomes 
across countries are attributable to development effort.  
 
In contrast to the aforementioned explanation, the present study argues that giving 
more aid to countries facing larger budget deficits is not the underlying reason why aid 
induces larger budget deficits. Rather, aid conditionality with respect to the budget 
balance is a within-country phenomenon such that D JLYHQ FRXQWU\¶V \HDU WR \HDU
inflows of aid are conditioned on the budget balance and does not depend on the 
relative amount of aid receipts across countries. To arrive at this conclusion, the study 
first acknowledges that various countries have different characteristics, and the 
fundamental reason for giving aid is that, generally, low income countries are not able 
to obtain enough resources from taxation and the international financial markets. 
Therefore, it is optimal to give more aid to countries with more difficulties in this 
regard. Next, the study shows that there is a divergence between aid disbursement 
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across and within countries. Aid disbursement across countries is mainly need-based 
whereas year-to-year aid disbursement within a given country may be predominantly 
performance- or need-based. Thus, aid conditionality with respect to the budget deficit 
is a within-country phenomenon and can be implemented even when more aid is given 
to countries with larger budget deficits.  
 
Finally, the study shows that aid induces lower budget deficits in countries within 
which year-to-year aid conditionality is implemented. To arrive at the latter result, we 
obtain a regression-based coefficient of aid conditionality (which increases with the 
extent of implementation of aid conditionality) for each of the recipient countries in 
the sample. The latter is then interacted with aid in a cross-country regression to show 
that aid induces larger budget balances as the coefficient of aid conditionality 
increases. Thus, in spite of giving more aid to countries with larger budget deficits, aid 
induces lower budget deficits once the within-country aid conditionality is 
implemented. We therefore conclude that giving more aid to countries with larger 
budget difficulties is not the underlying reason why aid induces larger budget deficits. 
Rather, the main culprit is failure to implement within-country aid conditionality.  
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APPENDIX 
  
 
Estimating beta-policy ± the short-run correlation between aid and the budget 
balance 
 
(1980 ± 2004)  
                                 
(i) BENIN - LIBERIA                                            
 
 
¨%%*'3t 
 
¨ORJ<t 
 
ECMt-1 
 
R2 
BENIN -0.389 (0.286) 0.422 (0.310) -0.843** (0.334) 0.530 
BOTSWANA 0.037 (0.034) -0.115** (0.048) -0.452 (0.260) 0.415 
BURK. FASO 0.46 (0.573) -0.616 (0.485) -0.637* (0.311) 0.306 
BURUNDI 0.29 (0.344) 0.100 (0.386) -0.251 (0.183) 0.298 
CAMEROUN 0.019 (0.085) -0.180 (0.128) -1.091*** (0.260) 0.559 
CENT.AFR.REP. . . . . . . . 
CHAD -0.096 (0.136) 0.084 (0.121) -0.839*** (0.270) 0.428 
CONGO REP. 
OF -0.067 (0.150) -0.137 (0.173) -0.856** (0.289) 0.459 
COTE D'IV. 0.543 (0.334) -0.882** (0.355) -1.336*** (0.292) 0.695 
EQU. GUINEA 0.14 (0.264) -0.199 (0.116) -0.896 (0.645) 0.541 
ETHIOPIA -0.018 (0.203) 0.059 (0.122) -0.361* (0.200) 0.201 
GABON 0.02 (0.035) 0.002 (0.049) -0.777*** (0.258) 0.396 
GAMBIA 0.299 (0.389) -0.218 (0.352) -0.949*** (0.226) 0.543 
GHANA 0.352* (0.188) -0.366 (0.325) -0.476** (0.200) 0.486 
G. BISSAU -0.272 (0.372) 0.527 (0.497) -1.276*** (0.322) 0.697 
KENYA -0.067 (0.083) -0.272 (0.285) -0.265 (0.169) 0.283 
LESOTHO -0.032 (0.090) -0.453* (0.261) -0.195 (0.115) 0.162 
LIBERIA . . . . . . . 
 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *  
 respectively. The dependent variable is the change in aid to GDP ratio. Beta policy refers to the coefficient of 
 ¨ORJ%%*'3t and it measures the short-run correlation between aid and the budget balance. Y, BBGDP and ECM  
 represent GDP, the budget balance to GDP ratio, and the equilibrium-correction component respectively. 
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Continuation of table 
 
                                        
(ii) MADAGASCAR ± ZIMBABWE 
 
 
 
¨%%*'3t 
 
¨ORJ<t 
 
ECMt-1 
 
R2 
MADAGASCAR 0.330 (0.500) 0.289 (0.612) -0.851** (0.355) 0.338 
MALAWI -0.340* (0.169) -1.019*** (0.261) -1.055*** (0.201) 0.771 
MALI 0.121 (0.100) -0.609*** (0.211) -0.681*** (0.160) 0.485 
MAURITANIA 0.003 (0.224) 1.443** (0.506) -0.829*** (0.253) 0.694 
MAURITIUS -0.077 (0.119) 0.182 (0.102) -0.843*** (0.273) 0.56 
MOZAMBIQUE -1.62 (1.021) -1.562** (0.727) -0.387** (0.178) 0.344 
NAMIBIA 0.220** (0.086) -0.259*** (0.083) -0.840*** (0.256) 0.674 
NIGER -1.390*** (0.406) -0.791* (0.396) -0.815*** (0.252) 0.608 
NIGERIA . . . . . . . 
RWANDA 0.039 (1.036) -1.253** (0.404) -0.668* (0.355) 0.732 
SENEGAL 0.096 (0.237) -0.446* (0.245) -0.956*** (0.231) 0.573 
S. LEONE -0.477 (0.280) 0.244 (0.397) -0.495** (0.215) 0.375 
SOMALIA . . . . . . . 
SWAZILAND -0.079 (0.060) 0.078 (0.072) -1.055** (0.320) 0.619 
TANZANIA -0.631 (0.549) -0.456 (0.322) -0.567 (0.434) 0.446 
TOGO 0.137 (0.131) 0.221 (0.162) -0.948*** (0.191) 0.636 
UGANDA -1.014*** (0.303) -0.258 (0.379) -0.604** (0.243) 0.48 
ZAMBIA -0.146 (0.483) -0.017 (0.917) -0.972*** (0.269) 0.541 
ZIMBABWE -0.1 (0.087) -0.234** (0.096) -0.337** (0.157) 0.373 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *  
respectively. The dependent variable is the change in aid to GDP ratio. Beta policy refers to the coefficient of 
¨ORJ%%*'3t and it measures the short-run correlation between aid and the budget balance. Y, BBGDP and ECM  
 represent GDP, the budget balance to GDP ratio, and the equilibrium-correction component respectively. 
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Time profile of differenced aid and budget balance series (as ratios to GDP)48 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Only series with at least 18 years of data were included in the analysis. Countries with extremely short 
series are not included in the illustrations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLAINING THE CONTRASTING AID ± BUDGET DEFICIT 
RELATIONSHIPS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: THE CASE 
OF GHANA AND ZAMBIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background 
Given the overwhelming evidence on how ineffective foreign aid has been at 
promoting growth in low income countries, the focus of recent studies in the literature 
has shifted towards examining the channel through which aid affects growth. Of 
particular interest is the effect of aid on pro-growth policies. Since most aid is given to 
the government directly,49 and policy implementation is also by the government, the 
effect of aid on pro-growth policies largely depends on the interest of the recipient 
government in those policies. Therefore, donors seeking to improve aid effectiveness 
must seek to influence the interest of recipient governments towards pro-growth 
policies. The most likely way of achieving this, proposed mainly in the aid incentive 
literature, is to condition disbursement on the implementation of pro-growth policies 
(labelled aid conditionality). This way, recipient governments, in their quest for more 
aid, would be obliged to implement pro-growth policies. Evidence however shows that 
donors have been inconsistent with regards to the purpose and determinants of aid 
disbursement. In effect, aid has induced different policy actions across recipient 
countries, some of which flout the expected association of aid with pro-growth 
                                                 
49
 See Fagernas and Roberts (2004a). 
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policies. In the light of this, the question that the present study seeks to answer is what 
actions of donors and recipient governments are responsible for the contrasting 
relationship between aid and pro-growth policies across recipient countries? For 
reasons outlined below, we address the research question using Ghana and Zambia as 
case studies whiles focusing on reduced budget deficit as a pro-growth policy.   
 
Giving aid to the recipient government generates fiscal policy response because the 
budget constraint facing fiscal authorities is relaxed. Therefore, fiscal policy 
constitutes a relevant policy-focus in the context of an aid-effectiveness study. In 
particular, reducing the fiscal deficit is often a target in conditional aid agreements that 
seek to achieve economic stability and growth. The reason is that, firstly, increasing 
fiscal deficits persistently may cause government debt to reach unsustainable limits, 
resulting in high and unproductive spending on debt servicing and loss of credibility. 
Secondly, since the fiscal deficit is mainly financed domestically in low income 
countries, high deficits may crowd-out the private sector with the possibility that gains 
from development spending are nullified (Deverajan and Go, 2002). Thirdly, persistent 
budget deficits may lead to fiscal dominance, whereby monetary policy, and inflation 
for that matter, is driven by deficit financing rather than stable inflation targets. Thus, 
even when aid spending fails to make any remarkable impact on growth, exploiting the 
incentive role of aid to reduce the budget deficit presents an indirect channel for 
improving growth. We therefore consider reduced budget deficit as an appropriate pro-
growth policy to focus on in the present study.   
 
To answer our research question, we use Ghana and Zambia as case studies for the 
following reasons: (i) Sub-Saharan African countries are highly dependent on aid, 
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implying that its effect is not likely to be negligible. (ii) Ghana and Zambia have 
contrasting outcomes with regards to the implementation of aid conditionality. 
Generally, Zambia is known to be a country where aid conditionality is not met, 
whereas the opposite is true for Ghana. For instance, using an aggregate measure of 
policy (comprising budget deficit, inflation, and trade openness), aid inflows to 
Zambia is shown to be associated with poor policy performance whereas inflows to 
Ghana are a reflection of its improved policy performance (Burnside and Dollar, 2000 
and 2004).  (iii) For most of the period between 1970 and 2006, which constitutes our 
study period, both countries engaged in some form of aid program ± unlike Ghana, 
however, Zambia repeatedly defaulted agreements, including fiscal targets (Fagernas 
and Roberts, 2004; Goldsbrough and Cheelo, 2007). (iv) There is adequate data on aid 
and fiscal aggregates for both countries covering the study period.   
 
In chapter 4 we find that, consistent with the aforementioned aid-policy relationship 
observed by Burnside and Dollar (2000 and 2004), aid inflows to Ghana are associated 
with reduced budget deficits, whereas aid inflows to Zambia are associated with 
increased budget deficits. Knowing the underlying cause of the different outcomes in 
the two countries may be useful for shaping future aid policies. Although different 
countries with similar outcomes may have different explanations, knowing one way of 
achieving a given outcome may be as useful as knowing several ways of achieving that 
outcome. Therefore, the specific objective of the present study is to investigate the 
different donor and/or recipient behaviour(s), in terms of the relationship between aid 
LQIORZVDQGWKHUHFLSLHQWV¶ILVFDODJJUHJDWHV which are responsible for the contrasting 
aid-budget deficit relationships in Ghana and Zambia.  
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The possible cause(s) of the difference in aid-fiscal deficit relationship across countries 
may range from factors associated with donor response to fiscal policy, to factors 
associated with fLVFDOUHVSRQVHWRDLG)URPWKHGRQRU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZFRQGLWLRQLQJDLG
disbursement on reduced budget deficit, reduced expenditure, or increased revenue 
may all lead to a negative correlation between aid and deficit. Also, from the recipient 
JRYHUQPHQW¶Vpoint of view, adhering to contractionary fiscal agreements after aid is 
received (be it a reduction of the deficit, an increased effort at raising revenue, or a cut 
in spending) would result in a negative correlation between aid and deficit. Thus, 
establishing the underlying cause of the observed relationship between aid and the 
budget deficit in a given country requires an examination of the causal mechanism 
between aid and the components of the budget. Central to the present study, however, 
is how this objective is achieved. To be specific, we coin our research questions into 
testable hypotheses within a vector error correction model (VECM) which provides a 
statistical framework for testing economic concepts, without having to make prior 
assumptions about the structural relationship between the variables. Another advantage 
of our approach is that the VECM models the short- and long-run relationships 
between the variables explicitly and separately, permitting us to gain insight into how 
aid is spent. For instance, when aid has no significant long-run impact on the fiscal 
variables, the implications are that aid may have been used for relaxing the budget 
constraint in the short- and medium-run, or in other words for funding mainly 
consumption expenditure and debt repayments rather than investment expenditure 
(Martins, 2010). The specification and estimation of the VECM is based on a new 
approach suggested by Juselius (2009).   
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Our results show that the negative correlation between aid inflows and the budget 
deficit in Ghana is ascribable to actions of both donors and the fiscal authorities. 
Specifically, aid disbursement is conditioned on decreases in total expenditure and 
domestic finance, both of which are associated with deficit reduction. In response, 
fiscal authorities use aid in a way that is consistent with agreed deficit-reducing 
conditions. Particularly, aid has a significant reducing effect on total expenditure and 
domestic finance. On the other hand, there is increased inflow of aid to Zambia when 
total government expenditure increases, possibly because donors are interested in 
preventing further increases in the already high deficits and domestic financing. 
Therefore, the actions of the aid donors contribute towards the positive correlation 
observed between aid and the budget deficit in Zambia, but aid does not cause the 
deficit to widen. Rather, aid induces cuts in total expenditure, implying that the actions 
of fiscal authorities (in response to aid inflows) are not responsible for the positive 
correlation between aid and the budget deficit in Zambia. Given that aid has no 
significant effect on domestic borrowing in Zambia, and that there is a close positive 
association between domestic borrowing and the budget deficit in developing 
countries, we infer that the cuts in government expenditure, induced by aid inflows, are 
not enough (compared to the initial increase in government expenditure that attracted 
aid) to cause a reduction in the budget deficit. We therefore suggest the need for a 
more proactive stance by donors in conditional aid programs, whereby aid is directly 
conditioned on reduced total government expenditure, budget deficit and/or domestic 
finance. 
 
The study is organised as follows. The econometric method employed is presented in 
section 5.2, followed by a discussion on the variables used and the sources of data in 
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section 5.3. The analysis and discussion of results on Ghana and Zambia are presented 
separately in sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. Finally, in section 5.6, we present a 
summary of our results and conclusion.          
 
5.1.2 Literature review  
This section reviews the literature on three different classes of studies on aid 
effectiveness with regards to government behaviour, focusing on the strengths and 
limitations of the underlying concepts and empirical approaches used. The classes 
considered are fungibility studies, studies based on fiscal response models (FRMs), 
and studies based on vector autoregressive models (VARs). McGillivray and 
Morrissey (2004) give a detailed review of the literature on fungibility studies and 
FRMs; Osei et al. (2005) address the departure from fungibility studies and FRMs to 
VARs, and Martins (2010) addresses recent improvements on VARs. Given the 
voluminous literature review on these issues in recent studies, we present only a brief 
discussion and address more recent suggestions in Juselius (2009).    
 
The first class of studies on the effect of aid on the behaviour of government focuses 
RQµFDWHJRULFDO¶IXQJLELOLW\WKDWLVZKHWKHURUQRWDLGUHFeipts are used as intended by 
donors (Pack and Pack, 1990; Gupta, 1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Swaroop et al., 
2000). Aid is fungible when used for purposes other than what donors intend.   
Fungibility studies investigate which components of government expenditure (such as 
social activities, health and education, or on a more aggregate level, consumption and 
capital expenditure) increase with aid inflows. Since aid is mainly for development and 
poverty alleviation purposes, it is considered as fungible if inflows are associated with 
increases in recurrent components of expenditure.  
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The underlying concept of this class of studies is that recipient governments maximise 
utility derived from public consumption by relaxing their budget constraint with the 
fungible part of aid which they have control over (Feyzioglu et al., 1998; McGillivray 
and Morrissey, 2004). There is therefore the tendency to use fungible aid against the 
interest of donors. Empirically, OLS and simultaneous systems of estimation, such as 
two- and three-stage least squares (i.e., 2SLS and 3SLS respectively), seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR), and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
methods are often used. However, McGillivray and Morrissey, (2004) argue that SUR, 
3SLS, and FIML methods are more appropriate since fiscal variables are jointly 
determined and shocks to the system are not orthogonal. Generally, aid is found to be 
fungible although the details of the results vary across studies. The credibility of 
fungibility studies have been questioned for the following reasons: firstly, determining 
aid effectiveness on the basis of components of government expenditure may be 
misleading. This is because some recurrent spending such as improved wages in the 
health or education sectors may be in line with donor interest. Secondly, fungibility 
studies leave no room for the effect of aid on more aggregate budget components such 
as domestic revenue and borrowing which are also important indicators of fiscal 
performance. A related limitation is that fungibility studies do not allow for the joint 
determination of fiscal variables.  
 
To address these shortcomings of fungibility studies, another class of studies on aid 
effectiveness use fiscal response models (FRMs) which focused on more aggregate 
components of the government budget (Mosley et al., 1987; Gang and Khan, 1991; 
McGillivray, 1994; Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998). Specifically, FRMs acknowledge 
the simultaneous determination of fiscal aggregates (and aid in studies that consider 
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aid as endogenous)50 and estimate the interrelationships between aid, government 
revenue, expenditure, and borrowing. Commonest estimation methods used in this 
class of studies are two stage least squares and three stage least squares.  Like 
fungibility studies, FRMs are founded on theories of government utility maximization. 
However, unlike fungibility studies, the government sets targets for revenue (including 
aid revenue when endogenous), borrowing and expenditure, and derives utility from 
meeting those targets. Empirical results vary across studies, suggesting that the 
interrelationship between aid and fiscal aggregates of recipients is an empirical issue. 
For instance, in Cost Rica, aid inflows are shown to be associated with increases in 
government consumption and tax revenue and decreases in capital expenditure and 
domestic borrowing (Franco-Rodriguez, 2000); Aid does not have any significant 
impact on fiscal aggregates in India (Gang and Khan, 1991); Aid has a positive effect 
on capital spending, revenue and government consumption in Asia (Khan and 
Hoshino, 1992). 
 
FRMs have received their share of criticisms. The main criticism is to do with model 
specification problems and, as a structural model, the imposition of the structural form 
of the model. For instance, revenue and expenditure targets are difficult to estimate 
due to data limitations, and have therefore been captured by estimates that are arguably 
problematic (White, 1994). Also, whether or not aid is exogenous to the budget of the 
government is imposed rather than decided empirically; Mosley et al. (1987) and Gang 
and Khan (1991) treat aid as exogenous, while later work by Franco-Rodriguez et al. 
(1998) treated aid as endogenous. Yet, results are sensitive to model specification as 
well as the structure imposed on the model (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004). 
                                                 
50
 Gang and Khan (1991) consider aid to be exogenous but Franco-Rodriguez (1998) endogenize aid. 
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Another criticism is associated with estimation problems. As with fungibility studies, 
the 2SLS and 3SLS simultaneous systems of estimation used in estimating FRMs are 
very demanding in terms of data. This poses a limitation to such studies as the most aid 
dependent countries are the low income counties that are also the most likely to have 
the shortest length of comprehensive data.  
 
7RDYRLGWKHFKDOOHQJHRIµJHWWLQJWKHVWUXFWXUHDQGVSHFLILFDWLRQULJKW¶DVZDVWKHFDVH
with fungibility and FRM studies, VARs have become a widely accepted toolkit in 
recent fiscal response studies (See for instance, Fagernas and Schurich, 2004; Fagernas 
and Roberts 2004; Osei et al., 2005; Martins, 2010). This is because VARs present a 
framework for modelling the interrelationships between aid and fiscal aggregates 
without imposing any structure. Moreover, whether or not aid is exogenous is an 
empirical question that is determined (rather than imposed) within the VAR 
framework.  As with FRMs, the results have varied across studies. In Zambia, it is 
shown that aid inflows are associated with a decrease in domestic revenue and 
increases in domestic borrowing, debt repayment, and recurrent and capital 
expenditure (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a). In Ghana on the other hand, the evidence 
shows that aid inflows are associated with increased revenue and decreased domestic 
borrowing, and that there is no significant direct relationship between aid and total 
government expenditure (Osei et al., 2005). This reinforces the notion that the 
relationship between aid and fiscal aggregates is an empirical question.  
 
The VAR method also has some limitations. As with simultaneous system estimators 
used in fungibility and FRM studies, the VAR is method is a large sample estimator. 
Yet, the most aid dependent countries (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) are the ones 
 171 
 
with the shortest length of data. For instance, out of five recent studies on aid 
effectiveness in sub-Saharan African countries reviewed in Martin (2010), the largest 
sample size was 39 (for Kenya) and the lowest is 27 (for Zambia). This may question 
the validity of estimation results from VAR. A related setback is that VARs can easily 
be over-parameterised. This is because any additional (endogenous) variable 
introduces additional parameters (of the order of the lag length) to existing equations 
in the system as well as an additional equation.   
 
Other limitations of VARs which receive particular attention in the present chapter are 
as follows: Firstly, results are very sensitive to the choice of lag length. Yet, 
determining the correct lag length is not straight forward. Several studies use lag 
length information criteria such as the Akaike (AIC), Schwartz (SC) and Hannan 
Quinn (HQ). The problem, however, is that these information criteria depend on 
correct model specification, while correct model specification depends on the correct 
choice of lag length. For instance, when a model is wrongly specified by reason of not 
appropriately controlling for outliers, longer lag lengths may be suggested by the 
criteria above, resulting in misspecification of the VAR model. This may be the reason 
why the short-run parameter estimates for some recent aid-fiscal response studies are 
not meaningful, and could be very misleading when these estimates are of interest. For 
instance, the short-run estimates for Ghana obtained in Osei et al. (2005) shows that 
increased (decreased) inflows of aid are associated with decreased (increased) inflows 
in the previous year, and increased revenue is associated with decreased expenditure in 
the previous years. Also, increased domestic borrowing is associated with increases in 
aid inflows and revenue in the previous year. While it may be argued that the latter is 
the result of aid illusion, this is not consistent with the long-term (equilibrium) 
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relationship between the variables. Another example relates to Zambia, where increase 
in domestic borrowing is associated with decrease in current expenditure in the 
previous year &RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD. 
  
The second limitation that is addressed as one of the key objectives of the present 
chapter is that, as reduced-form models, short-run parameter estimates from VARs are 
mere correlations with no meaningful economic interpretation unless the underlying 
structure of the model is identified. Short-run identification in reduced-form VARs 
involves (though not the sole objective) purging the correlation of the residuals of the 
system. Therefore, several recent studies limit the interpretation of short-run dynamics 
to generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs) since they purge residual 
correlations (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a; Osei et al., 2005). While GIRFs are 
considered superior over their orthogonal Cholesky counterparts that impose arbitrary 
causal structure on the variables of the system, they are not without drawbacks. GIRFs 
treat every variable as being caused by all other variables in the system and so 
correlation of system residuals are purged without actually identifying the correct 
causal structure of the variables. Moreover, while impulse response functions in 
general are useful for determining the end effect of a shock to the system after all 
simultaneous interactions between the variables have gone through, it requires the 
ceteris paribus short-run dynamics of the system to inform policy as to why different 
resultant effects are achieved for different countries. Thus, impulse response functions 
on their own may not provide useful information for reform policies.   
 
To circumvent the problem associated with estimation of redundant lags, Juselius 
(2009) suggests a tentative method that begins with VAR(2), controls for outliers, and 
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tests for the adequacy of the VAR(2). Also, in response to the short-run identification 
of the VAR model, Juselius (2009) suggests the use of empirical identification. The 
latter includes contemporaneous variables in the equations of VAR (to obtain a 
structural VAR), imposes identifying restrictions on lagged variables in the VAR 
system, and uses full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method to estimate the 
identified equations as a system. This is a relatively new approach to VAR estimations 
that may be adapted in aid-fiscal response studies. Martins (2010) used the tentative 
approach for determining the correct lag length. However, they find VAR(1) as 
adequate for their model for Ethiopia and are unable to carry out empirical 
identification of the short-run structure of their model since there were no lagged 
differences to help with the empirical identification process. 
 
5.2 Econometric methodology 
5.2.1 Econometric model 
Following their adoption by Johansen (1988) for the estimation and testing of 
multivariate relationships among non-stationary data, vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methods have become the 'tool of choice' in much of time series macro-econometrics. 
As a reduced form representation of a large class of dynamic structural models 
(Hamilton 1994: 326-7) the VAR offers both empirical tractability and a link between 
data and theory in economics.  Accordingly, in the current application, where the fiscal 
aggregates are likely to be non-stationary and cointegrated, it will be convenient to 
couch the empirical analysis in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework (Hendry and 
Doornik, 2001:129). Consider an unrestricted VAR(p) model: 
(5.1) ttptpttt H<   dxȆxȆxȆx  . . . 2211   
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where tx  is a ( 1un ) vector of jointly determined variables at most integrated of order 
one I(1), td  is a ( 1uq ) vector of deterministic terms (such as constants, linear trends 
and dummies) and tH  is a ( 1un ) vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-
diagonal covariance matrix, 6 .  In what follows, it will be convenient to express (5.1) 
in its unrestricted error correction representation, 
(5.2) ¦
 
  '
1
1
1 ǻ
p
i
ttititt İȌGxīȆ[x   
where each of the ( nnu ) matrices )( 1 ii Ȇī  and )( 1 pȆȆIȆ    
FRPSULVH FRHIILFLHQWV WR EH HVWLPDWHG E\ -RKDQVHQV¶V  PD[LPXP OLNHOLKRRG
procedure using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data. The ('reduced rank') procedure allows 
Ȇ  to be factorised such that, 'ĮȕȆ   where Į  and E  are both ( rnu ) and r  is the 
rank of Ȇ  corresponding to the number of linearly independent relationships among 
the variables in tx . This is advantageous since it delivers a neat economic 
interpretation to the vector error correction model (VECM) of (5.2), whereby the r  
columns of E  represents the co-integrating vectorV WKDW TXDQWLI\ WKH µORQJ-UXQ¶ RU
equilibrium) relationships between the variables in the system and the r columns of 
error correction coefficients of D, load deviations from equilibrium (i.e. kt' xȕ ) into 
tx'  for correction, thereby ensuring that the equilibrium is maintained. The *i  
matrices in (5.2) estimate the short-run or transient effect of shocks on tx'  and 
thereby allow the short and long-run responses to differ. The parameterisation in (5.2) 
allows the short run adjustment effects embodied in the new equilibrium (which lead 
to permanent changes in the level) to be distinguished from the effects of lagged 
differences (which are transitory).  
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As we discuss in the following section, (5.2) readily facilitates estimation and 
inference on key parameters relevant to aid and fiscal response modelling, thereby 
providing a framework for addressing issues on aid conditionality and its implications 
for components of the government budget. By construction, estimated parameters are 
predicted on the ceteris paribus clause, and need to be interpreted in this light. Where 
the variables in an economic system are characterised by simultaneous and potentially 
rich dynamic interaction, inference based on 'everything else held constant' can be 
usefully augmented by the estimation of impulse response functions (see inter alia 
Lutkepohl and Reimers 1992) which explicitly incorporate such interactions. Impulse 
response functions are readily calculated from reduced forms such as (5.1) and (5.2).  
 
As a reduced form model, parameter estimates from the VAR model cannot be given a 
meaningful economic interpretation unless the structural economic representation from 
which (5.1) and (5.2) derive is known. Equivalently, impulse response functions 
cannot be legitimately attributed to economic (causal) mechanisms. To see why, note 
that in its reduced form the right-hand-side variables of the VAR comprise only 
predetermined and exogenous variables, whiles all contemporaneous effects are 
confined to the residual. Therefore, where significant contemporaneous relationship 
exists between variables, residuals of their reduced form representations, associated 
with shocks, are correlated contemporaneously such that shocks through the system 
cannot be given economic interpretation. It follows then that the estimated parameters 
upon which dynamic responses are based cannot be given economic (causal) 
interpretation either.   Recovering the structural representation of the VAR therefore 
involves correct identification of the matrix of contemporaneous relationships among 
 176 
 
variables which is required to purge the residuals of any contemporaneous correlation. 
It is only when the residuals are mutually uncorrelated that they can be considered as 
µVWUXFWXUDO¶ VKRFNV DQG EH JLYHQ HFRQRPLF LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK FDVH G\QDPLF
responses of the system (and the estimated reduced form parameters that generate 
those responses) are also given economic interpretation.  
 
To formalise the concept of identification in VAR models, the natural starting point is 
to show the relationship between the reduced form and structural VAR models. To do 
so, consider the structural economic representation of (5.2), namely, 
(5.3) > @ ¦
 
  '
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~ǻ~~
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ttitiptt vdȌxīȕ[ĮxA   
where A  represents the )( nnu  matrix of coefficients defining the contemporaneous 
structural linkages in the system, AĮĮ  ~ , ii Aīī  ~ , ii AȌȌ  ~ and ttv Aİ  are the 
structural shocks which, as pure disturbances, are assumed to be serially uncorrelated 
and uncorrelated with each other with zero means and diagonal variance-covariance 
matrix, ']E[ ' $$  Ȉȍ ttvv  (Hamilton, 1994, p.329). Thus, recovering the structural 
shocks, tv , from the reduced form residuals, tİ , requires the identification of the 
matrix of contemporaneous relationship between the variables, A.   
 
The exact identification of the structural VECM of (5.3) requires )1( nn  (identifying) 
restrictions to be imposed. A typical way of achieving this is to transform the VAR 
model by pre-multiplying all terms with the inverse of the Choleski decomposition of 
the covariance matrix, 2/1Ö : , in which case A is chosen as the lower triangular matrix, 
2/1Ö : . This approach imposes 2/)1( nn  zero restrictions on A and the residual 
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correlation matrix, 6 , alike, in order to account for the required total restrictions. 
Although the resulting residuals are mutually uncorrelated by construction, this 
identification scheme, pioneered by Sims (1980), arbitrarily imposes a recursive causal 
ordering on the contemporaneous relationships among the endogenous variables, 
which can be difficult to justify in the empirical setting. However, in small systems 
with less complex residual correlation structure it is relatively easier to use empirical 
identification of current effects, proposed in Juselius (2009: 243-245), as a guide to 
impose an empirically justifiable recursive causal ordering on the variables of the 
system. Empirical identification accounts for any significant residual correlation as a 
contemporaneous effect in A whiles leaving the residual correlation matrix, 6 , 
unrestricted. The model is identified by imposing identifying restrictions on the short 
term parameters A, Į~ , iī~ , and iȌ~ .  
 
To give a theoretical exposition of the empirical identification process, we employ a 
VAR(2) model in VECM form in which tx  is decomposed into t1x  and t2x . In the 
context of aid conditionality (with respect to the components of the fiscal budget) and 
the effect of aid on the components of the fiscal budget, we consider t1x as comprising 
only aid while t2x contains the components of the fiscal budget.  Accordingly, when dt 
is excluded for readability, (5.2) could be re-written as follows:  
(5.4)     
 )(ǻǻ
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where ),0(~ :NItİ  and »¼
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Assume just for illustration purposes that t2x contemporaneously causes t1x . Then, 
leaving out this information leads to a contemporaneous correlation between the 
residuals of the two equations in (5.4) (i.e. 02112 z: : ). The residual correlation 
could be purged by explicitly accounting for the contemporaneous effect of t2x on t1x . 
To explain the role of empirical identification in the latter process, we de-compose 
(5.4) into the conditional model for t1x  given t2x , and the marginal model for t2x as 
follows:51 
 (5.5)        
 )(ǻǻ
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where 1222110
:: ī , 21101111 īīīī  , 22101212 īīīī  , and 21011 DDD ī . 
Given that the second equation of the system in (5.5) is a subset of the first equation, 
the system is not identified. The objective is to identify t2x , and the whole point of an 
empirical identification is to achieve this objective by imposing identifying restrictions 
guided by the empirical estimation of (5.4). To be specific, a fundamental step in the 
empirical identification process is to exclude lagged regressors that are statistically 
insignificant in the estimation of (5.4) from the corresponding equation in (5.5). More 
                                                 
51
 See Harris and Roberts (2005:137), Juselius (2009: 244), and Johansen (1992). 
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often than not, however, zero restrictions on insignificant lagged regressors are not 
enough to achieve empirical identification. The reason is that insignificant (or 
significant) lagged regressors may be common to the two equations in (5.4) in which 
case identification is not achieved in (5.5). In such circumstances, empirical 
identification may still be achieved but this would require the imposition of zero 
restrictions on some statistically significant lagged regressors. To explain the concept 
underlying the latter process, note that when 12 tx  is a significant determinant of t2x  in 
the second equation of (5.4), it may appear to be significant in the first equation as 
well, not because it significantly affects t1x , but because it is strongly correlated with 
the significant contemporaneous regressor, t2x , that is omitted from the t1x  equation in 
(5.4). In that case, 12 tx would no longer be significant in the t1x equation once t2x is 
included as a regressor, as in the first equation of (5.5). This suggests that once the 
omitted contemporaneous variable, t2x , is included in the structural estimation of 
t1x in (5.5), it would be possible to impose zero restriction on 12 tx for identification 
purposes, notwithstanding the fact that it emerged significant in the corresponding 
reduced-form equation in (5.4), whiles purging the residual correlation in the system at 
the same time. However, this is possible if and only if the direction of causation is 
from t2x to t1x as in the present illustration, and may therefore serve as a test for 
determining the direction of causation. Thus, knowing whether t2x  indeed causes t1x  
contemporaneously is a matter of inspecting the residual correlation from (5.5), as 
when the direction of causality is wrong, the contemporaneous correlation between the 
residuals from the t1x and t2x  equations in (5.5) would still remain statistically 
significant. Knowing which significant lags could be useful for empirical identification 
is explained in section 5.4.3. 
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Two justifications for considering the contemporaneous structure, and not only the 
lagged structure, of the aid-fiscal response are that, firstly, if aid disbursement in a 
given period depends on agreed fiscal conditions, and the conditions are met later in 
that period, then modelling aid as a function of the expected (or agreed) fiscal 
condition is equivalent to modelling aid as a function of the realised fiscal policy in 
that period. Secondly, when the lag between the response of aid to fiscal policy or the 
fiscal response to aid is only a few months, then the relationship between fiscal policy 
and aid would be contemporaneous when annual data is used (See Juselius, 2009: 239-
240, and Martins, 2010). Therefore, as an empirical guide for identifying the VAR 
model, empirical identification is an important tool in the context of the present study. 
Moreover, empirical identification of the contemporaneous relationships among 
variables may be useful for answering some relevant policy questions that the reduced 
form exposition does not address, particularly in the present context where aid 
conditionality with respect to certain fiscal variables may be a contemporaneous 
phenomenon. 
 
5.2.2 Model Specification and Hypothesis Testing 
The VECM of section 5.1 is particularly attractive in the current context since it 
provides a natural framework in which the parallels between the economics and 
econometrics of fiscal response models can be exploited. Specifically, the framework 
not only facilitates a statistical investigation of the effect of aid on the budget of 
different recipient countries but it also shows how fiscal conditions in those recipient 
countries affect aid-allocation behaviour of their respective donors. This permits 
comparison across recipient countries with regards to the different impacts of aid and 
the associated aid-allocation behaviours. Because these economic hypotheses of 
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interest represent parameter restrictions within the VECM, they can be evaluated 
formally. In what follows these economic issues of interest are set-out as a number of 
key propositions. 
 
Distinguishing between the long- and short-run impacts of aid on the budget of 
recipients may give an insight into the role of aid. Insofar as aid represents an injection 
of foreign finance, it relaxes the budget constraint. Aid allocated to finance debt or 
domestic consumption is unlikely to achieve longer term effects on the budget, in 
which case the impact of aid will be confined to the short run. In contrast, where aid is 
used as a source of investment for development projects, such as healthcare or 
infrastructure, there may be more long-term effects on the budget, as such investments 
spawn further spending (aid illusion) or increased tax revenues.  Since development 
projects of this sort are likely to have come about as a result of aid's incorporation into 
the process of budgetary planning, it is convenient to think of the aid's long-run effects 
and its incorporation into budgetary planning synonymously. Clearly, whether aid is 
anticipated or not has a decisive bearing on the uses to which it is put and thus the 
(short and/or long run) effects that it has.  
 
The economic distinction between short-and long-run tie in neatly to the econometric 
formulation of the VECM. These in turn offer insights into the role of aid in the 
empirical setting.  Indeed, the correspondence between the economics and 
econometrics of aid in fiscal response is central to this chapter since it provides the 
basis for the empirical testing of a range of economic hypotheses relating to the effects 
that aid has in developing countries. Before we examine how these economic 
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hypotheses can be tested, it is instructive to recognise the role of deterministic terms in 
cointegrated VARs. 
 
Deterministic Terms 
As set-out in Johansen (1994), the specification of deterministic terms contained in td  
(such as intercepts, trends and intervention dummies) has important implications for 
cointegration analysis, both statistically and economically. While in general the 
introduction of dynamic terms into a static model alters the interpretation of the 
coefficients (Hendry and Juselius, 2000), this is especially true in an error correction 
representation of the data which explicitly incorporates data expressed in levels and 
first differences.  This mixture of levels and first differences that is characteristic of the 
VECM underscores the potentially complex role of deterministic terms in dynamic 
models comprising non-stationary variables. For example, the inclusion of an 
unrestricted constant in td  to account for the non-zero mean of the cointegrating 
relationships (i.e. > @ ȝxȕ  1'E t ) will also allow for linear trends in tx  via 
accumulation of the constant in the first difference (in which case > @ Ȗx  ' tE ). Should 
these linear trends not cancel out in the cointegrating relation, td  should be augmented 
with a linear trend to account for it, which if left unrestricted, would allow for 
quadratic trends in tx  (this being implied where > @ tt ȡx  'E ).  Hence, unrestricted 
intercepts (trends) in td  may give rise to linear (quadratic) trends in tx  and where 
these do not occur in the data parsimony dictates they should not appear in the model 
either. Moreover, because deterministic terms affect the limiting distributions of the 
cointegration test statistics, the precise specification of td  is rarely a simple or 
innocuous decision. Knowledge of the economic problem at hand can be usefully 
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brought to bear to determine the appropriate specification, or at least rule out some 
possibilities. For instance, wKHUHWKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHRIWUHQGLQWKHGDWDµZLWK-WUHQG¶
variants may be ruled out a priori.52   
 
As Juselius (2009) demonstrates, each unrestricted deterministic term in td  of (5.1) or 
(5.2) represents the combined sum of its contribution to the cointegrating relation(s) 
and growth rates in txǻ . By explicitly separating the long- from short-run behaviour in 
the data, the VECM allows the dual role of deterministic terms to be isolated, if 
required. Consider the cointegrated VAR(2) model in its error correction model 
representation given in  (5.2) where td  is simply a ( 1uq ) vector of constants giving 
 > @ tttt İȥxīxȕĮx  '  111 ǻ'  (5.6) 
Under cointegration, all terms in (5.6) are stationary and thus have a constant mean 
which we may obtain by taking expectations, so that > @ Ȗx  ' tE  is a ( 1uq ) vector 
describing the unconditional growth rates of each series and > @ ȝxȕ  1'E t  is a ( 1ur ) 
vector of intercepts in the cointegrating relations.  Hence, taking expectations of (5.6) 
gives 
 
> @ > @
ȥĮȝ
ȥxȕĮȖīI
 
  11 'E t
 
As a result > @ ĮȝȖīIȥ 1   demonstrating that the constant term in (5.6) consists of 
two components, one related to linear growth rates in the data and the other to the 
                                                 
52
 Calculation of the mean growth rates of all of the variables (and their standard deviation) may assist 
visual inspection for detection of trend in the data.  
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mean values of the cointegrating relations (as given by the intercepts of the 
equilibrium  relations).  
 
The same applies to all other deterministic elements in td  such as the intervention 
dummies that are typically required to satisfy the normality of tH  that is required for 
valid inference.  For example, where an intervention (exogenous shock) affects a 
subset of variables (or all but to different degrees) the short-run impact may carry-over 
into the equilibrium relation necessitating an additional dummy(s) there too. Hence the 
components of td  and the restrictions that are placed on them play an important part of 
the modelling process. As parameter restrictions in the VECM, intervention effects are 
directly testable where degrees of freedom allow. In short samples, it is customary to 
confine intervention effects to (say) the short run only. This, of course, emphasises the 
importance of institutional knowledge of the interventions at hand, in contrast to their 
all-too-common use DVDµTXLFNIL[¶-XVHOLXV) provides detail on this issue, but it 
should be borne in mind that in general the precise composition of deterministic 
elements in td  (and whether they are restricted or unrestricted) affects the distributions 
of cointegration test statistics and hence the critical values that are appropriate. Hendry 
and Julselius (2001) set out the most commonly estimated combinations of trend and 
intercept (for which separate critical values apply).  
 
Formulating Aid Hypotheses 
The cointegrating relation is the statistical analogue of the budgetary equilibrium in 
fiscal response models. Hence, fiscal response theory predicts the presence of a single 
cointegrating relation (i.e. stationary linear combination of the variables in tx ) such 
that E  is an 1un  vector, the coefficients of which quantify the budgetary equilibrium. 
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Of course, this presupposes that all variables in tx  are integrated of order one, [I(1)]. 
Where a variable is I(0) it will form a stationary linear combination with itself, so that 
there can exist at most n  of these stationary linear combinations; rn   implying that 
all variables are I(0). As Johansen (1992) demonstrates, the r  columns of D  
correspond to the r  rows of 'E  so that inference on the number of cointegrating 
vectors (non-zero rows in 'E ) can be evaluated by hypothesis testing on the adjustment 
coefficients (non-zero columns in D ) using likelihood ratio methods.  Specifically, 
standard tests for cointegration are equivalent to testing that the rD  are significantly 
less than zero for nr ,1 . This leads us to the first set of cointegration hypothesis 
tests, which amount to zero restrictions on each of the n columns of D  in (5.7): 
 )(rH c : 0 r ,  nr ,1  
To assist the exposition, consider a VAR(2) in VECM form with unrestricted constant 
partitioned conformably as in section (5.1), 
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where t1x comprises aid and t2x contains the other components of the fiscal budget. 
The D  and E  coefficients are partitioned by cointegrating vector, such that 'E  is 
divided by row into two subsets of cointegrating vectors '1E  and '2E  which are 
themselves partitioned by variable in the same way as tx . Thus, 1D  and 2D  load each 
of the subsets of cointegrating vectors into each equation for correction. We assume 
that '1E  represents the budgetary equilibrium so that '2E  (and ]:[ 22122 DDD  ) will be 
a null matrix unless some variables are  I(0).  
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Proposition I: The existence of fiscal equilibrium 
Evaluation of Proposition I is by )1(cH  and is confirmed by 02111  ĮĮ , 
02212   ĮĮ  using cointegration tests. While all variables in tx  will be tested for the 
order of integration prior to the estimation of (5.7), where results from testing )(rH c  
suggests two (or more) stationary linear combinations of the data, the stationarity of 
variables in tx  (such as aid) may account for it. Generally, any linear combination of 
variables in tx that appear to be stationary by reason of one or more I(0) variables is 
not of economic interest and is therefore confined to  '2E   and removed from the 
model. Adjusting the dimensions of Į and E accordingly, yields53   
(5.8)   
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When the focus of the study is on the long-run only, stationary variables are 
transferred from tx  to td , so that the former contains only those variables germane to 
the long run. However, stationary variables may contain some relevant information for 
the short-run  and therefore, when the short-run is of interest, as in the context of the 
present study, stationary variables are maintained in tx (though removed from the 
long-run) to yield (5.8).   
 
It is apparent that this set of tests performs a dual role in the analysis: (a) it determines 
the appropriate formulation of variables in (5.2) and (b) results offer an important 
insight into the role of aid in the recipient country. Specifically, where aid is found to 
                                                 
53
 Where variables are found to be I(0) Rahbek and Mosconi (1999) suggest a tractable modification to 
ensure that the limiting distributions of the cointegration test statistics are invariant to the presence of 
the stationary regressors. 
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be I(0), it cannot belong to the fiscal equilibrium relationship and thus its principal role 
is to relax the budget constraint. This may be indicative of countries where aid is too 
small to be included in the process of budget planning or suggest that aid is diverted 
away from investment purposes for other reasons.  
  
Having established the number of stationary linear combinations within tx  the next 
step is to establish the variables that each contains. We proceed on the assumption that 
1 r  having dealt with the multiple cointegrating vector case above.54 Testing the 
statistical significance of each variable in the cointegrating relation requires long run 
exclusion tests, which amount to testing zero restrictions on each coefficient in '1E , 
namely,  
 0:)( '1  je jH ȕ , nj ,1  
Of particular interest is the significance of the aid variable which gives rise to, 
 
Proposition II: Aid forms part of the fiscal equilibrium relation 
which is evaluated by 0:)( '11  ȕte xH  in (5.8). As with the cointegration tests, long 
run exclusion tests have economic implications. Where aid is found to be I(1) but 
redundant to the long run relation suggests that there may be institutional factors 
preventing aid from playing a role in the fiscal equilibrium. Any variable that is 
unimportant in the long run can nonetheless be informative in the short-run and is 
therefore maintained in tx for the purpose of investigating the short-run when the latter 
                                                 
54
 In practice, long run exclusion tests would be applied in conjunction with cointegration tests to 
determine whether multiple cointegrating vectors were indeed due to the presence of stationary variables 
in xt or multiple cointegrating relations among I(1) variables in xt. Since the latter case is implausible 
from an economic viewpoint it is ruled-out in the following development.  
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is also of economic interest as in the present study, implying a VECM specification of 
the form in (5.8).   
 
In seeking to investigate the way in which aid impacts on the budget of recipient 
countries attention naturally focuses upon the causal mechanisms that exist between 
aid and the other components of the budget. Specifically, we may want to establish 
whether aid is treated as given in the budget or whether its allocation actually reflects 
the state of the budget in some way. More generally, issues of exogeneity (or 
endogeneity) may be addressed with respect to the short- and long-run behaviours. 
Regarding the latter, it is useful to know which of the variables adjust to maintain the 
budgetary equilibrium. This can be accomplished econometrically, by application of 
-RKDQVHQ¶V  long run weak exogeneity test. This represents a set of exclusion 
tests on the ( 1un ) vector of error correction coefficients, > @'21111 ĮĮĮĮ    in (5.8). 
Since these measure the speed at which the corresponding variables in 
> @'21 ttt xxx '' '  adjusts to deviations from the equilibrium, a zero coefficient 
implies that the variable does not adjust to disequilibrium in the system and is 
exogenous to the long run part of the system.55  
 
%\*UDQJHU¶V5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ7KHRUHP(QJOHDQG*UDQJHUDWOHDVWRQHYDULDEOH
must adjust in order to maintain the equilibrium relation(s) and thus the exogeneity 
status of the variables is typically an issue of economic interest. For example, when 
applied to the domestic fiscal variables in tx , the test offers a guide as to the behaviour 
                                                 
55
 Importantly, weak exogeneity specifies parameters of interest (unlike Granger Non-Causality for 
example) thus a variable that is weakly exogenous for the long run parameters need not be weakly 
exogenous for other parameters (such as those describing the short run).   
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of the fiscal authorities, indicating which fiscal aggregate adjusts in light of deficit or 
surplus to restore the budgetary equilibrium. This gives rise to, 
Proposition III: Recipient governments do not react to fiscal disequilibrium 
which is tested by 0:)( 212  Įx tweH  in (5.8). Given that we might ordinarily expect 
the government to maintain the fiscal equilibrium, in which case )( 2tweH x  is rejected, 
similar tests can be applied to the individual coefficients within 21Į  to establish which, 
if any, components are weakly exogenous.  
 
Weak exogeneity tests also cast light on the behaviour of aid donors and leads to, 
Proposition IV: Donor  governments do not react to fiscal disequilibrium 
which is tested by 0:)( 111  Įx tweH  in (5.8).  Where rejected, donors' aid allocation 
reacts to past fiscal imbalance in the recipient country. Conversely, a non-rejection 
implies aid is weakly exogenous to the long run relation, so that departures from the 
UHFLSLHQWV EXGJHWDU\ HTXLOLEULXP GR QRW LQIOXHQFH WKH GRQRU¶V DLG DOORFDWLRQ. Once 
more the formulation of the VECM offers some interesting insights into the economic 
behaviours embodied in the data.   
 
The foregoing discussion assesses whether any of the non-stationary variables can be 
treated as weakly exogenous for the estimation of the long run parameters ( 'Įȕ ). Any 
variable that forms part of the cointegrating relation but is weakly exogenous to it is 
described as long run forcing (Pesaran et al. 2000).56 It should also be borne in mind 
                                                 
56
 As a concept long-run forcing is weaker than Granger non-causality (see below). While both concepts 
rule-out the possibility that shocks to the endogenous variables have any long-run impact on the variable 
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that all stationary variables are also weakly exogenous for 'Įȕ  by construction. As 
stationary regressors, they can play no part in the long-run part of the model, and may 
therefore be treated as fixed for the purpose of estimation of it. In practice, if the 
parameters of interest are solely those pertaining to the long run (i.e. 'Įȕ ) there are no 
advantages to estimating separate equations for the weakly exogenous variables, which 
as a consequence, enter contemporaneously on the right hand side of (5.2) as discussed 
above (see for example, Ericsson et al., 1998). While, this usually simplifies the 
modelling exercise, it is inappropriate in the current context, since short-run 
parameters are also of interest for impulse response analysis and for addressing issues 
on aid conditionality. With regards to the latter, short-run parameters in the aid 
equation are relevant since aid may adjust to short-run changes in fiscal variables, even 
if it does not respond to deviations from their values in the long run relation (i.e. even 
if it is weakly exogenous). In other words, because the VECM distinguishes the short-
from long-run relationships among the data, we are able to evaluate whether variables 
such as aid are exogenous to both short- and long-run behaviours. Questions of this 
sort lead in to Granger non-causality testing (Granger, 1969 but see e.g., Ericsson et al. 
1998) and gives rise to, 
Proposition V: Donors aid allocation is not influenced by past fiscal conditions in the 
recipient country 
which can be expressed in terms of (5.8) as the null hypothesis that t2x  does not 
Granger-cause t1x ,  
 )( 12 xx oGH 0)(: '1211  ȕĮ  and 012  ī  
                                                                                                                                             
in question, lagged changes in those endogenous variables may influence it under long run forcing, but 
denied under Granger non-causality. 
/
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Where they are upheld, these restrictions ensure that past values of the fiscal variables  
do not influence current values of aid, whether in terms of long- or short-run 
behaviours. The weak exogeneity of t1x  (i.e. 011  Į ) ensures that 0)( '1211  ȕĮ  and 
t2x  does not Granger-cause t1x  providing lagged changes in t2x  do not influence t1x . 
Where this is so, t1x  is described as being strongly exogenous (Engle, Hendry and 
Richard, 1983). Given the stationarity of (5.8), this can be evaluated using standard t 
and F tests. Of course, it may also be of interest to evaluate whether aid is Granger 
non-causal for the domestic budget (i.e. the domestic fiscal variables). Where this 
hypothesis is upheld, aid is unlikely to be effective, however in practice it may result 
when aid is numerically small rather than statistically insignificant. This gives rise to 
the most fundamental of the economic hypotheses, namely, 
Proposition VI: Aid does not influence the fiscal conditions in the recipient 
This proposition amounts to the null hypothesis that aid is Granger non-causal for the 
budget in the recipient country, (i.e. t1x  does not Granger-cause t2x ) and evaluated in 
(5.8) by, 
 )( 21 xx oGH 0)(: '1121  ȕĮ  and 021  ī  
in an analogous manner to that given above. Table 5.1 contains a summary of the 
economic propositions of interest and the restrictions they impose on the VECM. In 
general, all hypotheses within a VECM are conditional upon the correct choice of 
cointegrating rank (r) and this also applies here. Thus the cointegrating rank (and 
appropriate specification of deterministic terms) is established prior to the estimation 
of the VECM.   
 
/
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In summary, this section has set out some key issues and principal propositions 
relevant to the representation of aid in fiscal response modelling. We adopt a VAR 
framework for this purpose owing to the tractability of the VECM and the insights that 
it brings to the investigation of aid in developing countries. In particular we consider 
six propositions of relevance to the aid relationships between donors and recipients and 
set out the parameter restrictions these imply in the VECM. In the following section 
we apply these methods to data from two developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
namely Ghana and Zambia.  
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Table 5.1  Summary of Aid Propositions 
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Proposition Evaluation Restrictions  Inference 
I. The existence 
of fiscal 
equilibrium  
 
 
How many 
stationary linear 
combinations )(r  
of the data exist?  
)0(cH : 02212
2111
  
  
ĮĮ
ĮĮ
 
 
)1(cH : 02111 z ĮĮ , 
 02212   ĮĮ  
 
),,2( nHc  :
 02111 z ĮĮ , 
 02212 z ĮĮ  
Theory of fiscal response indicates a 
single cointegrating vector ( 1 r ) so 
rejection of )0(cH  is consistent with 
this.  
 
 
Where 1!r  suggests that aid (and 
potentially other variables) may be 
stationary and thus plays no role in the 
fiscal equilibrium relation.   
 
Maintained Model II 
(single equilibrium assumed) 
> @ »¼º«¬ª»¼º«¬ª»¼º«¬ª»¼º«¬ª»¼º«¬ª »¼º«¬ª  ttttttttt 2112 112221 121121'12'11211121 İİȌGxǻxǻīī īīxxȕȕĮĮxǻxǻ  
 
Proposition Evaluation Restrictions Inference 
II. Aid forms part 
of the fiscal 
equilibrium 
 
Is aid 
statistically 
significant in the 
fiscal relation? 
)( 1teH x : 0'11 E  Assuming aid is I(1), non-rejection 
implies institutional factors deny aid a 
long-run role.  Rejection of )( 1teH x  
suggests aid belongs in the fiscal 
relation. 
III. Recipient 
governments do 
not react to fiscal 
disequilibrium   
Are fiscal 
aggregates 
weakly 
exogenous to 
the fiscal 
relation? 
)( 2tweH x :  021  Į  Rejection of )( 2tweH x  implies 
governments in recipient countries adjust 
to maintain fiscal equilibrium. Similar 
further testing identifies those variables 
that maintain equilibrium.  
IV. Donors do not 
react to fiscal 
disequilibrium in 
recipient country 
Is aid weakly 
exogenous to 
the fiscal 
relation? 
)( 1tweH x :  011  Į  Non-rejection of )( 2tweH x  implies 
governments in recipient countries do not 
adjust to maintain  fiscal equilibrium; 
rejection implies they do.  
9 'RQRU¶V DLG
allocation is not 
influenced by past 
fiscal conditions 
in recipient 
Are fiscal 
variables 
Granger-non-
causal  for aid? 
)( 12 xx oGH : 
0)( '1211  ȕĮ  and 012  ī  
Non-rejection of )( 12 xx oGH  implies 
donor behaviour is unaffected by past 
fiscal conditions in either the long or 
short run. 
VI. Aid does not 
influence fiscal 
conditions in 
recipient 
Is Aid Granger-
non-causal  for 
the fiscal 
variables? 
)( 21 xx oGH : 
0)( '1121  ȕĮ  and 021  ī  
Non-rejection of )( 21 xx oGH  implies 
aid has no impact on the budget of the 
recipient in either the long or short run.  
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5.3 Description of variables and sources of data 
The present study investigates the source of differences in the aid-budget deficit 
relationships in Ghana and Zambia, using annual time-series data over the period 1972 
to 2006. The components of the government budget included in the analyses are 
government expenditure, government revenue, domestic borrowing, and foreign aid. 
Foreign aid is obtained as net official development assistance (ODA), and includes 
concessional loans with a grant element of 25% or more; While it may be argued that 
the loan component of this measure over-estimates the actual amount of aid received 
by the fiscal authorities, it does not pose much problem for the present study since our 
focus is on relaxing the budget constraint and the fiscal response induced. It may also 
be argued that ODA includes technical assistance, projects carried out by donors, and 
IRRGDLGZKLFKDUHQRW LQFOXGHG LQ WKHµSRW¶RIDLG UHFHLYHGE\ WKHILVFDODXWKRULWLHV
and would therefore not induce fiscal response; In disagreement with this view, we 
purport that the latter components of ODA are likely to affect fiscal policy since they 
relax the fiscal budget constraint by reason of eliminating what would have constituted 
a target of government spending. Data on foreign aid was compiled by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) but obtained from the African Development 
Indicators database of the World Bank.  
 
Unlike Osei et al (2005) on Ghana, our measure of government revenue includes both 
tax and non-tax revenues. Whereas this measure has the advantage of capturing the 
induced effort of the government at raising revenue by all means, tax revenue may not 
be a functional indicator when the tax capacity is reached, as is believed to be the case 
in Zambia (&RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD, 2007). Data on government revenue is obtained 
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from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS) databases of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also, unlike several other 
studies in this area,57 we do not disaggregate government expenditure into its current 
and capital components. This is because, given the relatively small sample sizes 
involved in the present study, we may already be trading-off some useful degrees of 
freedom as we encourage the use of dummy variables to induce Gaussian residuals. 
Moreover, investigating how aid is actually spent is not the focus of the present study. 
Data on government expenditure is also obtained from the IFS and GFS databases of 
the IMF. 
 
Data on domestic borrowing in Zambia was obtained from the GFS database of the 
IMF and the ADI database of the World Bank; data from the two sources were 
consistent. We however did not succeed in obtaining a consistent data on domestic 
borrowing for Ghana covering the study period. We therefore use domestic finance by 
the monetary authorities as a proxy. The latter constitutes a good proxy because, in 
addition to being a component of domestic borrowing, the correlation is relatively high 
(87% and 97% in constant 2000 price and current price denominations respectively, 
using data obtained from 1972 to 1989 from the GFS of IMF). Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that results associated with domestic financing by monetary authorities are 
PRUHLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHLPSOLFDWLRQRIDLGIRUILVFDOGRPLQDQFHWKDQIRUµFURZGLQJ-RXW¶
of the private sector; none of these however constitutes the main focus of the study and 
therefore the difference is not a drawback. Data on domestic finance from monetary 
authorities was obtained from the GFS database of the IMF and the ADI database of 
the World Bank.  
                                                 
57
 See Martin (2010), Osei et al (2005), Fagernas and Roberts (2004a and b), and Fagernas and Schurich 
(2004). 
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All the variables were in constant 2000 price LCU (ie Cedis in Ghana and Kwacha in 
Zambia). The latter transformation was computed using the GDP deflator (and 
exchange rate data ± for converting aid from US dollars) obtained from the ADI 
database of the World Bank. As in Martins (2010) and Osei et al (2005), we preserve 
the budget identity by not taking the logarithms of the transformed variables. Also, by 
leaving out some components of the government budget such as external borrowing 
(and other domestic borrowing in the case of Ghana) and loans, we are not estimating 
an identity.     
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5.4  Estimations for Ghana 
5.4.1 Unit root test 
In order to obtain valid economic and statistical inferences, there is the need to 
augment the standard economic techniques to allow for unit roots where necessary. As 
a natural starting point, therefore, we begin our empirical estimations by testing for the 
order of integration of the individual series, using the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) 
test. Since the ADF specification includes lagged differences on the right-hand-side to 
correct for potential autocorrelation in the residuals, tW , there may be loss of power of 
the test as a result of loss of degrees of freedom. Therefore, we also employ an 
alternative approach, known as the Phillip-3HUURQ¶V 33 WHVW which deals with non-
normality without adding extra parameters to the test formulation. The PP test uses a 
non-parametric method that accounts for structural breaks in the series.  
 
Table 5.2 below shows the results of the ADF and the PP test for unit roots. At the 
99% and in all three deterministic forms of the model, none of the variables in levels is 
stationary but when differenced once all the variables become stationary. This implies 
that all variables are integrated of order one (denoted I(1)) at the 99 percent confidence 
level. Notable, however, is that domestic finance in levels appears to be stationary 
around a constant (and trend) at the 95 (90) percent level of significance. By inspecting 
the domestic finance series in figure 5.1, we suspect that the apparent stationarity at 
relatively lower levels of significance may be because a combination of seasonal 
interventions or outliers (associated with the four-year elections among others) 
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nullifies the effect of unit roots on the temporal ordering of the series.58 Therefore, to 
obtain a clearer profile of the series, we smooth out the outliers by taking the three-
year averages of the data. The corresponding time profile is also illustrated in figure 
5.1. We conclude from the ADF and PP tests, reported in table A5.3 of the appendix, 
that the three-year-average domestic finance series is I(1). We therefore proceed with 
an integration of order one for domestic finance, as with all the other variables.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Time profile of domestic finance 
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58
 Osei et al (2005) find domestic borrowing to be I(1) when the data is over the period 1964-1998. 
Considering domestic finance as stationary could be considered as tentative at this point, and would be 
evaluated when the cointegration vector is estimated. 
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Table 5.2 Unit root test: ADF and Phillip Perron (Variables in constant 2000 LCU) 
 
Maintained model: t
p
i
ititt xxtx WJUDD ' ' ¦
 

1
121  
   LEVELS   1ST DIFF. Inference 
 
 H0: 
ȡ  
H0: 
ȡ Į2=0 
H0: 
ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
 H0: 
ȡ  
 
       
ADF TEST       
 
      
Aid  -3.358* -0.851 0.195  -7.478*** I(1) 
.       . 
Domfin  -3.407* -3.353** -2.572**  -7.355*** I(1) 
.       . 
GovRev  -1.740 1.274 2.556  -6.250*** I(1) 
.        
GovExp  -0.086 0.966 1.673  -6.463*** I(1) 
.        
P-P TEST       
 
       
Aid  -3.306* -0.665 0.195  -7.537*** I(1) 
.        
Domfin  -3.407* -3.353** -2.382**  -7.477*** I(1) 
.        
GovRev  -1.661 1.386 2.723  -6.387*** I(1) 
.        
GovExp  0.328 3.627 4.488  -6.864*** I(1) 
.        
Crit. Val. H0: 
ȡ  
H0: 
ȡ Į2=0 
H0: 
ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
   
99%  -4.253 -3.639 -2.635    
95%  -3.549 -2.951 -1.951    
90%  -3.207 -2.614 -1.611    
                           *,**, and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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5.4.2 Model specification 
Determination of the lag length  
The validity of inferences drawn from the VAR model depends crucially on the 
adequacy of the specified model. A wrongly specified model is likely to breach one or 
more of the standard assumptions underlying a statistical model and may therefore lead 
to results that are economically and statistically false. The challenge of specifying an 
adequate model includes the correct choice of lag length. To determine the appropriate 
lag length, three information criteria that are commonly used are the Akaike (AIC), the 
Schwartz (SC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQ).  Though similar in the underlying 
likelihood function, results from the three criteria may be different because they apply 
different penalties to the loss of degrees of freedom associated with increased lag 
lengths. Conventionally, the sequence of events in a VAR analysis is to use the 
aforementioned lag length criteria to determine a tentative lag length of the VAR in 
levels for which there is no sign of autocorrelation, check the residuals for model 
misspecification, and specify structural dummies to correct for non-normalities (if 
model misspecification tests suggest so) before conducting the cointegration rank test. 
However, the problem associated with this approach is that the choice of lag length is 
valid only when the model is correctly specified. For instance, not accounting for 
outliers and structural shifts in the series may wrongly suggest the need for longer lag 
lengths to deal with potential autocorrelation, and longer lag lengths conceal other 
model specification problems. We therefore prefer to have a prior knowledge of the 
QDWXUH RI RXWOLHUV DQG µVKLIWV¶ EHIRUH GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH ODJ OHQJWK $QRWKHU SUREOHP
associated with the conventional approach to VAR analysis is that the nature of 
residuals from the VAR in levels is not indicative of the normality of residuals from 
the actual model. This is because, for I(1) variables, the actual model would comprise 
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the differenced variables and, possibly, an error-correction term that are not accounted 
for when the VAR is estimated in levels, suggesting that testing residuals from the 
latter for model specification problems may be misleading. We therefore prefer to test 
for model specification problems on a tentatively estimated VECM or VAR in 
differences (when there is no cointegration). Thus, our approach is to proceed with the 
test for cointegration rank using a tentative model that incorporates identified 
structural dummies and a reasonable (and possibly redundant) lag length. Using the 
estimated rank, we estimate a tentative VECM and test for misspecification. In the 
event of redundant or inadequate lag length, the rank (trace) test is re-conducted.59  
 
Before choosing a reasonable lag length to start with, we report the estimates from the 
formal lag length criteria to show how the different approaches compare. The 
estimated lag lengths from the AIC, SC, and HQ criteria, whose validity are 
conditional on correct model specification, are reported in table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.3 Lag length criteria 
Lag LogL AIC SC HQ 
     0 -3537.65 228.752 229.122 228.872 
1 -3481.27 226.146 227.256* 226.508* 
2 -3470.09 226.457 228.307 227.06 
3 -3447.3 226.019* 228.61 226.864 
4 -3432.48 226.096 229.426 227.181 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion at 5% 
 
 
 
                                                 
59In large samples, altering the lag length would not necessarily warrant another rank test since the 
nature of the test is such that the short-run dynamics are concentrated out, in accordance with the Frisch-
Waugh theorem, before determining the rank (Juselius, 2009:116). However, this may not hold for small 
samples.   
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The AIC points to three lags whiles the SC and HQ suggest one lag. Whereas too few 
lags may understate the dynamics of the model, too many lags may be equally harmful 
by reason of compromising useful degrees of freedom and masking specification 
problems. There is a strong argument in favour of specifying a VAR(2) for a start and 
correcting for possible structural problems. For instance, Juselius (2009: 72) suggests 
that, in practice, a correctly specified model does not often require a longer VAR order 
than two, and Martin (2010) concluded from their review of literature that most 
empirical studies on fiscal response to aid often find an appropriate VAR order of two. 
We therefore proceed using a VAR (2) model with structural dummies, though 
tentative for a start, and attempt to identify and correct for structural specification 
problems once the corresponding VECM is estimated.  
 
Dummy Variables 
A readily available econometric toolkit for dealing with non-normalities in VAR 
models is the use oI µLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ RU RXWOLHU DQG µVKLIW¶ GXPPLHV &KRRVLQJ WKH
correct dummy, and particularly getting the timing right, is however a non-trivial 
exercise. When wrongly specified, the dummy variable may be of no use or even 
detrimental to the estimation (Juselius, 2009: 104). To specify dummy variables, 
therefore, we use as much information and evidence as possible, ranging from the 
examination of the series in levels and differences vis a vis the economic calendar, to 
the inspection of estimated residuals from a tentatively specified VECM model. 
Inspecting tentative VECM residuals, rather than the residuals from the VAR in levels, 
is useful because the latter may not be reflective of the actual model specification. To 
see this, note that when the VAR is in levels, outliers may not show up in the residuals 
because they may cancel out when they affect two or more (cointegrating) variables. 
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This is however not the case when the variables are in differences. Therefore, given 
that all the variables are I(1) and for that matter, the analyses would involve mainly the 
first differences (and, possibly, the levels of the series only in the event of existing 
cointegration relation(s)), it would be more useful to inspect residuals that capture 
specification problems associated with the differenced data. It is noteworthy that 
model misspecification results in large residual variance that may conceal specification 
problems. In this case, correcting one specification problem reveals another (Juselius 
2009: 77). Therefore, examining the graphical representation of the series in levels and 
in differences, along with the economic calendar, is a useful precursor since it helps 
specify some very obvious dummy variables for a start. The series in levels and first 
differences are as illustrated in figure 5.2 below.  
 
The time profile shows that, in levels, domestic finance trended downwards between 
the late 1970s and the mid 1990s, reflecting the implementation of economic reform 
programs that targeted lower levels of domestic borrowing. The sudden upsurge in the 
OHYHORIGRPHVWLFERUURZLQJLQGHSLFWHGE\DWUDQVLWRU\µEOLS¶LQWKHSURILOHIRU
the differences, was associated with election spending by the incumbent PNDC 
government during the very first democratic election in Ghana. Given that there is a re-
election of government every four years, the upsurge in domestic borrowing was 
bound to recur accordingly. Indeed, that appeared to be the case for the year 1996 and 
2000 election years but not in 2004. The change in pattern of election borrowing in 
2004 may be associated with improved institutions that enforce reform programs even 
during election years. This suggests that different intervention dummies are required 
for each election year.  
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Figure 5.2 Time Profiles of the fiscal variables and aid60 
 
 
-2,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
DOMFIN DDOMFIN
Domestic finance (Domfin)
DD
om
fin
 
in
 
bi
llio
n 
ce
di
s 
(co
ns
ta
nt
 
20
00
 
pr
ice
s) Dom
fin
 in
 billion
 cedis
 (constant
 2000
 prices)
 
 
 
 
-2,000
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
GOVEXP DGOVEXP
Government expenditure (Govexp)
D
G
o
ve
xp
 
in
 
bi
lli
o
n
 
ce
di
s 
(co
n
st
a
n
t 2
00
0 
pr
ic
e
s) Go
ve
xp
 in
 billio
n
 cedis
 (co
n
sta
nt
 2000
 p
rice
s)
 
                                                 
60
 Note: The prefiǆ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĐůĂƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐĞŶĚĚĞŶŽƚĞƐĨŝƌƐƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? 
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Figure 5.2 continued 
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With regards to government expenditure and revenue, we clearly identify three trends: 
a downward trend from the early 1970s till the famine year of 1983 when the economy 
collapsed, a rising trend of a mild gradient from 1984 till 1997, and yet another rising 
trend with even higher gradient from 1998 onwards. Given the similarity between the 
two variables, these trends are likely to cancel out without generating any non-
normality when estimations include only the levels of government expenditure and 
revenue. However, there is the need to account for a mean-shift dummy when 
estimation involves the differences of the two variables, as is the case with VECMs. 
Thus, broken trends in the levels data translate into mean-shifts in the differenced data, 
which is more obvious in the differences profile for government expenditure and 
revenue when the pre-1983 and 1984-1997 periods are observed, but blurred out by 
outliers in the later period. Like domestic borrowing, the pattern of government 
expenditure is affected in the election years. Unlike domestic borrowing, however, 
government spending continues to rise following an upsurge in an election year. The 
trend in government expenditure is interrupted temporarily by an excessive reduction 
in government spending in 2002, when aid donation to Ghana was inexplicably low 
and the resulting increase in domestic borrowing was not enough to make amends, 
hence the need for a 2002 outlier dummy. The government revenue data, however, 
does not appear to be plagued by the elections and the 2002 outliers.  
 
The aid data also seems to depict three regimes that coincide with those identified for 
government expenditure and revenue. However, the polygonal quadratic pattern is less 
pronounced in the levels data for aid. Surprisingly, the aid profile shows a sudden fall 
in aid during the first election year, in 1992, but not in the subsequent election years. 
In fact, aid inflows to Ghana increased in the 2000 election year, and actually peaked 
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in the 2004 election year. This reinforces the need to employ different dummies for 
each election year if any possible non-normality is to be dealt with effectively. In 
addition to the aforementioned unexplained fall in aid inflows in 2002, the aid profile 
also shows another sudden unexplained reduction in 1990, suggesting the need for a 
1990 outlier dummy.  
 
In order to ensure that less conspicuous but influential outliers are not over-looked, we 
obtain and inspect the residuals from a tentatively specified VECM that includes only 
the election dummies. The process confirmed the non-normalities and the 
corresponding dummy variables already identified. Upon inspection of the series, in 
levels and differences, and the residuals of the tentative VECM estimation, the dummy 
variables suggested for the adequate specification of the VECM are as summarised in 
table 5.4 EHORZ7KHHOHFWLRQGXPP\WDNHVRQDYDOXHRIµ¶LQDQGµ-¶LQ
1993, and follows in that order for all other election dummies and outliers. The mean-
VKLIWGXPP\WDNHVRQDYDOXHRIµ¶IURPWRµ¶IURPWRDQGµ¶
from 1998 to 2006.  
 
Table 5.4 Dummy Variables 
SERIES SUGGESTED DUMMIES 
Domestic Finance Election, outlier2002 dummies 
Gov. Expenditure Mean-shift, election, and outlier2002 dummies 
Gov. Revenue Mean-shift dummy 
Aid Mean-shift, election, outlier1990 and outlier2002 
dummies 
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Determination of the cointegration rank 
The cointegration rank refers to the number of unique equilibrium combinations of the 
variables in the system. The importance of correct model specification cannot be 
overemphasised in the determination of the cointegration rank; a misspecified model 
may lead to the wrong choice of cointegration rank (obtained from the trace test), 
especially in small samples, resulting in false inferences from the VECM model since 
the latter is influenced by the choice of cointegration rank. 
  
Using the VAR(2) model with the dummy variables suggested in table 5.4, namely 
election dummies, mean-shift dummy, and the outlier dummies for aid, the trace test 
predicts a cointegration rank of one as shown in table 5.5. This means that one unique 
equilibrium relationship exists between the variables in the system, and leads to the 
rejection of the hypothesis that no fiscal equilibrium exists in Ghana. To arrive at 
this result, we allow for a trend term in the cointegration space to capture trending 
exogenous effects that have not been accounted for, whiles we allow for a constant 
term in the short-run specification. It is noteworthy that whereas the treatment of these 
deterministic components often affects the estimate of cointegration rank, this is not 
the case in the present study. As summarised in table 5.6, all possible specifications of 
the deterministic components point to a cointegration rank of one.  
 
Typically, accounting for dummy variables in the rank test alters the asymptotic 
distribution of the estimator and, for that matter, the critical values. The latter are 
however indicative of the true values when the dummy variables do not enter the 
cointegration space. In the present study we expect non-normalities to cancel out in the 
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cointegration space since each cause affects more than one variable in the system.61 
We therefore restrict the dummy variables to the short-term, implying that inferences 
based on the critical values are valid. Therefore, consistent with Osei et al. (2005), we 
proceed with the estimation of the VECM using a single cointegrating relation. 
 
Table 5.5 Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized . Trace 0.05 
 No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     None * 0.732 73.388 63.876 0.006 
At most 1 0.408 29.906 42.915 0.508 
At most 2 0.282 12.588 25.872 0.770 
At most 3 0.049 1.666 12.518 0.985 
Trend restricted to cointegration space, but constant unrestricted in model 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Summary of cointegration rank for different assumptions 
about the deterministic components 
             
Data 
Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
      Test Type 
 
No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61This is confirmed by plotting the error-correction term in the next section.   
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5.4.3  Estimation of the VECM 
 
Model misspecification tests 
7KH9(&0LVHVWLPDWHGXVLQJWKH-RKDQVHQ¶VDSSURDFKZKLFKLVLQWZRSDUWV7KHILUVW
part comprises maximum likelihood estimation of the long-run (cointegration) relation 
based on reduced rank regression. The second part estimates the short-run dynamics in 
a VAR whiles including the estimated long-run relation explicitly as an error-
correction term. The estimator is derived under the assumption of the residuals being 
Gaussian and is considered full maximum likelihood provided the underlying 
assumptions are met. It follows then that the model estimates are valid only when the 
estimated residuals are indeed Gaussian. Therefore, before reporting the long- and 
short-run estimates and testing the corresponding hypotheses, we first test for model 
misspecification by conducting the standard tests on the distribution of the residual, 
namely autocorrelation, normality and heteroscedasticity tests. The distribution of 
residuals is reported in figure 5.3 and the test results in table 5.7 below.  
 
Figure 5.3 Distribution of residuals 
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Table 5.7 Test for model misspecification 
 
(a) Test for autocorrelation 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 19.994 0.221 
2 18.205 0.312 
3 20.919 0.182 
4 16.004 0.453 
   
 
 
(b) Test for normality 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 0.659 2 0.719 
2 1.026 2 0.599 
3 0.073 2 0.964 
4 2.431 2 0.297 
    Joint 4.190 8 0.840 
    
 
(c) Test for heteroscedasticity 
 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   248.455 240 0.340 
   
 
Standard test results show that, even at the 90 percent confidence level, there are no 
signs of significant autocorrelation (up to the fourth lag), non-normality and 
heteroscedasticity. To ascertain the redundancy of the second lag, we perform a lag 
exclusion test on the lagged difference. The results in table 5.8 shows that with the 
exception of government revenue series, the lagged differences are significant in all the 
series and jointly even at the 99 percent confidence level. This rules out the VAR(1) 
suggested by the SC and HQ information criteria. We therefore consider the VECM 
transformation of the VAR (2) model as adequately specified. 
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Table 5.8 Lag exclusion test 
 
¨'20),1 ¨*29(;3 ¨*295(9 ¨$,' Joint 
      Lag 1 29.020 13.483 5.440 15.435 79.013 
 
[ 0.000] [ 0.009] [ 0.245] [ 0.004] [ 0.000] 
      df 4 4 4 4 16 
Numbers in [ ] are p-values 
 
 
 
Long-run estimates and hypotheses    
Normalising on domestic finance, the long-run relationship between the fiscal 
YDULDEOHVDQGDLGZLWKWKH-RKDQVHQ¶VPD[LPXPOLNHOLKRRGFRHIILFLHQWVVXEVWLWXWHGLV
as shown in (5.10) below. 
 
(5.10)   785.0*043.0*331.0*078.0exp*350.0
)116.2()182.2()527.0()019.5(
 

trendGovrevAidGovDomfin                   
 
where the figures in parenthesis represent the t-statistic. The result shows that ceteris 
paribus, domestic finance is positively correlated with government expenditure but 
negatively correlated with aid and government revenue. We also find that the 
magnitude of the estimates for government expenditure and revenue are very similar 
and with opposite signs. These findings are consistent with Osei et al. (2005). With the 
exception of aid, however, the sizes of the coefficient estimates are relatively a third of 
what Osei et al. (2005) obtains.62 This may be ascribed to the fact that the present 
study uses the domestic finance from monetary authorities rather than domestic 
borrowing in general. Given the similarity of the coefficients for aid, and the large 
proportion of domestic borrowing that is accounted for by domestic finance from 
monetary authorities, we do not rule out the possibility that the influence of the fiscal 
authorities on monetary policy (fiscal dominance) has reduced (possibly as a result of 
                                                 
62
 In Osei et al. (2005), the coefficient estimates for government expenditure, government revenue and 
aid in the corresponding long-run equation were 0.841, -1.040, and -0.074 respectively.  
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improved institutions). This view suggests that, in recent times, fiscal authorities resort 
to alternative means (rather than domestic sources) to finance the primary deficit, and 
is supported by the significant and negative coefficient of the trend term that suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, domestic finance is falling over time.  
 
The result also shows that, unlike government expenditure and revenue, aid is 
statistically insignificant and therefore does not form part of the fiscal equilibrium 
relation. This suggests that, in Ghana, aid has been used principally to relax the budget 
constraint rather than for investment purposes. Nonetheless, aid may still impact on 
growth if it was used as an incentive instrument in the short-run to encourage growth 
enhancing policies such as the reduction of the primary deficit. In what follows we 
acquire more insight into the determination and role of aid in the short-run. 
 
Although we do not account for dummy variables in the equilibrium relationship, we 
do not expect the long-run estimates to be affected because, as explained earlier, we 
expect non-normalities to cancel out in the cointegration space since each of them is 
associated with more than one variable. To confirm this expectation, we present a 
graphical illustration of the equilibrium-correction term, when the short-run effect is 
concentrated out, in figure 5.4. We find that, indeed, the cointegration space is 
stationary and shows no signs of non-normality. 
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Figure 5.4 Equilibrium-correction term (Residuals from equation 5.10) 
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Short-run estimates and hypotheses 
As a reduced form model, short-run parameter estimates from a VECM are unique 
(generically identified) but cannot be given causal interpretation unless the underlying 
structure of the model shows no significant contemporaneous relationship between the 
variables (in which case the reduced-form is also the structural form). Therefore, until 
we identify the underlying structure of the reduced-form VECM, a significant 
regressor is said to Granger-cause the dependent variable, which simply means that the 
dependent variable is not exogenous to the regressor, but the effect may occur 
indirectly through other (contemporaneous) variables. Thus, the reduced-form 
parameter estimates are simply considered as correlations. Nonetheless, since our 
hypotheses of interest only requires information as to whether or not a lagged regressor 
contains statistically significant information about future values of the dependent 
variable (even if the link between the variables is indirect) rather than a quantification 
of the (direct) structural effect, we proceed with the estimation and interpretation of the 
reduced-form model to address our hypotheses. An important caveat, however, is that 
if there exist any significant contemporaneous relationships between the variables (that 
have been relegated to the residuals by construction of the reduced-form VECM), then 
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OLS estimates could be biased in some cases.63Also the resulting correlations between 
residuals could cause OLS estimates of the VECM to be inefficient (with the 
possibility of a type IV error).64 Therefore, the test of hypotheses based on the 
reduced-form VECM becomes substantiated when the underlying structure of the 
model is identified.    
 
The short-run estimates of the VECM are as reported in table 5.9. Since the error-
correction term is insignificant in the aid equation, we do not reject the hypothesis that 
donor governments do not react to fiscal disequilibrium.65 However, aid inflows are 
significantly associated with past reduction in government expenditure (at the 1% 
level), suggesting that donors may have used aid as an incentive for the Ghanaian 
government to reduce the fiscal deficit. This finding is consistent with elements of aid 
conditionality which target the reduction of domestic borrowing and debt sustainability 
through cuts in government spending, and leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that 
donors¶ aid allocation is not influenced by past fiscal conditions in Ghana. Donor 
actions therefore contribute to the negative correlation between aid inflows and the 
budget deficit in Ghana. Nonetheless, the humanitarian use for aid appears to exist 
marginally, evidenced by the marginally significant positive correlation between aid 
inflows and the level of domestic finance in the previous year.  
 
                                                 
63
 Parameter estimates may be biased if the lagged regressor has indirect effect (occurring through the 
omitted contemporaneous variable) that is opposite the direct effect on the variable. A typical example is 
the error-correction (ecm) term in the aid equation; the ecm term may have a direct negative effect on 
aid but also an indirect positive effect occurring through domestic finance. Therefore, controlling for 
contemporaneous domestic finance in the aid equation (when suggested by identification criteria) may 
cause an otherwise insignificant ecm to become more negative and significant.  
64
 Type IV error is whereby variables appear to be insignificant when they are actually significant. 
65
 As will become clear later, the error-correction term becomes significant in the aid equation when the 
underlying structure is identified. 
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Given that a considerable amount of aid is channeled through to the fiscal authorities 
directly, we expect aid to impact on the fiscal conditions in Ghana in the short-run. 
However, considering the numerous uses to which aid could be put, the nature of the 
impact is not known a priori. The result indeed rejects the hypothesis that aid does 
not affect the fiscal conditions in Ghana. Specifically, aid inflows have significant 
reducing effect on domestic borrowing and government expenditure (at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively), reflecting the efficacy of aid conditionality in Ghana. Since these 
impacts of aid are closely associated with deficit reduction,66 we conclude that the 
actions of the Ghanaian government, regarding the use of aid, contribute to the 
negative correlation between aid and the budget deficit in Ghana. The error-correction 
term is statistically significant and with the right (negative) sign in the domestic 
finance and government expenditure equations, meaning these two fiscal variables 
adjust to correct fiscal disequilibrium in Ghana. We therefore reject the hypothesis 
that the Ghanaian government does not respond to fiscal disequilibrium.  
 
7KLV IDU ZH KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG WKH µFHWHULV SDULEXV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ DLG DQG WKH
fiscal variables in Ghana, and for that matter the behaviours of aid donors and the 
Ghanaian government underlying the relatively successful implementation of aid 
conditionality. A useful next step, for policy purposes, is to draw inferences about the 
dynamic effect of aid on the fiscal variables when all simultaneous and dynamic 
LQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHYDULDEOHVDUHLQFRUSRUDWHG7RGRVRZHDXJPHQWWKHµFHWHULV
SDULEXV¶UHGXFHG-form estimates of table 5.9 into impulse response functions. Since the 
latter quantify the causal effects of an economic shock that is unique to the variable of 
interest (aid in this case), obtaining structural parameter estimates is essential. In what 
                                                 
66
 The budget deficit is principally financed by domestic borrowing. Therefore, reduced domestic 
borrowing is likely to be associated with reduced budget deficit. Also, ceteris paribus, government 
expenditure cuts lead to reduced budget deficits. 
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follows, therefore, we identify the underlying structure of the VECM before estimating 
the impulse responses of the fiscal variables to an aid shock. 
 
Table 5.9 Short-run estimates of reduced-form VECM 
 
¨'RPILQt ¨*RYH[St ¨*RYUHYt ¨$LGt 
¨'RPILQt-1 -0.557*** 0.178 0.018 0.196* 
 
(0.168) (0.184) (0.157) (0.115) 
     ¨*RYH[St-1 1.068*** 0.310 -0.367* -0.512*** 
 
(0.236) (0.258) (0.220) (0.162) 
     ¨*RYUHYt-1 -0.961*** 0.170 0.303 0.107 
 
(0.336) (0.368) (0.314) (0.231) 
     ¨$LGt-1 -0.806*** -0.471** 0.264 0.338** 
 
(0.209) (0.229) (0.195) (0.144) 
     Const 0.200 0.353** 0.192 0.106 
 
(0.150) (0.160) (0.140) (0.100) 
     Ecmt-2 -0.601*** -0.461** -0.237 -0.079 
 
(0.202) (0.221) (0.189) (0.139) 
     R2 0.848 0.787 0.668 0.861 
                          Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and  
                          10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. The regression  
                           includes dummy variables that have been confined to the appendix for  
                           readability. 
 
 
Structural identification of the VECM 
As explained in section 5.2.1, the reduced-form VECM restricts contemporaneous 
relationships between the variables to the residuals, leading to contemporaneous 
correlations between residuals. Therefore, shocks through the system cannot be 
identified as unique to any variables (or equations), and cannot be given structural 
(economic) interpretation, unless the underlying structure of the VECM is identified. 
Identifying the underlying structure of the VECM is essentially an exercise to purge 
off any contemporaneous correlations between the residuals. Therefore, a natural first 
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step is to inspect the residual correlation matrix for any significant correlations. The 
residual correlation matrix is reported in table 5.10 below. 
 
Table 5.10 Residual correlation Matrix 
 
¨'RPILQ ¨*RYH[S ¨*RYUHY ¨$LG 
¨'RPILQ 1 0.118 -0.771 -0.448 
¨*RYH[S 0.118 1 0.006 0.018 
¨*RYUHY -0.771 0.006 1 0.188 
¨$LG -0.448 0.018 0.188 1 
The critical value for the correlation coefficients is 35.0/2   Tcij , 
                             where T is the effective sample size (N-k). 
 
We find that, by standard measure,67 the significant contemporaneous residual 
correlations of concern are between aid and domestic finance, and between 
government revenue and domestic finance. A contemporaneous causal effect from 
domestic finance to government revenue is inexplicable and very unlikely. Based on 
empirical knowledge, therefore, we purge the corresponding residual correlation by 
imposing a contemporaneous causal effect from government revenue to domestic 
finance. Thus, an increase in revenue results in less borrowing by the Ghanaian 
government.  
 
Identifying the contemporaneous causal direction between aid and domestic finance is 
less straightforward because either direction is possible. For instance, donation of 
development aid is often conditioned on agreed developmental actions, (including 
fiscal policy actions) to be carried out by the recipient government and some donors 
wait for the recipient to commit to the actions before disbursing aid, suggesting a 
                                                 
67
 The critical value for the correlation coefficients is 35.0/2   Tcij , where T is the effective 
sample size (N-k). 
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causal effect from domestic borrowing to aid. On the other hand, most aid is given to 
the fiscal authorities directly as a source of foreign revenue and therefore, for a given 
level of spending, less borrowing would be required; hence aid may be viewed as 
causing changes in domestic borrowing.  
 
To identify the causal direction between aid and domestic borrowing, we employ the 
empirical identification scheme described in the methodology section; the scheme is 
based on the empirical estimates of the reduced-form VECM in table 5.9 (see Juselius, 
2009: 243-245). To be specific, we first isolate the domestic finance and aid equations 
from the VECM to obtain a system of two equations. We then estimate the system 
twice; in the first estimation, we assume the causation is from domestic finance to aid. 
We therefore include domestic finance as a contemporaneous regressor in the aid 
equation. We then assume that the causal direction is from aid to domestic finance and 
run the second estimation in which case contemporaneous aid is included as a 
regressor in the domestic finance equation. In each of the two estimations, the 
empirical identification of the contemporaneous right-hand-side variable is achieved 
by imposing zero restrictions. The specification that is considered adequate, in terms of 
the correct causal direction between the aid and domestic finance variables, is the one 
in which the identified contemporaneous regressor emerges statistically significant 
and, at the same time, succeeds in purging the residual of any significant 
contemporaneous correlation.   
 
Fundamentally, the empirical identification process involves imposition of zero 
restrictions on lagged regressors that are insignificant in the reduced-form VECM 
estimation in table 5.9. As explained in section 5.2.1, however, it is often necessary to 
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impose zero restrictions on some significant lagged regressors as well during the 
empirical identification process. To achieve this, we first look for the lagged regressors 
that are statistically significant in both equations but with opposite signs, given that the 
correlation between aid and domestic finance is negative; the variables that meet this 
requirement are the lags of domestic finance, government expenditure and aid. We 
then impose zero restrictions on these lagged regressors in the aid equation during the 
first estimation, whereby contemporaneous domestic finance is included as a regressor 
in the aid equation. The process is repeated for the domestic finance equation during 
the second estimation, but in this case it is the contemporaneous aid variable that is 
included as a regressor in the domestic finance equation. Note that we also include the 
contemporaneous government expenditure and revenue variables as additional 
regressors in both equations of the system in order to eliminate their influence on the 
resulting correlation between the residuals. Since the equations of the system do not 
have the same regressors in this procedure, OLS estimates would not be equivalent to 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates, hence we use FIML method 
in what follows.  
 
The FIML estimates and the corresponding residual correlation matrices are reported 
in table 5.11.  In the first two columns, we show that domestic finance has a (negative) 
contemporaneous effect on aid which is significant at the 5% level, and once this effect 
is controlled for, the contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of the aid and 
domestic finance equations becomes insignificant (0.126). This suggests that changes 
in domestic finance affect changes in aid contemporaneously. Given that the 
contemporaneous effect could be two way, we still investigate the reverse causality. 
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Table 5.11 FIML estimation of aid and domestic finance 
 
 
 
zero restriction on 
contemp. aid 
 
zero restriction on 
contemp. dom. finance 
 
¨'RPILQW ¨$LGW 
 
¨'RPIint ¨$LGW 
    ¨'RPILQW 
 
-0.337** 
   
  
(0.156) 
   ¨*RYH[SW 0.313 0.081 
 
0.247 0.043 
 
(0.405) (0.178) 
 
(0.279) (0.333) 
¨*RYUHYW -0.491** -0.080 
 
-1.015 0.319 
 
(0.239) (0.310) 
 
(0.691) (0.320) 
¨$LGW - - 
 
0.940 
 
    
(0.991) 
 ¨'RPILQW-1 -0.558 
   
0.005 
 
(0.406) 
   
(0.212) 
¨*RYH[SW-1 0.911*** 
   
0.125 
 
(0.246) 
   
(0.297) 
¨*RYUHYW-1 -0.801* 
  
-0.282 
 
 
(0.468) 
  
(0.618) 
 ¨$LGW-1 -0.779*** 
   
-0.167 
 
(0.249) 
   
(0.261) 
ECMt-2 -0.307 
  
-0.04 
 
 
(0.562) 
  
(0.394) 
 Const 0.080 -0.018 
 
0.015 0.022 
 
(0.155) (0.153) 
 
(0.411) (0.267) 
Elect1992 1.730 -0.172 
 
1.640 -0.226 
 
(1.490) (0.443) 
 
(1.000) (0.424) 
Elect2000 
 
0.873 
  
0.517 
  
(0.845) 
  
(0.421) 
Elect2004 
 
1.420*** 
  
1.060** 
  
(0.345) 
  
(0.503) 
AidOut1990 
 
-0.735 
  
-0.549 
  
(0.869) 
  
(0.401) 
Mean-shift 
 
0.128 
  
-0.011 
  
(0.102) 
  
(0.201) 
Log. L'hood -1826.576 
 
-1852.198 
Res. Corr. 0.126 
 
-0.818 
                Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels  
                are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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We however find that the contemporaneous effect of aid on domestic finance is 
statistically insignificant (even at the 10% level) and the residual correlation between 
the two equations (which is -0.818) remains statistically significant in the second 
estimation, as shown in the third and fourth columns of table 5.11. We therefore 
conclude that the contemporaneous causal direction is from domestic finance to aid. A 
possible explanation, informed by the fact that the budget deficit of developing 
countries is mainly financed domestically, is that aid disbursement is actually 
conditioned on the budget deficit as a way of targeting lower domestic finance and 
fiscal stability in general. Thus, domestic finance in the present study may be serving 
as a proxy for budget deficit in an environment where donors aiming to enforce aid 
conditionality wait for the recipient government to commit to a lower fiscal deficit 
before disbursing aid. This finding therefore reinforces the previously established view 
that the implementation of aid conditionality is relatively successful in Ghana.  
 
Having deduced the positions of government revenue, domestic finance and foreign 
aid in the causal chain, the final variable to position is government expenditure. It is 
noteworthy that the location of government expenditure is not likely to have any 
significant impact on the results because its reduced-form residual has no significant 
correlation with any other reduced-form residual in the system, suggesting that 
government expenditure has no significant contemporaneous relationship with the 
other variables. Nonetheless, it is essential to locate government expenditure in the 
causal chain because not doing so would relax the number of identifying restrictions 
required, in which case OLS estimates would no longer be equivalent to FIML 
estimates. We therefore use empirical knowledge to locate the position of government 
expenditure in the causal chain. We expect the revenue of the government in a given 
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year to dictate spending in that year (rather than the reverse causality), and we expect 
expenditure decisions to precede government borrowing in general. We therefore 
identify the causal chain between aid and the fiscal variables in Ghana as follows: 
 
                               ¨*RYUHYĺ¨*RYH[Sĺ¨'RPILQĺ¨$LG 
 
When we impose this causal structure on the variables, we obtain the structural VECM 
estimates in table 5.12. Consistent with the residual correlation matrix of table 5.11, 
the results show that the only variables with statistically significant contemporaneous 
effect in the structural VECM are domestic finance (at the 5% level) in the aid 
equation and government revenue (at the 1% level) in the domestic finance equation 
with coefficient estimates of -0.538 and -0.827 respectively. Qualitatively, the results 
of the structural domestic finance equation, with the exception of the additional current 
(government revenue) variable, do not differ from the reduced-form results; as a result 
of controlling for the contemporaneous effect of government revenue, however, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of the lagged variables become smaller since their 
indirect effects, occurring through current government revenue, are sifted out. For 
instance, the coefficient of the lagged (difference) government revenue variable 
reduces from -0.961 in the reduced-form to -0.729 in the structural-form domestic 
finance equation but still remains significant at the 1% level. In the context of the 
present study, such reduction in the magnitude of the structural-form coefficient does 
not imply a bias in the reduced-form estimates; rather, the reduced-form estimates 
include indirect impacts once the linking contemporaneous variable is omitted.  
 
With regards to the structural aid equation, we find that, once the contemporaneous 
effect of domestic finance is accounted for, the lags of domestic finance, government 
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expenditure and aid become insignificant in the structural aid equation (even at the 
10% level), implying that they affect aid indirectly through their impact on current 
domestic finance (confirmed by their significance in the domestic finance equation). 
An interesting finding, however, is that the error-correction term becomes statistically 
significant with a negative coefficient (-0.443) at the 10% level, leading to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that aid donors do not respond to fiscal 
disequilibrium. All other conclusions from the hypotheses tests based on the reduced-
form remain the same ± A summary of our conclusions on the hypotheses tests is 
shown in table 5.13 (page 226). 
 
Table 5.12 Short-run estimates of structural VECM 
 
 
¨*RYUHYW 
 
¨*RYH[SW 
 
¨'RPILQW 
 
¨$LGW 
¨'RPILQ - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.538** 
       
(0.227) 
¨*RYH[S - 
 
- 
 
0.112 
 
0.071 
     
(0.135) 
 
(0.132) 
¨*RYUHY - 
 
0.007 
 
-0.827*** 
 
-0.307 
   
(0.269) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.242) 
¨'RPILQW-1 0.018 
 
0.178 
 
-0.562*** 
 
-0.110 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.168) 
¨*RYH[SW-1 -0.367* 
 
0.312 
 
0.730*** 
 
-0.073 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.282) 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.234) 
¨*RYUHYW-1 0.303 
 
0.168 
 
-0.729*** 
 
-0.329 
 
(0.314) 
 
(0.386) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.275) 
¨$LGW-1 0.264 
 
-0.473* 
 
-0.535*** 
 
0.019 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.194) 
Const -0.192 
 
-0.352** 
 
-0.319*** 
 
-0.247* 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.131) 
Ecmt-2 -0.237 
 
-0.459* 
 
-0.746*** 
 
-0.443* 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.224) 
R2 0.668 
 
0.787 
 
0.941 
 
0.899 
Normality 2.307 
 
1.208 
 
3.194 
 
2.431 
. [0.316] 
 
[0.547] 
 
[0.203] 
 
[0.300] 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and * respectively. This regression includes dummy variables that have been confined to the 
appendix (A5.3) for readability.  
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Coefficient estimates of the structural government expenditure equation remain almost 
the same as in the reduced-form, both qualitatively and quantitatively. To be specific, 
the coefficients on the lags (in differences) of aid and the error-correction term are 
respectively -0.471 and -0.461 in the reduced-form government expenditure equation 
and -0.473 and -0.459 in the structural equation. However, the error-correction term 
and the lag of aid become less significant compared to the reduced-form estimates. 
Seeing that the additional insignificant current government revenue variable does not 
improve the goodness of fit of the model (with the R-squared remaining at 78.7%), we 
ascribe the loss of significance of the two variables to the loss of degrees of freedom. 
The coefficients on the lags (in differences) of domestic finance, government 
expenditure, and government revenue remain insignificant in the structural government 
expenditure equation. 
 
Finally, we find evidence that increase in government expenditure may be associated 
ZLWK µFURZGLQJ-RXW¶ RI WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH UHVXOWV VKRZ WKDW DQ
increase in government expenditure leads to an increase in domestic finance, coupled 
with a decrease in government revenue, in the following year. Our interpretation is that 
the decrease in government revenue, when expenditure and domestic finance increases, 
may be associated with a reduction of private sector activities that tend to reduce the 
revenue base of the government.  
 
,Q VXPPDU\ WKH µFHWHULVSDULEXV¶ ILQGLQJV IURP WKHVWUXFWXUDO9(&0HVWLPDWLRQ WKDW
are of relevance to policy are as follows: aid donors condition aid disbursement to 
Ghana on reduced domestic borrowing and aid, so disbursed, influences the reductions 
of domestic borrowing both directly and through cuts in government expenditure. 
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Conditioning aid disbursement on reduced domestic borrowing, with the aim of 
inducing lower domestic borrowing, is justifiHGE\HYLGHQFHRIµFURZGLQJ-RXW¶HIIHFW
increased domestic borrowing is associated with decreased government revenue in the 
following year, indicating loss of private sector activities. With the underlying 
structure of the reduced-form VECM identified, our next step is to estimate impulse 
UHVSRQVHIXQFWLRQVWRH[DPLQHWKHIXOOLPSDFWRIDLGZKHQWKHµFHWHULVSDULEXV¶FODXVH
is relaxed. 
 
 
 
Table 5.13 Summary of test results on hypotheses 
NULL HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS 
I. The existence of fiscal equilibrium  Not rejected 
II. Aid does not form part of the fiscal 
equilibrium Not rejected 
III. Recipient governments do not react to 
fiscal disequilibrium Rejected 
IV. Donors do not react to fiscal 
disequilibrium in recipient country Rejected 
V. 'RQRU¶VDLGDOORFDWLRQLVQRt influenced 
by past fiscal conditions in recipient Rejected 
VI. Aid does not influence fiscal 
conditions in recipient Rejected 
 
 
 
Impulse response analyses 
The full impacts of one standard deviation (positive) shock to aid on domestic finance, 
government expenditure, and government revenue over time, when all dynamic and 
simultaneous relationships between the variables are taken into consideration, are 
illustrated by the impulse response functions in figure 5.5. The shock occurs only in 
the first year and is of a magnitude of 210 billion cedis (in 2000 prices). As a guide to 
determine whether or not the impact of the aid shock is significant in a given period, a 
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90% confidence interval is shown on each diagram; the impact of aid is significant 
when both margins of the confidence interval are positive or negative.   
 
All the three fiscal variables of interest (domestic finance, government expenditure, 
and government revenue) respond to the aid shock with a lag as a result of their causal 
ordering. With regards to domestic finance, the impact of the aid shock is significant in 
the second year but not in the subsequent years. Specifically, domestic finance 
decreases by a significant amount of 169 billion cedis in the second year but the 
impact of the shock continually diminishes thereafter. Nonetheless, the cumulative 
decrease in domestic finance by the end of the fifth year is about 504 billion cedis, 
which is more than twice the magnitude of the shock to aid. Also, government 
expenditure responds significantly to the aid shock only in the second year with a 
decrease of 99 billion cedis. Cumulatively, however, the impact of the shock on 
government expenditure by the end of the fifth year is a decrease of about 292 billion 
cedis, which is more than the magnitude of the aid shock. On the other hand, the aid 
shock has no significant impact on government revenue in any year but the cumulative 
impact by the end of the fifth year is an increase of 235 billion cedis, which exceeds 
the magnitude of the aid shock. The largest effect of the shock to government revenue 
in a year is an increase of 55 billion cedis in the second year. All three fiscal variables 
of interest respond to the aid shock in a manner that is consistent, though not 
significantly so in the case of government revenue, with the objective of reducing 
domestic debt to sustainable levels.  
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Figure 5.5 Impulse responses to aid shock 
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In sum, our results show that, by conditioning disbursement on reduced domestic 
financing, aid has been used as an incentive for fiscal stability, particularly lower 
domestic finance, in Ghana. We also find that aid, so disbursed, has been relatively 
effective at promoting fiscal stability in Ghana, evidenced by the contractionary effect 
of aid on fiscal policy and the reduction in domestic financing. Our explanation is that 
the Ghanaian government makes the effort to reduce domestic financing in order to 
receive more aid. Given the limited access to foreign borrowing, lower domestic 
finance is associated with reduced budget deficit, which is in turn achieved through 
cuts in government expenditure and increase in revenue. Therefore aid has been 
relatively effective at promoting fiscal stability in Ghana.      
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5.5 Estimations for Zambia 
5.5.1 Formulation of empirical model 
In this section, we determine the empirical specification that is suitable for the 
estimation of our VAR model for Zambia. To be specific, we determine the 
appropriate transformation of the variables, guided by unit root tests, as well as the lag 
length. It is noteworthy that the VAR approaches used in the empirical estimations for 
Zambia and Ghana are fundamentally similar and have been discussed in considerable 
detail in the sections on methodology and estimation for Ghana. Therefore, we provide 
only a brief description and explanation of methodological issues in this section.   
 
Unit root test and model types 
As with most time series analyses, the empirical estimations for Zambia are preceded 
by unit root tests to determine the order of integration of the series and, for that matter, 
the suitable transformation of the data to use if there are unit roots. Results of the ADF 
and PP unit root tests are reported in table 5.14 below. Both unit root tests show that, 
with the exception of the government revenue series, all series are stationary around a 
trend and/ or drift at the 1% level of significance. In the ADF test, government revenue 
emerges non-stationary even around a deterministic trend, but shows some signs of 
stationarity around the drift, though at the 10% level of significance only; When 
structural breaks are controlled for, as with the PP test, the government revenue series 
becomes stationary around the deterministic trend as well, but still at the 10% level of 
significance only. The implication of these findings is that at the 10% level of 
significance, all the series are stationary (I(0)) around a trend (and/ or drift) and could 
be estimated in levels within a VAR model. However, the latter estimation approach  
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Table 5.14 Unit root test: ADF and Phillip Perron (Variables in constant 2000 LCU) 
 
 
  Maintained model: t
p
i
ititt xxtx WJUDD ' ' ¦
 

1
121  
   LEVELS   1ST DIFF. Inference 
VARIABLES  H0: 
ȡ  
H0: 
ȡ Į2=0 
H0: 
ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
 H0: 
ȡ  
 
       
ADF TEST       
 
      
Aid  -4.300*** -3.148** -0.757  -8.965*** I(0) 
.        
Domfin  -5.824*** -2.287 -1.739*  -10.076*** I(0) 
.        
GovRev  -3.041 -2.819* -0.056  -6.694*** I(1) 
.        
GovExp  -4.833*** -4.744*** -0.478  -7.829*** I(0) 
.        
P-P TEST       
 
       
Aid  -4.300*** -3.148** -1.163  -23.705*** I(0) 
.  
   
 
  Domfin  -5.825*** -4.389*** -2.839***  -32.756*** I(0) 
.  
   
 
  GovRev  -3.226* -2.910* 0.342  -19.199*** I(1) 
.  
   
 
  GovExp  -5.656*** -4.636*** -0.610  -20.467*** I(0) 
.  
   
   
Crit. Val. H0: ȡ  
H0: 
ȡ Į2=0 
H0: 
ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
   
99%  -4.253 -3.639 -2.635    
95%  -3.549 -2.951 -1.951    
90%  -3.207 -2.614 -1.611    
*,**, and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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has to be treated with caution because, statistically, there is only weak evidence that 
government revenue is I(0); estimating this variable in a VAR comprising I(0) 
variables in levels, when it is actually I(1), would result in inconsistent regression 
problem, in which case inferences would be invalid. On the other hand, treating 
government revenue as I(1) when it is actually I(0) is not a preferred option because 
that may result in loss of information, associated with the transformation of data into 
first differences (I(0)), and for that matter, weak estimates. Yet, we are unable to rule 
out any of the two possible estimation approaches because there is reasonable evidence 
in support of each. On one hand, the evidence from unit root tests point towards a 
VAR with transformed variables (by first differencing). On the other hand, evidence 
from the literature and the plot of the government revenue profile in figure 5.6. below 
suggests that government revenue is likely to be I(0) ± once interventions are 
controlled for ± and therefore a VAR in levels is preferred; Fagernas and Robert 
(2004) found the government revenue series for Zambia, between 1972 and 1998 
(which excludes the latter end of our series), to be stationary around the trend, even at 
the 5% level of significance, using both the ADF and PP tests. Therefore, the apparent 
unit root in the longer series (1972 to 2006) may be merely due to interventions that 
are not well captured even in the PP test; Indeed, the government revenue profile (see 
figure 5.6) reveals that there are two unexplained outliers close to the two extreme 
ends of the series, specifically in 1974 and 2000, and these have the potential of 
confounding the unit root test.  As a precaution, therefore, we estimate two VAR 
models, one in differences and the other in levels, and determine which one is 
adequate. The model in differences would be preferred if government revenue, unlike 
the rest of the variables, is confirmed to be I(1). On the other hand, the estimation in 
levels would be superior if all variables are indeed stationary. One advantage of  
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Figure 5.6 Time Profiles of the fiscal variables and aid68 
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Figure 5.6  continued 
 
-800
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
GOVREV DGOVREV
D
G
o
vr
e
v 
in
 
bi
lli
o
n
 
Kw
a
ch
a
 
(co
n
st
a
n
t 2
00
0 
pr
ic
e
s) Go
vre
v
 in
 billio
n
 K
w
a
ch
a
 (co
n
sta
nt
 2000
 p
rice
s)
Government revenue (Govrev)
 
 
 
 
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
ODA DODA
D
O
D
A 
in
 
bi
lli
o
n
 
Kw
a
ch
a
 
(co
n
st
a
n
t 2
00
0 
pr
ic
e
s) OD
A
 in
 billio
n
 K
w
a
ch
a
 (co
n
sta
nt
 2000
 p
rice
s)
Aid (ODA)
 
 
 
 235 
 
estimating both models is that we are able to determine which model is more suitable 
after controlling for outliers, given that outliers may confound the result of unit root 
tests, not only for government revenue, but also for all the other variables of the VAR, 
namely domestic finance, government expenditure, and foreign aid variables.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned 1974 and 2000 outliers in the government revenue 
series, other outliers revealed from inspection of the time profile of the variables in 
figure 5.6 are the 1991 election outlier (evident in the government expenditure profile) 
and the 1995 outlier in the aid profile which may be associated with the restoration of 
donor confidence when the economic performance of Zambia begun to improve in the 
mid-1990s. There is also an unexplained 1974-outlier observed in the domestic 
borrowing profile. However, with the exception of the government revenue profile 
which exhibits a mild trough-shape defined by a combination of interventions, all other 
profiles seem to be consistent with results of the unit root tests irrespective of the 
observed outliers. 
   
It is noteworthy that, unlike Ghana, the empirical model specification for Zambia is 
devoid of the challenge associated with the determination of the correct cointegration 
rank whether or not government revenue is I(0). This is because, when all the four 
variables are stationary on their own, they would not have a long-run relation with any 
other variable. Even when government revenue is I(1), three out of the four 
endogenous variables, namely domestic finance, government expenditure and foreign 
aid, are stationary on their own and would therefore not form equilibrium relation 
among themselves. The remaining I(1) variable, government revenue, would require at 
least one other I(1) variable to form a long-run equilibrium relation. We therefore 
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conclude from the unit root test that, given the variables of interest in the present 
study, the concept of cointegration is of no relevance in the Zambian context. On this 
basis, therefore, we reject the hypothesis that a fiscal equilibrium exists in Zambia. 
This automatically leads to the following conclusions about the long-run: (i) aid has 
no significant effect on the fiscal variables in the long-run; (ii) the donor and 
recipient governments do not react to an existing fiscal equilibrium. However, given 
the uncertainty about the unit root test results, particularly regarding the stationarity of 
the government revenue variable, the long run conclusions may be treated as tentative 
until they are confirmed by the cointegration rank test; Full rank of four implies that 
there are four stationary relations out of four variables, indicating that all four variables 
are stationary on their own and would not form long run equilibrium relations with 
each other. Zero rank also implies that there are no cointegrating relations but none of 
the variables is stationary. Cointegrating ranks between one and three (when there are 
four endogenous variables in total) are less indicative of the order of integration of the 
variables since they may be reflecting stationary variables, cointegrating relations (in 
which case variables are not stationary on their own) or a combination of the two. 
When the cointegrating rank is between one and three (given that there are four 
endogenous variables), confirmation of the order of integration of the variables can be 
achieved only after the cointegrating vectors and the equilibrium adjustment 
coefficient are estimated. 
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Determination of the lag length 
As explained in section 5.4, the correct choice of lag length constitutes a fundamental 
objective of all VAR analyses. To reiterate, lag length criteria such as AIC, SC, and 
HQ are reliable only when the model is correctly specified. Therefore, we maintain the 
tentative method for determining the lag length in section 5.4.2. Nonetheless, we report 
the results of the AIC, SC, and HQ in table 5.15, to show the priors of the data with 
regards to the choice of lag length when outliers are not controlled for. The lag lengths 
suggested are zero by the SC and HQ, and 4 by the AIC. As would become clear, these 
two suggested lag lengths appear to be at the opposite extremes as lag exclusion test 
accepts the exclusion of the second lag but rejects the exclusion of the first lag.  
 
In what follows, we estimate two VAR model types, namely the differences and levels. 
We begin with the VAR in differences, which is to safeguard against the possibility of 
an inconsistent-regression problem which occurs when an I(1) variable (government 
revenue in this case according to unit root test results, though evidence is weak) is 
estimated with I(0) variables in levels.69 We then estimate the VAR in levels to ensure 
that useful information is not lost if government revenue is actually I(0).70 In both 
estimations, we include dummy variables to control for the outliers in the data. As 
mentioned previously, the outliers identified upon inspection of the variable profiles 
are the unexplained 1974 outliers in the domestic finance and government revenue 
series, the 1991 outlier in the government expenditure series which is associated with 
the first election year, the 1995 outlier in the aid series, that is possibly associated with 
the re-gain of donor confidence as a result of improved macroeconomic performance, 
                                                 
69
 Note that the VAR in first differences is still valid if government revenue is I(0). Some information 
would however be lost as a result of the transformation of the data. 
70
 Fagernas and Roberts (2004) estimated a VAR (2) in levels even though government current 
expenditure was an I(1) variable among four I(0) variables, namely capital expenditure, revenue, 
domestic borrowing and aid. 
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and the unexplained 2000 outlier in the government revenue series. Accordingly, the 
dummy variables specified are the 1974, 1991, 1995, and 2000 dummies. In the VAR-
in-OHYHOV WKHGXPP\YDULDEOH WDNHVRQDYDOXHRI µ¶ LQ LQ WKH9$5-in-
GLIIHUHQFHVKRZHYHUWKHGXPP\YDULDEOHWDNHVRQDYDOXHRIµ¶LQDQGµ-
¶ LQ  $V VXPPDULVHG LQ table 5.16, these sequences of dummy variable 
specification, for the levels and first-difference VAR models, apply to all other dummy 
variables.  
 
Table 5.15 Lag length criteria 
Lag LogL AIC SC HQ 
     0 -3501.56 226.165 226.350* 226.225* 
1 -3482.94 225.996 226.921 226.297 
2 -3468.07 226.069 227.734 226.612 
3 -3459.99 226.580 228.985 227.364 
4 -3433.9 225.929* 229.075 226.954 
                    *indicates lag order selected by the criterion at 5% 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.16 Dummy Variables 
SERIES SUGGESTED DUMMIES 
Domestic Finance Outlier1974 dummy 
Gov. Expenditure Election1991 dummy 
Gov. Revenue Outlier1974 and outlier2000 dummies 
Aid Outlier1995 dummy 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Model 1: Estimation of the VAR in differences 
In this section, we summarise the main conclusions from the estimation of model 1 
(VAR in differences). The estimation results for model 1 are relegated to the appendix 
(B5) because, as would become clear, cointegrating rank test result for model 2 (VAR 
in levels) suggests that the latter is superior to model 1. Specifically, the rank test 
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shows full rank (of four) for the four endogenous variables in the VAR, suggesting that 
all the variables are stationary and therefore model 1 (VAR in differences) would be 
less preferred due to possible loss of information associated with transformation of 
data from levels to first differences.  
 
In summary, there is no significant lagged fiscal variable in the aid equation; neither is 
the lag of aid significant in any of the fiscal equations in the system. Therefore, we do 
not reject the following hypotheses based on model 1: (i) that aid inflows are not 
influenced by past fiscal conditions in Zambia; (ii) that aid does not influence the 
fiscal conditions in Zambia. Combining the latter conclusions with previous ones 
regarding the long run (equilibrium relationship between aid and the fiscal variables), 
the test results on our hypotheses when model 1 is used are as outlined in table 5.17. 
The conclusions apply to both the structural and reduced-form. 
 
Table 5.17 Summary of test results on hypotheses 
NULL HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS 
I. The existence of fiscal equilibrium  Rejected 
II. Aid does not form part of the fiscal 
equilibrium Not rejected 
III. Recipient governments do not react to 
fiscal disequilibrium Not rejected 
IV. Donors do not react to fiscal 
disequilibrium in recipient country Not rejected 
V. 'RQRU¶VDLGDOORFDWLRQLVQRWLQIOXHQFHG
by past fiscal conditions in recipient Not rejected 
VI. Aid does not influence fiscal 
conditions in recipient Not rejected 
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The empirical results for model 1 also show that an increase in domestic finance 
results in significant decreases in all three fiscal variables (domestic finance, 
government expenditure, and government revenue) in the following year. Two 
interpretations for the latter finding are that, firstly, by reducing domestic finance and 
government expenditure in response to a previous increase in domestic finance, the 
Zambian government makes the effort to stabilize domestic debt. Secondly, the fall in 
government revenue that follows a rise in domestic borrowing is an indication that the 
latter is associated with the crowding-out of private investment; That is to say, 
government revenue falls because the rise in domestic borrowing by the government 
limits private sector activities and the tax base for that matter.  
 
5.5.3 Model 2: Estimation of the VAR in levels 
Following the empirical rule of thumb in model 1, we begin the estimation of model 2 
(VAR in levels) within a tentative VAR (2) framework. We however do not report the 
latter results because, as with model 1, lag exclusion test, reported in table 5.18, shows 
that the second lag is not jointly significant, even at the 10% level of significance; In 
fact, the second lag is neither significant in any of the individual equations of the VAR 
system. However, the first lag is jointly significant even at the 1% level. Model 2 
therefore constitutes the estimation of VAR (1) in levels.  
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Table 5.18 Lag exclusion test for VAR (2) in levels 
 
 
SCDOMBOR_ZBIA SCGOVEXP_ZBIA SCGOVREV_ZBIA SCODA_ZBIA Joint 
      Lag 1 3.684 14.651 7.712 9.442 33.926 
 
[ 0.450] [ 0.005] [ 0.103] [ 0.051] [ 0.006] 
      Lag 2 4.054 1.440 3.464 8.595 14.862 
 
[ 0.399] [ 0.837] [ 0.483] [ 0.072] [ 0.535] 
      df 4 4 4 4 16 
Numbers in [] are p-values 
 
 
As have been our preferred order of presentation, we first address the adequacy of the 
specified model before discussing the estimation results since a mis-specified model 
invalidates the estimates. The distributions of residuals are shown in figure 5.7 and the 
results of standard model mis-specification tests, specifically for the detection of 
autocorrelation, non-normalities, and heteroscedasticity, are reported in table 5.19. 
There is no significant autocorrelation, non-normality or heteroscedasticity even at the 
10% level of significance. An important remark however is that, in addition to the 
1974, 1991, 1995 and 2000 dummy variables identified from inspection of the variable 
profiles, model 2 (both in the form of VAR(2) and VAR(1) in levels) requires 
additional dummy variables for 1986 and 2005 in order to induce Gaussian residuals. 
The two dummy variables are associated with outliers that are less pronounced in the 
estimation of model 1 (VAR in differences). The 1986 outlier, which is unexplained, is 
observed in the aid series. The 2005 outlier is observed in the government expenditure 
VHULHVDQGLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK=DPELD¶VILUVWFRPSUHKHQVLYHGHEWUHOLHIXQGHUWKH+,3&
initiative which requires beneficiaries to increase spending on specific poverty-
reducing elements of the economy. 
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of residuals from VAR (1) in levels 
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Table 5.19 Model mis-specification tests 
 
(a) Autocorrelation 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   1 7.538476 0.9614 
2 10.39497 0.8452 
3 12.27706 0.7247 
4 17.94546 0.3271 
 
 
(b) Normality 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
    
    1 1.053726 2 0.5905 
2 0.639939 2 0.7262 
3 1.216863 2 0.5442 
4 1.107824 2 0.5747 
    Joint 4.018352 8 0.8555 
 
 
 
(c) Heteroscedasticity 
 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   120.3897 160 0.9916 
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Notwithstanding the positive evidence from the model specification tests, estimation 
results may still be plagued with the inconsistent regression problem if, as suggested 
by unit root test results at the 5% level of significance (but not at the 10% level),71 the 
government revenue variable happens to be I(1) amidst three I(0) variables in a 
VAR(1) in levels. We therefore conduct a cointegration rank test to check the 
consistency of the result with the unit root test. As reported in table 5.20, the result 
shows a full rank of four which is only possible when all four variables are stationary. 
This finding suggests that an inconsistent regression problem is very unlikely in the 
levels estimation, rendering model 2 superior over model 1 since estimations based on 
the latter may be affected by the loss of information that is often associated with 
transformed data (from levels to differences in this case). The results also confirm 
previous conclusions about the long-run implied by unit root tests at the 10% level of 
significance; Specifically, we reject the hypothesis that a fiscal equilibrium exists in 
Zambia. The corollaries of this are that (i) aid has no significant effect on the fiscal 
variables in the long-run, and (ii) the donor and recipient governments do not react 
to an existing fiscal equilibrium. Thus, evidence based on the model mis-specification 
tests and the cointegration rank test shows that the model 2 (VAR(1) in levels) is 
suitable for addressing the hypotheses of interest in the present study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 Note that the null hypothesis is that the variable is non-stationary and therefore larger (absolute) 
statistics imply stationarity. Therefore, it is possible for the test statistic to be large enough to reflect 
stationarity at the 10% level but not large enough for the 5% level.  
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Table 5.20 Rank test 
Hypothesized . Trace 0.05 
 No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     None * 0.883 190.483 63.876 0.00 
At most 1 * 0.806 117.519 42.915 0.00 
At most 2 * 0.693 61.777 25.872 0.00 
At most 3 * 0.471 21.618 12.518 0.0012 
                          * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
                          **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
                          Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Short-run estimates and hypotheses  
The estimates from model 2 (reduced-form VAR (1) in levels) are reported in table 
5.21 below. More coefficients become significant compared with the estimation of 
model 1 (VAR(1) in differences ± table B5.3 of appendix B5) suggesting that there 
may have been some loss of information in the latter as a result of variable 
transformation from levels to differences; in the levels estimation (model 2), the lags 
of government expenditure, government revenue, and aid become significant in the 
government expenditure equation, the lags of government expenditure and aid in the 
aid equation, and the lag of government revenue in the government revenue equation. 
On the other hand, the lag of domestic finance (which is significant in the differences 
equations of domestic finance and government revenue at the 1% and 10% levels 
respectively) is not significant in the levels domestic finance and government revenue 
equations. However, the lag of domestic finance remains significant at the 5% level in 
the levels government expenditure equation as in the differences equation with 
coefficient estimates of -0.312 and -0.383 respectively.  
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Table 5.21 Short-run estimates of reduced-form VAR in levels 
 
 
Domfint Govexpt Govrevt Aidt 
     
     Domfint-1 -0.113 -0.312** -0.006 -0.141 
 
(0.161) (0.145) (0.098) (0.215) 
     Govexpt-1 -0.079 0.178** -0.014 0.296** 
 
(0.090) (0.081) (0.055) (0.120) 
     Govrevt-1 0.286 0.550** 0.323** -0.212 
 
(0.245) (0.221) (0.150) (0.328) 
     Aidt-1 -0.059 -0.151** -0.045 0.185* 
 
(0.077) (0.070) (0.047) (0.103) 
     Const 0.802 1.632*** 1.426*** -0.173 
 
(0.613) (0.552) (0.375) (0.819) 
     Trend -0.029*** -0.012 0.001 0.046*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
     OUTL1974 -1.589*** -0.693** 0.808*** 0.062 
 
(0.338) (0.305) (0.207) (0.452) 
     OUTL1986 0.577* 0.452 0.094 1.213*** 
 
(0.318) (0.287) (0.194) (0.425) 
     ELEC1991 -0.032 2.830*** -0.202 1.150*** 
 
(0.322) (0.290) (0.197) (0.430) 
     AIDOUT1995 -0.314 -0.226 -0.168 3.660*** 
 
(0.325) (0.293) (0.199) (0.434) 
     OUTL2000 0.032 0.344 -0.500** 0.608 
 
(0.326) (0.294) (0.200) (0.437) 
     OUTL2005 0.158 1.159*** 0.191 -0.547 
 
(0.345) (0.311) (0.211) (0.462) 
     R2 0.697 0.883 0.703 0.892 
                           Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%,  
                           and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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The estimates from model 2 (levels estimation) show that, at the 5% level, past 
government expenditure has a significant positive effect on aid receipts, leading to the 
rejection of the hypothesis that aid inflows are not influenced by past fiscal 
conditions in Zambia. On the other hand, past aid receipt has a significant reducing 
effect on government expenditure at the 5% level, leading to the rejection of the 
hypothesis that aid does not influence the fiscal conditions in the recipient country.  
 
There is no significant relationship between aid and any other fiscal variable in the 
reduced-form estimation of model 2. We however find that, at the 5% level, an 
increase in the past government revenue causes a significant rise in government 
expenditure in the following year. The implication of these findings for our main 
objective, which is to determine the roles of aid donors and the recipient government 
that culminates in a positive correlation between aid and the budget deficit in Zambia, 
is as follows: The Zambian government reduces total expenditure after receiving 
foreign aid, suggesting some compliance (to an extent at least) with aid conditionality, 
which seeks to reduce the budget deficit through cuts in government expenditure. Even 
though the magnitude of the reduction in government expenditure might not meet 
agreed targets,72 the evidence suggests that the positive correlation between aid and the 
budget deficit is not driven by the actions of the Zambian government in response to 
aid.  
 
In addition to cuts in total expenditure, it can also be deduced from the documented 
dichotomy between financing of current and capital expenditures in Zambia, which are 
by domestic revenue (including domestic borrowing) and foreign aid respectively 
                                                 
72
 The Zambian government has repeatedly defaulted conditional aid agreements between the early 
1970s and mid-2000 (CGD, 2007; Fagernas and Roberts, 2004). 
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(Fagernas and Roberts, 2004), that the incentive effect of aid extends to the 
composition of spending ± non-development spending decreases and development 
spending increases. With the financing dichotomy, it is possible for aid to lower total 
government expenditure only when non-development expenditure falls, given that aid 
increases capital expenditure. Although, we do not disaggregate total expenditure into 
its current and capital components, we find evidence consistent with the existence of 
current and capital expenditure financing dichotomy. For instance, ceteris paribus, aid 
has no significant influence on domestic finance, implying that the two sources of 
finance are not substitutes. A weaker evidence, which nonetheless reflects the fact that 
domestic finance only pays for a component of total government expenditure is that an 
increase in total government expenditure (which may be driven by an increase in 
current spending at one point in time, capital spending at another point in time, and 
both in other times) has no significant effect on the domestic finance. We therefore 
conclude that the Zambian government complies with aid conditionality to some extent 
at the least. With regards to the actions of the aid donors, we find that an increase in 
government expenditure results in an increase in aid inflows (at the 5% level). This is 
possibly because donors are willing to prevent increases in the budget deficit and 
domestic financing for that matter. It follows then that the humanitarian actions of aid 
donors contribute to the positive correlation between aid and the budget deficit in 
Zambia though aid does not cause the budget deficit to widen.  
 
Given that aid appears to be used effectively by the Zambian government and does not 
cause the budget deficit to widen, a question that clearly remains unanswered is why 
aid does not achieve its ultimate fiscal objective, which is to reduce domestic 
borrowing? This question may be addressed from a structural identification of model 2 
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by reason of giving additional information about the contemporaneous relationship 
between the variables. As explained in section 5.4.3, another importance of a structural 
identification is to facilitate the estimation of impulse response functions which, 
together with the ceteris paribus estimates of the reduced-form, is useful for policy 
purposes. In what follows, therefore, we identify the underlying structure of model 2. 
 
Structural identification of Model 2 (VAR(1) in levels) 
By inspecting the residual correlation of the reduced-form estimates of model 2 that is 
shown in table 5.22, we find, by standard measure,73 
 
Table 5.22 Residual correlation matrix 
 
Domfint Govexpt Govrevt Aidt 
Domfint-1 1 0.197 0.089 -0.251 
Govexpt 0.197 1 -0.010 -0.034 
Govrevt 0.089 -0.010 1 -0.392 
Aidt -0.251 -0.034 -0.392 1 
                        The critical value for the correlation coefficients is 34.0/2   Tcij , 
                             where T is the effective sample size (N-k). 
 
 
that the only significant residual correlation exists between aid and government 
revenue (with a correlation coefficient of -0.392). This suggests that the two variables 
have a significant contemporaneous relationship. We therefore employ the empirical 
identification process (section 5.2.1) to determine the direction of causality. As 
explained in the econometric model section (5.2.1), where zero restrictions on 
insignificant reduced-form estimates are not enough to achieve identification, further 
zero restrictions on some variables that are significant in the reduced-form estimation 
(table 5.21) may be required. Given that the correlation between the residuals of the 
reduced-form aid and government revenue equations is negative, the significant 
                                                 
73
 Footnote 18 holds. The critical value for the correlation coefficient, 34.0 ijc .  
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variables that qualify for zero restrictions are those that are significant in both the aid 
and government revenue equation but with the opposite signs.74 Table 5.21, however, 
shows that there are no such variables in the present case and therefore empirical 
identification may be relatively weak. It is noteworthy, however, that the latter 
observation suggests that the omitted contemporaneous variable(s) is(are) not 
correlated with the regressors in the reduced-form aid and government revenue 
equations in model 2 and therefore the estimates in table 5.21 are likely to be close 
approximations of their structural counterparts; it also suggests that the 
contemporaneous relationship is between aspects of revenue and aid that are not 
predicted by past fiscal conditions and aid (e.g. contemporaneous shocks). 
Nonetheless, we proceed with the empirical identification process in order to identify 
unique shocks to aid. The results are as reported in table 5.23.    
 
As expected, weak empirical identification of contemporaneous aid and government 
revenue variables leads to both variables becoming insignificant in the FIML 
estimations. However, controlling for contemporaneous government revenue in the aid 
equation purges the system of the residual correlation (reducing the correlation 
coefficient from -0.392 to -0.063). On the contrary, controlling for contemporaneous 
aid in the government revenue equation does not purge the residual correlation though 
it reduces marginally from -0.392 to -0.353. We therefore conclude that the direction 
of causality is from contemporaneous government revenue to aid and, as a result, we  
 
 
                                                 
74
 See the methodology section for intuition. 
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Table 5.23 FIML estimation of aid and government revenue: zero restriction 
on contemporaneous aid versus zero restriction on government 
revenue  
 
 
zero restriction on 
FRQWHPSJRY¶WUHY 
 
zero restriction on 
contemp. aid 
 
Govrevt Aidt 
 
Govrevt Aidt 
    Domfint -0.012 -0.289 
 
0.081 -0.363 
 
(0.158) (0.440) 
 
(0.112) (0.420) 
Govexpt -0.006 -0.011 
 
-0.023 0.032 
 
(0.133) (0.241) 
 
(0.122) (0.236) 
Govrevt 
    
-0.774 
     
(0.932) 
Aidt -0.060 
    
 
(0.074) 
    Domfint-1 
     
      Govexpt-1 
 
0.188* 
  
0.211** 
  
(0.104) 
  
(0.101) 
Govrevt-1 0.319 
  
0.386* 
 
 
(0.198) 
  
(0.212) 
 Aidt-1 
 
0.197** 
  
0.137 
  
(0.085) 
  
(0.095) 
Const 1.445*** -0.098 
 
1.238*** 1.423 
 
(0.333) (0.859) 
 
(0.314) (1.700) 
Trend 
 
0.040** 
  
0.037*** 
  
(0.016) 
  
(0.013) 
OUTL1974 0.007 
  
0.009 
 
 
(0.424) 
  
(0.118) 
 OUTL1986 
 
0.168 
  
0.147 
  
(0.168) 
  
(1.418) 
ELEC1991 
 
0.073 
  
0.094 
  
(0.074) 
  
(1.437) 
AIDOUT1995 
 
0.366** 
  
0.342 
  
(0.159) 
  
(0.601) 
OUTL2000 -0.033 
  
-0.047 
 
 
(0.090) 
  
(0.534) 
 OUTL2005 
     
      Log. L'hood -468.309 
 
-465.181 
Res. Corr. -0.353 
 
-0.063 
                Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels  
                are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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maintain the same causal ordering of the four objective variables suggested by model 
1, bearing in mind that it is only the positions of government revenue and aid relative 
to each other that are relevant.75 The causal ordering adopted is as illustrated below. 
 
*RYUHYĺ*RYH[Sĺ'RPILQĺ$LG 
   
When the causal ordering above is imposed, we obtain the structural estimates of 
model 2 reported in table 5.24. With the exception of the lag of aid in the aid equation, 
the rest of the results remain similar to their reduced-form counterparts qualitatively. 
 
The lag of aid, which was marginally significant (at the 10% level) in the aid equation 
of the reduced-form of model 2, becomes insignificant in the structural form. Since the 
lag of aid does not affect government revenue significantly, we ascribe the loss of 
significance to the loss of degrees of freedom since the sample size is relatively small. 
Otherwise, there is no qualitative difference between the reduced-form estimates and 
their structural counterparts and therefore we maintain our conclusions from the 
hypotheses tests, as summarised in table 5.25 (page 253).  
 
Consistent with the residual correlation matrix of the reduced-form estimation, the 
only contemporaneous variable that becomes significant (with a negative sign and at 
the 10% level) is the government revenue variable in the aid equation. Thus, a fall 
(rise) in government revenue leads to increased (decreased) inflow of aid in the same 
year. Given that aid inflows have no significant effect on domestic borrowing, even 
 
                                                 
75
 :H QRQHWKHOHVV FRQWURO IRU DOO FRQWHPSRUDQHRXV YDULDEOHV EHFDXVH H[FOXGLQJ µXQLPSRUWDQW¶
contemporaneous variables relaxes the number of zero restrictions on the residual covariance matrix that 
are required for OLS estimates to be equivalent to FIML estimates (see Juselius, 2009: 241).  
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Table 5.24 Short-run estimates of structural VECM 
 
Govrevt Govexpt Domfint Aidt 
     
     Domfint 
   
-0.293 
    
(0.281) 
Govexpt 
  
0.220 0.009 
   
(0.242) (0.310) 
Govrevt 
 
-0.015 0.148 -0.814* 
  
(0.322) (0.357) (0.450) 
Domfint-1 -0.006 -0.312** -0.044 -0.176 
 
(0.098) (0.148) (0.181) (0.228) 
Govexpt-1 -0.014 0.178** -0.116 0.259* 
 
(0.055) (0.083) (0.102) (0.132) 
Govrevt-1 0.323** 0.555** 0.117 0.130 
 
(0.150) (0.249) (0.307) (0.387) 
Aidt-1 -0.045 -0.151** -0.020 0.133 
 
(0.047) (0.073) (0.089) (0.112) 
Const 1.426*** 1.653** 0.232 1.209 
 
(0.375) (0.728) (0.902) (1.135) 
Trend 0.0005 -0.012 -0.026*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
OUTL1974 0.808*** -0.681* -1.557*** 0.261 
 
(0.207) (0.406) (0.480) (0.745) 
OUTL1986 0.094 0.453 0.464 1.455*** 
 
(0.194) (0.295) (0.345) (0.453) 
ELEC1991 -0.202 2.826*** -0.623 0.950 
 
(0.197) (0.304) (0.763) (0.974) 
AIDOUT1995 -0.168 -0.229 -0.240 3.433*** 
 
(0.199) (0.304) (0.342) (0.435) 
OUTL2000 -0.500** 0.337 0.031 0.207 
 
(0.200) (0.342) (0.388) (0.487) 
OUTL2005 0.191 1.162*** -0.125 -0.356 
 
(0.211) (0.324) (0.457) (0.575) 
R2 0.703 0.883 0.712 0.914 
                       Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%,  
                            and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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though aid has a reducing effect on total government expenditure, it could be deduced 
that the fall in total expenditure associated with aid inflows is only enough to cancel 
out the additional demands that a decrease in total government revenue would pose on 
domestic borrowing. Also, given the expenditure dichotomy in Zambia (whereby 
capital and current spending are uniquely funded by aid and domestic borrowing 
respectively),76it may further be deduced from the results that aid-induced cuts in total 
expenditure occur through reduction of capital expenditure. The latter is not in 
conformity with the fundamental objective for giving development aid, which is to 
reduce poverty through sustained growth. It may therefore be useful to condition aid 
on the budget deficit or domestic borrowing directly if the ultimate fiscal objective for 
aid conditionality is to discourage domestic borrowing. The structural estimates of 
model 2 underlie the impulse response functions estimated in the next section to show 
the resultant effect of an aid shock on the fiscal variables when the ceteris paribus 
assumption is relaxed.  
 
 
Table 5.25 Summary of test results on hypotheses 
NULL HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS 
I. The existence of fiscal equilibrium  Rejected 
II. Aid does not form part of the fiscal 
equilibrium Not rejected 
III. Recipient governments do not react to 
fiscal disequilibrium Not rejected 
IV. Donors do not react to fiscal 
disequilibrium in recipient country Not rejected 
V. 'RQRU¶VDid allocation is not influenced 
by past fiscal conditions in recipient Rejected 
VI. Aid does not influence fiscal 
conditions in recipient Rejected 
 
                                                 
76
 &RUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD 
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Impulse response analyses    
The effect of one standard deviation (positive) shock to aid on the fiscal variables after 
all simultaneous and lagged effects have gone through is illustrated by the impulse 
response functions in figure 5.8. The shock, which occurs only in the first year, is of 
magnitude K339 billion (in 2000 prices). As explained previously, the aid shock has a 
significant effect only when both margins of the 90% confidence interval are positive 
or negative.  
 
With the exception of government expenditure, the aid shock has no significant effect 
on the fiscal variables. For instance, domestic finance falls by approximately K22 
billion in the second year and K1.9 billion in the third year, with the cumulative 
decrease being approximately K24 by the fourth year. Similarly, the effect of the shock 
on government revenue diminishes over time, starting with an initial fall of 
approximately K17 billion in the second year and K7 billion in the second year, with a 
cumulative decrease of about K26 billion by the fourth year. With regards to 
government expenditure, however, a significant reduction of K56 billion occurs in the 
second year, but the impact of the shock diminishes to insignificant levels in the 
subsequent years, falling by approximately K23 billion in the third year and K87 
billion cumulatively by the fourth year. The significant fall in government expenditure 
LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH REMHFWLYH RI GRQRUV WR KHOS VWDELOL]H =DPELD¶V GHEW SUREOHP
through reduction of the fiscal deficit. 
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Figure 5.8 Impulse responses to an aid shock of one standard deviation 
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In summary, the results show that aid disbursement to Zambia is not conditioned on 
improved fiscal performance. Rather, more aid is received when total expenditure rises 
as well as when revenue falls, explaining the positive correlation between aid and the  
 budget deficit. Even though aid has been successful at inducing cuts in total 
government expenditure, the magnitude of the cuts is just enough to offset the extra 
demands of falling revenue on domestic borrowing. Therefore, aid does not affect 
domestic borrowing significantly. In accordance with the aid incentive theory, 
therefore, aid might be more effective at reducing domestic borrowing if it is condition 
on the latter or the budget deficit directly.77  
 
5.6 Summary of results and conclusion78 
High domestic borrowing by the government is a common feature of low income 
countries, and has consequences such as unsustainable debt levels, high unproductive 
spending on debt servicing, loss of credibility of the government, crowding out of 
private investment, and fiscal dominance, all of which are detrimental to economic 
growth. Given the relatively high dependency of such countries on foreign aid, the 
incentive-aid literature suggests that conditioning aid disbursement on contractionary 
fiscal policy would induce government actions that lead to reduced deficit and, for that 
matter, reduced domestic borrowing. Yet, the fiscal determinants of aid disbursement 
and the fiscal effect of aid vary across countries, resulting in different aid-budget 
deficit relationship across countries. Therefore, the main objective of the present study 
is to determine which actions of aid donors and recipient governments are responsible 
for the contrasting aid-budget deficit relationship across low income countries. We use 
                                                 
77
 The budget deficit is mainly financed by domestic borrowing (CRUGHOODDQG'HOO¶$ULFFLD 2007). 
78
 Inferences on the tested hypotheses are in italics. 
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Ghana and Zambia as case studies. The main reason is that the two countries are 
known to have contrasting aid-budget deficit relationship ± The relationship is positive 
in Zambia where aid conditionality has been defaulted repeatedly over the study period 
and negative in Ghana where the implementation of aid conditionality has been 
relatively successful. Another reason is that, as low income sub-Saharan countries, 
Ghana and Zambia have relatively high aid dependency, implying that the effect of aid 
is not negligible.   
 
We proceed by addressing a number of hypotheses about the relationship between the 
components of the fiscal budget and the inflow of foreign aid. Our hypotheses allow us 
to draw inferences about the fiscal determinants of aid disbursement and the 
consequences for fiscal policy in the two countries. The component of the fiscal budget 
considered are government revenue, government expenditure, and domestic financing. 
Our results show that in Ghana, the negative correlation between aid and the budget 
GHILFLW LV WKH UHVXOW RI ERWK GRQRUV¶ DQG UHFLSLHQW JRYHUQPHQW¶V DFWLRQV Donors 
condition aid disbursement on expenditure cuts (in the previous year) and decreased 
domestic borrowing, both of which are associated with reduced budget deficit. In order 
to maintain inflows of aid, therefore, the recipient government uses aid in a fashion 
that is consistent with conditional aid programs that target deficit reduction. 
Particularly, aid has a decreasing effect on domestic financing and total government 
expenditure in Ghana.  
 
On the other hand, aid disbursement to Zambia increases with total government 
expenditure (in the previous year) but decreases with revenue. It follows then that, all 
things being equal, more aid is received when the budget deficit increases. This is 
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possibly because donors are willing to prevent the worsening of the already high 
budget deficits and domestic financing. We therefore conclude that donor actions, in 
terms of disbursement pattern, are responsible for the positive correlation between aid 
and the budget deficit in Zambia, but aid does not necessarily cause the widening of 
the deficit. In fact, aid has a decreasing effect on total government expenditure, 
implying that the Zambian government complies with conditional aid programs to a 
certain extent at the least. However, since aid does not affect domestic finance 
significantly, we deduce that the cut in total expenditure, induced by aid receipt, is 
only enough to offset the initial rise in expenditure and fall in revenue that attracted aid 
in the first place. Therefore, aid neither worsens nor improves the budget deficit, 
implying that the actions of the Zambian government, with regards to the use of aid, 
are not responsible for the positive correlation between aid and the budget deficit. The 
results suggest that, for aid to be more effective at inducing lower budget deficits and 
domestic finance, donors must take a more proactive stance by conditioning aid 
disbursement on decreased deficits and/or domestic finance.   
 
The relationship between aid and the components of the fiscal budget in Ghana and 
Zambia leads to the rejection, in both countries, of the hypotheses that GRQRUV¶ DLG
DOORFDWLRQLVQRWLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHUHFLSLHQW¶VSDVWILVFDOFRQGLWLRQV, and that aid does 
not influence the fiscal conditions in the recipient country. To address the main 
objectives of the present study, which is a short-term phenomenon, it is necessary to 
use an approach that separates the short- and long-term relationship between aid and 
the components of the fiscal budget. Although not part of our main objectives, the 
approach permits us to compare and draw inferences about the long-run focus of aid 
donors and recipient governments, as well as the composition of aid spending, in 
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Ghana and Zambia. We find contrasting results on the existence of fiscal equilibrium 
in the two countries; we reject the hypothesis that fiscal equilibrium exists in Zambia. 
Consequently, we reject all hypothesis related to fiscal equilibrium in Zambia. This 
limits our analysis on Zambia to the short-run and further limits any inferences about 
the likely composition of aid spending, given that the only way to determine the latter 
when total government expenditure is not disaggregated is by its long-term 
implications. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with evidence in the literature 
about the financing dichotomy of current and capital expenditure in Zambia, whereby 
aid is used to finance capital expenditure and current expenditure is financed from 
domestic sources. To be specific, we find that aid has no significant influence on 
domestic finance, suggesting that the two sources of finance are not substitutes. 
Moreover, increase in total government expenditure has no significant effect on 
domestic finance, indicating that the latter only pays for a component of total 
government expenditure. 
 
In Ghana, on the other hand, we do not reject the existence of fiscal equilibrium. 
However, aid does not form part of the fiscal equilibrium. The latter suggests that aid 
has been used predominantly for short-term objectives, such as relaxing *KDQD¶V
budget constraint, rather than long-term investments or possibly that aid is too small to 
affect the equilibrium. Nonetheless, aid donors react to fiscal disequilibrium in Ghana.  
 
We also find that, without the influence of aid, the Ghanaian government reacts to 
fiscal disequilibrium (caused by expansionary measures) by decreasing total 
expenditure and domestic borrowing for that matter. Thus, results related to the long-
run suggest that aid donors and fiscal authorities in Ghana and Zambia have differed in 
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their focus on the long-run. Whereas achieving long-run fiscal equilibrium has been at 
the centre of donor and recipient government actions in Ghana, this does not appear to 
be the case in Zambia. On the other hand, it appears that aid is used for long-term 
purposes such as financing capital spending in Zambia, but is used for short-term 
purposes, including relaxing the budget constraint and financing consumption 
expenditure, in Ghana. The conclusions on the composition of aid spending are only 
implied and would require further research involving more disaggregate components 
of government expenditure.   
 
Finally, we use impulse response functions to determine the resultant effect of an 
increase in aid on the fiscal variables after all simultaneous interactions have gone 
through. We find that, in Ghana, both government expenditure and domestic finance 
decrease significantly in the year following the upsurge in aid, but the impact fades to 
insignificant levels in the subsequent years. The decrease in domestic finance is 
indicative of a reduction in the budget deficit since the two are closely associated. The 
resultant effect of an aid increase on government revenue is however insignificant in 
Ghana. With regards to Zambia, both domestic finance and government revenue do not 
respond significantly to an increase in aid when all simultaneous interactions between 
variables have taken place. In contrast, total government expenditure decreases 
significantly in the following year in response to the increase in aid; Given the close 
association between the budget deficit and domestic finance in developing countries, 
the irresponsiveness of the latter to an increase in aid suggests that the fall in total 
government expenditure is not enough to induce a significant decrease in the budget 
deficit.   
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APPENDIX A5 
 
Table A5.1 Dummies from reduced-form VECM estimation for Ghana 
 
Domfin Govexp Govrev Aid 
ELEC1992 2.130*** 0.336 -1.200*** -0.818*** 
 
(0.380) (0.420) (0.360) (0.260) 
ELEC1996 0.453 0.210 -0.464* 0.152 
 
(0.290) (0.320) (0.280) (0.200) 
ELEC2000 0.0665 -0.863** 0.316 0.739*** 
 
(0.310) (0.340) (0.290) (0.210) 
ELEC2004 0.416 1.250*** 0.751*** 1.430*** 
 
(0.300) (0.330) (0.280) (0.210) 
HIPC2002 -0.084 -0.770 0.163 0.388 
 
(0.460) (0.500) (0.430) (0.310) 
AIDOUT1990 0.363 0.112 -0.618** -0.883*** 
 
(0.280) (0.310) (0.260) (0.190) 
MEAN-SHIFT 0.249 0.634*** 0.404*** 0.291*** 
 
(0.150) (0.170) (0.140) (0.100) 
               Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
                   levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. The dummy for the 2002  
                   HIPC debt cancellation year is insignificant at the 10% level but is nonetheless  
                   maintained because its exclusion results in heteroscedasticity.   
 
 
Table A5.2 Dummies from structural VECM estimation for Ghana 
 
¨*RYUHYW ¨*RYH[SW ¨'RPILQW ¨$LGW 
     
     Elect1992 -1.200*** 0.345 1.100*** -0.065 
 
(0.356) (0.536) (0.318) (0.395) 
Elect1996 -0.464* 0.213 0.046 0.239 
 
(0.275) (0.354) (0.209) (0.202) 
Elect2000 0.316 -0.865** 0.425* 0.933*** 
 
(0.286) (0.354) (0.238) (0.249) 
Elect2004 0.751*** 1.250*** 0.897*** 1.790*** 
 
(0.282) (0.394) (0.286) (0.342) 
HIPC2002 0.163 -0.772 0.137 0.447 
 
(0.425) (0.513) (0.318) (0.308) 
AIDOUT1990 -0.618** 0.116 -0.160 -0.885*** 
 
(0.263) (0.357) (0.210) (0.206) 
MEAN-SHIFT 0.404*** 0.631*** 0.512*** 0.504*** 
 
(0.143) (0.203) (0.146) (0.183) 
                       Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and  
                       10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table A5.3 Unit root test for three-year averaged domestic finance series for 
Ghana 
                           (Maintained model: t
p
i
ititt xxtx WJUDD ' ' ¦
 

1
121 ) 
Test 
  
LEVELS 
  
1ST DIFF. 
 
 
H0: ȡ  ȡ Į2=0 
H0: ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
H0: ȡ  Inference 
        ADF 
 
-1.695 -1.425 -0.943 
 
-4.356 I(1) 
        PP 
 
-1.840 -1.879 -1.207 
 
-3.465 I(1) 
        Crit. Val. 
 
ADF 
     
 
H0: ȡ  ȡ Į2=0 
          H0: 
      ȡ Į1 Į2=0 
   99% -4.310 -3.679 -2.647 
    95% -3.574 -2.968 -1.953 
    90% -3.222 -2.623 -1.610 
    *,**, and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX B5 
 
Model 1: Estimation results for the VAR in differences (Zambia) 
 
Model mis-specification tests 
 
Table B5.1 Lag exclusion tests 
(a) VAR (2) 
 
¨'20),1 ¨*29(;3 ¨*295(9 ¨$,' Joint 
      Lag 1 8.247 5.924 2.337 5.799 19.967 
 
[ 0.083] [ 0.205] [ 0.674] [ 0.215] [ 0.222] 
      Lag 2 2.041 2.475 8.356 5.284 19.836 
 
[ 0.728] [ 0.649] [ 0.079] [ 0.259] [ 0.228] 
      df 4 4 4 4 16 
                Numbers in [] are p-values 
 
 
(b) VAR (1)  
 
¨'20),1 ¨*29(;3 ¨*295(9 ¨$,' Joint 
      Lag 1 16.756 8.520 3.044 3.324 26.053 
 
[ 0.002] [ 0.074] [ 0.551] [ 0.505] [ 0.053] 
      df 4 4 4 4 16 
                Numbers in [] are p-values 
 
Figure B5.1 Distributions of the residuals 
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Table B5.2 Test for model mis-specification 
 
(a) Test for autocorrelation 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 7.187 0.970 
2 17.511 0.353 
3 18.047 0.321 
4 23.334 0.105 
 
 
 
(b) Test for normality 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 0.058 2 0.971 
2 1.021 2 0.600 
3 1.539 2 0.463 
4 0.373 2 0.830 
    Joint 2.991 8 0.935 
 
 
 
(c) Test for heteroscedasticity 
 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob. 
   102.454 160 0.999 
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Short-run estimates and hypotheses 
 
Table B5.3 Short-run estimates of reduced-form VAR 
 
¨'RPILQt ¨*RYH[St ¨*RYUHYt ¨$LGt 
 
    ¨'RPILQt-1 -0.539*** -0.383** -0.100* 0.005 
 
(0.134) (0.172) (0.058) (0.208) 
 
    ¨*RYH[St-1 0.100 0.008 0.037 0.203 
 
(0.091) (0.117) (0.040) (0.141) 
 
    ¨*RYUHYt-1 -0.236 0.394 -0.064 0.346 
 
(0.264) (0.340) (0.115) (0.410) 
 
    ¨$LGt-1 0.008 -0.032 -0.008 -0.058 
 
(0.076) (0.097) (0.033) (0.117) 
 
    Const -0.042 -0.010 -0.006 0.041 
 
(0.063) (0.081) (0.027) (0.098) 
 
    OUTL1974 -1.309*** -0.414 0.624*** -0.021 
 
(0.259) (0.334) (0.113) (0.403) 
 
    ELEC1991 0.357 2.733*** -0.018 0.593 
 
(0.281) (0.361) (0.123) (0.436) 
 
    AIDOUT1995 0.120 0.130 -0.103 3.195*** 
 
(0.297) (0.381) (0.129) (0.460) 
 
    OUTL2000 -0.139 0.449 -0.492*** 0.721* 
 
(0.258) (0.332) (0.113) (0.400) 
 
    R2 0.694 0.789 0.686 0.763 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
 
Structural identification of model 1 (VAR(1) in differences) 
 
Table B5.4 Residual correlation matrix 
. ¨'RPILQW ¨*RYH[SW ¨*RYUHYW ¨$LGW 
¨'RPILQW 1 0.367 0.129 -0.066 
¨*RYH[SW 0.367 1 0.067 -0.003 
¨*RYUHYW 0.129 0.067 1 0.004 
¨$LGW -0.066 -0.003 0.004 1 
       The critical value for the correlation coefficients is 34.0/2   Tcij , 
                             where T is the effective sample size (N-k). 
 
 266 
 
As long as identification is concerned, table B5.4 suggests that locating the positions 
of government expenditure and domestic finance relative to each other in the causal 
chain is what matters. This task is lessened in the present instance since a causal 
direction from domestic finance to government expenditure appears to be 
unreasonable. Rather, the government falls on domestic borrowing to pay for planned 
expenditure after all other sources of finance (such as aid and government revenue) 
have been exhausted. We therefore maintain the same causal chain derived for Ghana. 
Thus, the causal chain imposed is given as follows: 
 
¨*RYUHYĺ¨*RYH[Sĺ¨'RPILQĺ¨$LG 
 
Imposing this causal structure on the VAR estimation yields the results in table B5.5.  
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Table B5.5 Short-run estimate of structural VAR 
 
¨*RYUHYW 
 
¨*RYH[SW 
 
¨'RPILQW 
 
¨$LGW 
¨'RPILQW 
      
-0.118 
 
      
(0.365) 
¨*RYH[SW 
    
0.280* 
 
0.029 
 
    
(0.154) 
 
(0.282) 
¨*RYUHYW 
  
0.197 
 
0.241 
 
0.043 
 
  
(0.613) 
 
(0.453) 
 
(0.781) 
¨'RPILQW-1 -0.100* 
 
-0.363* 
 
-0.408*** 
 
-0.043 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.294) 
¨*RYH[SW-1 0.037 
 
0.077 
 
0.068 
 
0.211 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.157) 
¨*RYUHYW-1 -0.064 
 
0.406 
 
-0.331 
 
0.309 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.348) 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.468) 
¨$LGW-1 -0.006 
 
-0.031 
 
0.019 
 
-0.056 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.125) 
Const -0.006 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.038 
 
0.037 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.105) 
OUTL1974 0.624*** 
 
-0.537 
 
-1.343*** 
 
-0.190 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.512) 
 
(0.386) 
 
(0.824) 
ELEC1991 -0.018 
 
2.736*** 
 
-0.403 
 
0.557 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.500) 
 
(0.870) 
AIDOUT1995 -0.103 
 
0.151 
 
0.108 
 
3.209*** 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.394) 
 
(0.291) 
 
(0.500) 
OUTL2000 -0.492 
 
0.546 
 
-0.146 
 
0.713 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.453) 
 
(0.344) 
 
(0.592) 
R2 0.686 
 
0.789 
 
0.738 
 
0.764 
Normality 
       Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and 
* respectively. 
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Impulse responses 
Figure B5.2 Impulse responses to an aid shock of one standard deviation 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of main findings 
Government actions that exacerbate economic volatility, create disincentive for 
increasing development effort, and contribute to high debt levels may complicate 
macroeconomic management and slow down economic growth, and are therefore 
considered to be sub-optimal. The thesis addresses two of such actions. 
 
The first is that, even though theory suggests the contrary, government consumption 
(which is our fiscal policy variable) is pro-cyclical in developing countries. That is, 
government consumption increases when income is high and decreases when income 
is low. This practice clearly worsens economic volatility and growth for that matter. 
Even more, it is suggested theoretically (and indirectly supported by some empirical 
results) that income volatility may also cause fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical, creating a 
vicious cycle. Understanding the relationship between pro-cyclical government 
consumption and economic volatility is therefore an important first step towards 
breaking this cycle, especially when the focus is on rapid and sustainable growth. We 
address this issue for sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries where fiscal policy is most 
pro-cyclical and income is very volatile.  
 
Unlike existing studies, we overcome problems associated with model misspecification 
and spurious results by estimating the coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality within a 
stationary specification. Consistent with existing evidence, we find that government 
consumption is predominantly pro-cyclical in SSA. Our estimates however suggest 
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that existing studies may have under-estimated the absolute magnitude of the 
coefficients of fiscal policy cyclicality. We also find that pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy increases with income volatility in SSA. Unlike existing explanations that 
ascribe the latter to credit constraint in bad times and political pressure to spend in 
good times, our results suggest that it is the result of optimal solvency behaviour of 
governments facing imperfect risk sharing (associated with non-state contingent 
bonds) and uncertainty (associated with income volatility).  
 
The second sub-optimal fiscal policy addressed is that giving more aid to countries 
with larger budget deficits further induces larger deficits. This may worsen the already 
high debt levels and slow down economic growth even further. The explanation given 
in the incentive aid literature is that since aid disbursement is motivated by the 
UHFLSLHQW¶VQHHG Where is no incentive for the recipient government to avoid deficits, 
especially when the actions of the government cannot be easily monitored. The 
suggestion therefore is to condition aid disbursement on improved performance in 
order to create an incentive for exerting higher development effort. This however 
means that those who actually need more aid would receive less of it and economic 
fluctuations may be worsened. Therefore, further research to determine what 
constitutes an effective aid disbursement policy, in terms of ensuring that more aid is 
given to those who need it most while creating the incentive to avoid unnecessary 
deficits, is essential.  This requires an in-depth knowledge of the relationship between 
DLGDQGWKHUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VEHKDYLour. We address this for SSA by answering 
three secondary objectives. Given that the present study focuses mainly on the 
UHFLSLHQWV¶EXGJHWSHUIRUPDQFHDLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\UHIHUVPDLQO\WREXGJHWFRQGLWLRQV  
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In the first of the secondary objectives, we re-examine the existing evidence on the 
relationship between aid and the budget balance using more recent data. Our results 
show that, in line with past evidence, more aid is given to SSA recipients with larger 
budget deficits and aid induces larger budget deficits. However, an interesting finding 
is that whereas the response of aid inflows to the size of the budget deficit is 
comparable existing evidence suggests, the rate at which the budget deficit increases 
with aid inflows is less than half of what was observed in the past. This suggests that it 
may be possible to give more aid to countries with larger budget deficits without 
inducing larger deficits; investigating this constitutes the next secondary objective. 
 
By suggesting that aid conditionality ± or budget conditions in the present context ± 
should be implemented across countries, the Svensson aid incentive model assumes 
that differences in budget deficit across countries are entirely ascribable to differences 
in fiscal discipline. An implicit assumption then is that recipient countries have similar 
characteristics. This is a strong assumption because different countries have different 
tax capacities and ability to access credit from international financial markets, which is 
the main reason for aid donation. We therefore relax the assumption and show that 
there is a divergence between the determination of aid allocation across countries and 
the year-to-\HDU GLVEXUVHPHQW RI DLG WR D JLYHQ FRXQWU\ ODEHOOHG µEHWZHHQ-FRXQWU\¶
DQGµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶GLPHQVLRns of aid disbursement respectively). We also show that 
aid conditionality iVDµZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶phenomenon; aid induces lower (higher) budget 
deficits (budget balances) when µZLWKLQ-FRXQWU\¶DLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\LVLPSOHPHQWHG To 
arrive at this conclusion, we obtain coefficients of aid conditionality (which measure 
the extent of implementation) and find that aid induces smaller deficits as the 
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coefficient of conditionality increases. This suggests that giving more aid to countries 
with larger budget deficits is not the reason why aid induces larger budget deficits.  
 
Finally, we investigate the actions of aid donors and recipients that are responsible for 
the different aid-budget balance relationships across countries. To do so, we use an 
improved approach to estimating vector error correction model (VECM) that is new to 
this area of research. This aspect of the study uses Ghana and Zambia as case studies. 
Both countries were involved in some form of aid agreements over the study period. 
However, Zambia is known to have defaulted on agreements repeatedly whereas 
Ghana is known to be more successful in complying with conditional aid agreements. 
In effect, there is a positive (negative) correlation between aid inflows to Ghana and 
the budget balance (budget deficit) while the opposite is true for Zambia. We find that 
aid conditionality, with respect to reduced budget deficit, is more effective (in terms of 
inducing larger budget balances) when disbursements are conditioned directly on 
reduced budget deficit (and/or domestic borrowing) rather than its components. 
 
6.2 Policy implications of the findings 
Based on the existing credit constraint explanation, it is believed that fiscal policy in 
developing countries would be less pro-cyclical in volatile economies if international 
financial institutions facilitate the accessibility of such countries to credit in bad times. 
On the other hand, the political distortion argument suggests that the solution lies in 
improving fiscal institutions to prevent increased spending (associated with political 
pressures) in good times in order to save enough for bad times. Contrary to both 
suggestions, the policy implication of our main finding is that government 
consumption would be less pro-cyclical in volatile economies if governments have 
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access to state-contingent bonds. We do identify the need for improved economic 
stabilization policies in the first place, but given that efforts in that direction have 
either stalled or been inconsistent, alternative arrangements to curb the pro-cyclicality 
of fiscal policy are useful.  
 
Note that, by contrasting the credit constraint explanation for the effect of income 
volatility on the pro-cyclicality of government spending, we do not suggest that not 
being able to access credit in bad times is not an underlying reason why fiscal policy is 
pro-cyclicality. We only suggest that it does not explain the effect of income volatility 
on pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in SSA. In fact, we find that fiscal policy is more 
pro-cyclical in countries facing higher credit constraints. Also, by contrasting the 
political distortion explanation, we do not suggest that saving enough in good times to 
subsidize spending in bad times would not result in counter-cyclical pattern of fiscal 
spending. We only argue that the relationship between income volatility and the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy is not because of not saving enough in good times. In 
practice, due to pressing expenditure requirements combined with relatively limited 
resources, saving in good times in SSA is more about running lower deficits (rather 
than surpluses) in which case the precautionary role of savings implied by the political 
distortion argument is hardly realistic.  
 
Our findings also suggest that giving more aid to countries with larger budget deficits 
is not the reason why aid induces larger budget deficits; the major culprit is not 
implementing the year-to-year aid conditionality within a given recipient country.  It is 
encouraging to know that, unlike what existing knowledge implied, it is possible to 
maintain the deficit-induced aid disbursement across countries and yet implement aid 
conditionality within a given recipient country by way of conditioning year-to-year 
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disbursements on reduced deficits. It is therefore not imperative for performance-
motivated disbursement to deprive recipients with the most need of aid. As a matter of 
fact, the effectiveness of aid conditionality, when enforced, increases with the amount 
of aid. Therefore, as with the implementation of conditions, giving more aid to 
recipients who need it most is useful.  
 
Finally, the degree of enforcement of aid conditionality within a recipient country 
explains a large part of the variation in aid-fiscal behaviour across countries. When the 
focus is to reduce domestic borrowing and maintain sustainable debt levels, a more 
direct approach that conditions aid disbursement on domestic borrowing or the budget 
deficit is more effective than an indirect approach that conditions aid disbursement on 
other fiscal aggregates. As a concluding note, while we imply that aid conditionality 
works, we do not suggest that donors should be responsible for setting conditions as is 
often the case in practice. Action Aid International (UK), in their 2005 report (labelled 
µ$Q$JHQGD IRU0DNLQJ$LG:RUN¶ VXJJHVWHG WKHQHHG IRUFRQGLWLRQV WREHVHWE\
recipient governments; this is however beyond the present study. 
 
 
6.3 Limitations of study and suggestions for future research 
Given that the present study uses large sample estimators, including VECM and IV 
(systems) estimators, one limitation derives from the use of relatively small sample 
sizes. For instance, the longest sample sizes are 44 and 37 in the time series and cross-
section estimations respectively. Though these are not smaller than the usual sample 
sizes in studies on SSA countries, results are more reliable when large samples are 
used. Also because of limited data availability, the sample periods varied across 
countries in several instances; this may reduce the reliability of the cross-country and 
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panel results. It is therefore useful to re-evaluate the essays as more data becomes 
available.   
 
Another limitation, which relates to small sample size, is to do with uncontrolled 
regressors. In the VECM, for instance, only a limited number of endogenous variables 
are included in order not to deplete useful degrees of freedom. For instance, we do not 
decompose total government expenditure to its capital and current components because 
doing so would decrease the degrees of freedom significantly, considering the number 
of dummy variables included to induce Gaussian residuals and the relatively short time 
series for Ghana and Zambia. Similarly, as a result of small sample size, we do not 
specify instruments for GDP growth in the aid and budget balance equations. To 
minimise the effect of potential endogeneity bias, we use initial GDP instead. This 
may result in loss of useful information and could therefore be addressed in future 
studies.  
 
Some regressors were omitted because there was not enough data on them. For 
instance, the evidence given for the optimal solvency rationale ± that underlies the 
positive effect of income volatility on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy ± would be 
more complete if it is shown that the effect of income volatility increases with the 
dependability on non-state-contingent bonds. However, there is lack of comprehensive 
data on non-state-contingent bonds. Also, future studies on the aid-budget balance 
relationship can include debt to GDP ratio in the budget balance equation to account 
for the effect of credit constraint on the budget deficit. Otherwise, part of this effect 
may be captured by foreign aid, resulting in an underestimation of the extent to which 
aid induces budget deficits. We omit the debt to GDP variable for two reasons: firstly, 
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the series was too short for several countries in our sample and, secondly, to maintain 
comparability of our results with existing studies. 
 
The DAC measure of aid that we use overstates the actual amount in government 
expenditure. This is because much of the aid to the government is through projects that 
may not be included in government expenditure; for instance, if the government 
increases expenditure from its own resources by less as a result of aid projects. 
Moreover, a large proportion of the aid gets spent in the donor country on technical 
aspects. Future studies may use the measure of aid actually received by the 
government when more data becomes available.      
 
Finally, we make two suggestions for future research that are beyond the scope of the 
present thesis: the first is to address the incentive effect of aid on a composite measure 
of policy (comprising different types of policy indicators such as openness, inflation 
and the budget balance in Burnside and Dollar, 1997 and 2004). This is because, 
though suitable for our purpose, the budget balance as a measure of policy is too 
narrow to be generalized as the relationship between aid and policy as a whole. 
Secondly, to determine whether pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy is sub-optimal, as 
theory has it, future research should investigate the cost of debt default compared to 
the cost of income volatility in developing countries. 
 
In spite of the aforementioned limitations, this thesis provides a useful guide for policy 
makers who seek to address issues relating to pro-cyclical government consumption 
and the increases in the budget deficit associated with aid inflows. It also serves as a 
guide for future research in this area of study.   
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